Politics - Texas v. Johnson, the Supreme

Politics - Texas v. Johnson, the Supreme Court case about Flag Burning The phrase "Symbolic expression" is usually used to explain expressions that are mixed with elements of behavior. Symbolic expression (or expressive behavior) can be protected by the First Amendment, according to The Supreme Court that has made it clear in a series of cases. Many of these cases have been highly controversial, but none has probably been so, more than Texas v.

Johnson (1990) overturning the conviction of a man who expressed his utter displeasure with United States policies by burning an American flag. During the Dallas Republican National Convention in 1984, Dallas Texas, respondent Gregory Johnson took part in a political manifestation to protest against certain Dallas-based corporations and the policies of administration of Ronald Reagan. The situation tensed when Gregory Johnson burned an American flag while protesters chanted after a march through streets of the city.

Although none of the people present at the scene were neither injured physically nor threatened with injury, yet the flag burning seriously offended most of the witnesses. The Conviction On this act, Gregory Johnson was convicted of violation of a respected object in defiance of a Texas statute. The State Court of Appeals affirmed the convicting.

Conversely, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the convicting and held that the State could not punish Gregory Johnson for burning the flag, in consistence with the First Amendment, in the then prevalent circumstances. The court initially found the burning of the flag as an indicative demeanor of Gregory Johnson protected by the First Amendment, and then concluded that the flag desecration could not be criminally sanctioned by the State with the purpose of preserving the flag as a sign of national unanimity.

The court also upheld that the statute did not meet the objective of preventing infringements of the peace of the State. They validated this with the reason that it was not drawn barely enough to include only those burnings of the flags whose outcome would probably be a serious disturbance, and as the burning of the flag did not threaten such a reaction in this case. Additionally, it emphasized that another Texas statute proscribed violation of the peace and could be used to stop disturbances without penalizing the flag defilement.

The Court's Determinants The Court held the conviction for flag defilement of Gregory Johnson inconsistent with the First Amendment. Pp. 402-420. Expressive Texas had not emphasized any interest that was unrelated to the control of expression in support of conviction of Gregory Johnson. The State consequently had to permit application of the test set forth in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367.

According to this, an important governmental benefit in regulating non-speech could justify secondary limitations on First Amendment freedoms when speech and non-speech elements are combined in the same course of conduct. An interest in preventing breaches of the peace is not implicated on this record. Expression may not be prohibited [491 U.S.

397, 398] on the grounds that an audience taking serious affront to the expression may disturb the serenity, since the government cannot assume every expression of a provoking idea to incite a riot, but has to look at the actual situation that surrounded the expression. The dissatisfactory expression of Gregory Johnson with the policies of the Federal Government did not fall within the category of "hostile words" too, that are probable to be seen as a direct personal insult or a provocation to barter fisticuffs.

This holding of the Court did not prohibit a State from preventing "imminent lawless action" and, as a matter of fact, Texas has a law that specially prohibits breaches of the peace. Since the interest of Texas in preserving the flag - as a sign of nationhood and national unity - is related to expression in this case, it falls outside the O'Brien test. Pp. 406-410.

Circumstantial The State accepted that under the circumstances, the burning of the flag by Gregory Johnson comprised expressive conduct, which allowed him to invoke the First Amendment. Taking place as it did - right at the conclusion of a demonstration happening together with the Republican National Convention - the expressive, explicitly political nature of the conduct was intentional as well as overwhelmingly apparent. Pp. 402-406. Aim The conviction of Gregory Johnson was not justified by the latter interest.

The restriction on political expression of Gregory Johnson was content based, as the statute of the State was not focused to protect the physical integrity of the flag in all conditions, but rather was designed to protect it from intentional and known abuse that could cause serious offense to others. The act was consequently subject to "the most exacting scrutiny." Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312.

Limitations Even if the United States Flag is involved, the government cannot prohibit the verbal or nonverbal expression of an idea just on the basis of the fact that the society finds the idea offensive or disagreeable. Additionally by elimination of expressive conduct relating to the flag, a State may not foster its own view of the flag due to the reason that the government may not allow chosen symbols to be used for the communication of a limited set of messages.

Furthermore, the Court did not make an exception to these principles safeguarded by the First Amendment for the American flag alone. Pp. 410-422. Conclusion Finally, the Court addressed the highly emotional issue of flag burning by Gregory Johnson in Texas v. Johnson, and reverted the conviction of Gregory Johnson for burning the American flag during the Republican National Convention in Dallas, Texas (1984).

The Court concluded the flag for being a burning that was "speech." It determined that the flag defilement statute was aimed at the communicative impact delivered by the message of Gregory Johnson. Nevertheless, the Court noted that laws of neutral speech, like the.