Pros and Cons of Drone Use in the Global War on Terrorism

Abstract
Although unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) or more commonly, drones, have been used by the military since World War II, the United States began to use drones in earnest following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 in the prosecution of the global war on terror. Today, drones are used for aerial surveillance of combatants, of course, but they can also, purportedly, project military might far into the battlefield without exposing friends force to danger. While military drones therefore appear to be a perfect weapon for waging war against non-state actors that have no qualms about inflicting civilian casualties, their use has actually backfired and a growing number of critics argue that their continued use is only exacerbating already heated tensions in the world’s hot spots. Moreover, military drones are expensive weapons and critics also charge that they are a waste of taxpayer resources that are failing to achieve the desired “bang for the buck.” The purpose of this paper is to provide a review of the relevant literature concerning the effectiveness of using drones for military purposes to demonstrate that these weapons are radicalizing large portions of the Islamic world against Western interests in general and those of the United States in particular. Finally, a summary of the research and important findings concerning the continued use of military drones by the United States are presented in the conclusion.
Are Drones Ultimately Having a Positive or Negative Effect on Winning the Global War on Terror?
Throughout history, nations have constantly searched for the best weapons available to defend their interests and home and abroad, and this quest continues today. When they were first introduced around 150 years ago, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs or more commonly, “drones”) appeared to represent the pinnacle of weapons technologies. After all, here was a powerful weapon that could strike at the heart of enemy territories without risking friendly human lives in the process. Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, though, the use of drones became virtually synonymous with the global war on terror by the West and the United States continues to rely on these weapons to fight terrorism around the world. Although the U.S. has enjoyed some military successes with drones since 9/11, many critics argue that the collateral damage that is caused by these devices only serves to further radicalize Islamic populations. The purpose of this paper is to provide a review of the relevant literature to demonstrate that the use of drones by the United States and its allies has had a primarily negative effect on winning the global war on terror. Following this review, a summary of the research and important findings concerning the actual effects of drone usage by the United States on the global war on terror are presented in the conclusion.
Review and Discussion
At first blush, drones appear to represent the pinnacle in modern warfare (Sadat, 2012). These unmanned aircraft vary in size from model airplanes to full-sized Cessna aircraft, and some more recent models can even operate underwater. In sharp contrast to the smaller, camera-equipped drone models that are favored by many private citizens, the drones that are used for military applications are aptly named with a corresponding price tag to match. In this regard, Dalziel (2019) reports that, “As may be inferred from their names, the Predator, Reaper, Fire Scout and Global Hawk are some of the models equipped with Hellfire missiles capable of reaching targets from up to 65,000 feet, with a comparably low price tag (the smallest costing approximately US$4 million)” (Dalziel, 2019, p. 3).
Although drones differ in size, function and capabilities, they share the common characteristic of projecting military might without jeopardizing friendly human lives, or so the argument goes (Yolcu, 2019). In reality, though, critics of drone use by the U.S. military and intelligence agencies maintain that these practices only serve to heighten any existing local and regional tensions and further radicalize Moslem populations, especially those that may have been politically moderate prior to being attacked from above by unseen weapons, typically without any type of warning.
Likewise, similar to the use of mustard in World War I before it was banned seemed like a great idea until the wind changed direction and killed the troops that deployed it, and much the same thing has taken place as terrorist groups have begun using drones of their own for attacks against the United States and its allies abroad. Nevertheless, the use of military drones by the United States has increased significantly since they were first used for reconnaissance during the Vietnam War (Dalziel, 2019). The main catalyst for the rapid escalation in the use of drones by the United States since that time were the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, but even these earlier uses attracted a significant amount of criticism. For example, according to Dalziel (2019), “Following the 9/11 attacks, the Bush administration enlisted armed drones in counter-terrorist operations -- a usage that has proved controversial” (p. 4). Based on the best recommendations from American military leaders, President Barack Obama also authorized the continued use of drones following his accession to the executive office and President Trump has likewise continued this authorization to date (Sterio, 2018).
As the research that follows below clearly indicates, though, “controversial” is putting it mildly, especially given the actual number of civilian casualties that have been caused by U.S. military drones. In fact, researchers conclude that there have been fewer than 70 total civilian deaths that have been caused by U.S. military drones since 2008 compared to 2,160 Islamic belligerents (Abbott & Ahmed, 2013). Given the severe backlash that has resulted from America’s use of drones, it remains unclear whether these limited results justify their continued deployment against Islamic militants. Moreover, while fewer than 70 civilian deaths may appear to be a fairly innocuous number, each of these lives held meaning and the families and friends of these individuals did not view their deaths as insignificant. More importantly, any casualty that even appears to resemble an Islamic terrorist is counted as such regardless of whether they were innocent civilians or not (Coyne & Hall, 2016).
The incalculable costs of the innocent human lives that have been lost to drone strikes over the years call into question the fundamental rationale in support of their initial and continued use. While U.S. military tacticians can perhaps be forgiven for their original lack of complete understanding concerning the potential blowback from drone usage against Islamic militants since these weapons were still novel and untested. The results to date, however, clearly indicate that the U.S. is not only failing to learn from its mistakes, it still does not receive enough “bang from the buck” with drones since they are expensive and are actually creating more terrorists than they are eliminating (Terrill, 2019). For instance, according to Dalziel (2019), “To fight terror the United States has employed terror in the form of drone strikes, a strategy which has not defeated al-Qaeda, which responds with a mere shuffle of human resources [and] the War on Terror persists” (p. 3).
Just as one individual’s terrorist is another’s freedom fighter, the characterization of military drones as weapons of terror changes the calculus in important ways. If military drones are, as the U.S. and like-minded proponents charge, legitimate weapons of war that are specifically designed to minimize collateral civilian casualties, then their use should be accepted and even readily embraced and approved by the international community. In fact, taken to the extreme, the use of drones should even be accepted by those who are being targeted since these weapons intended to limit the total number of casualties they suffer from drone attacks to combatants, even if they fail to achieve that standard all of the time.
This viewpoint, of course, is not shared by the people on the receiving end of drone strikes irrespective of how well they have been aimed and guided to their targets. Although this emotionally charged reaction by people in Arab nations that have been the target of U.S. drones may not be completely understandable to many Americans who are already worried about the climate, an ongoing global pandemic and whether they will have somewhere to live and anything to eat tomorrow. Nonetheless, the citizens of targeted countries are likewise enduring these same challenges combined with the potential of being murdered by a silent killer from above. It is little wonder that critics of drone use by the United States cite the increasingly hostile reactions that inevitably follow strikes in foreign countries as a good reason to end the program. Nevertheless, the U.S. government has not advanced any indication of its intention to stop using drones for the foreseeable future despite demands from the leaders of targeted nations to do so (Ahmed, 2012). For example, following a drone strike in Pakistan in November 2011 that left 24 soldiers dead, Pakistani lawmakers issued a demand for the United States to “review its footprints in Pakistan [which] means the cessation of drone strikes inside Pakistan” (Ahmed, 2012, p. 37).
Furthermore, even many ardent hawks oppose the use of drones because they are not achieving their intended outcomes, all the while making things worse for troops on the grounds and international peacemakers. In this regard, Dalzeil (2019) concludes that, “Those who oppose the strikes consider the tactic terrorism -- the incitement of fear for political ends. They [also] argue that terror begets terror; the strikes motivate others to undertake acts of retaliatory terrorism against the United States and its supporters” (p. 4). The proponents of drone strikes, of course, counter that these weapons are being used for legitimate military applications rather than political purposes, but most observers realize that the two motivating factors go hand in hand in fighting the global war on terror.
As noted above, President Trump has followed the lead of his immediate predecessors by continuing the authorization of drone use by the United States and media reports indicate that he has even relaxed some of the former rules that were in place under the Obama administration concerning their deployment in the field (Sterio, 2018). This longstanding policy on the part of the United States to use drones when and where it wants without any discernible accountability may seem baffling to neutral observers that fail to understand how creating more ill will in regions of the world that already hate America is going to accomplish anything positive, but it is the reality of the ongoing war on terrorism. As Sterio (2018) emphasizes:
Drones have been used under all three presidents not only in traditional arenas of war, such as Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya, but also against terrorism suspects found in countries such as Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen without any declaration of armed conflict. In fact, in the latter set of countries, drones have been used in counterterrorism operations and operated through a covert program run by the Central Intelligence Agency. (p. 36)
Absent a formal declaration of armed conflict on the part of the United States, many critics claim that the use of drones not only violates a wide array of international laws, it also violates the sovereignty of any country that happens to have a few terrorist suspects living there. The reality of the situation that is facing the United States is that the designation of non-state actors as terrorist suspects always involves an actual state whether such state provides overt support or it is actively seeking to eliminate their presence from their lands. In other words, it is not possible to use military drones against foreign terrorist suspects without violating the sovereignty of other countries unless the U.S. has the permission of foreign leaders to do so (Terrill, 2013).
Not surprisingly, such permission is rare and even when it is offered, the foreign leaders that make these offers are reluctant to reveal their countenance of drone strikes since they likewise fear backlash from the local populace (Terrill, 2013). This was the case with the former Yemeni president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, whose time in office ended in early 2012. During his tenure, President Saleh consistently denied that the Yemeni government had authorized the U.S. to use drones over its territories or that he even knew about the strikes. These denials, though, flew in the face of reality since a number of major drone attacks occurred during his presidency and the Yemeni people were skeptical about his claims that he had no prior knowledge. Indeed, the Yemeni president’s cover story eventually unraveled under questioning by reporters from CNN and he conceded that these strikes were officially authorized prior to their conduct (Terrill, 2013).
Although such military applications have been the source of severe backlash, the use of drones by the U.S. intelligence community has been a special point of contention by critics since these agencies lack even the modest oversight that is applied to military operations and the potential for drone strikes based on faulty information is always present (Coyne & Hall, 2016). In addition, by operating in a clandestine fashion, critics caution that American operatives may even use drones against domestic targets in the United States if current trends continue (Sterio, 2018).
In sum, the use of military drones by the United States has raised a number of important and timely questions, including their potential violation of state sovereignty and international laws, the newly emerging debate over using robotics in warfare, the potential for collateral damage, and the profound lack of transparency that is in place with respect to the U.S. government’s unfettered use of drones (Rosenthal & Schulman, 2019)
Conclusion
The research showed that drones have been used by the military for more than 70 years for a wide range of applications, but most especially surveillance and as weapons delivery platforms. Although the model drones that are favored by civilian hobbyists carry their own respective risks for aviation and privacy invasion, the use of drones by the military is another matter entirely. Military drones are not only incredibly fast, they are potentially deadly to anyone in the proximity whether they are accurately delivered or not. In the final analysis, it is reasonable to conclude that if people poke a hungry tiger with a sharp stick long enough, they will regret it and this has also been the case with the use of drones by the United States in its prosecution of the global war on terror.
References
Abbott, S. & Ahmed, M. (2013, October 31). Pakistan says 3% of drone deaths civilians. USA Today. Retrieved from https://cm.usatoday.com.
Ahmed, I. (2012, March 20). What does Pakistan want from US? An apology, more money, no drones. The Christian Science Monitor, 19.
Coyne, C. J. & Hall, A. R. (2018, Summer). The drone paradox: Fighting terrorism with mechanized terror. Independent Review, 23(1), 51-55.
Dalziel, N. (2014, May-June). Drone strikes: Ethics and strategy. New Zealand International Review, 39(3), 2-5.
Rosenthal, D. J. & Schulman, L. D. (2019, August 10). Trump’s secret war on terror: Drone strikes continue and spread—away from public scrutiny or congressional oversight. The Atlantic. Retrieved from https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/08/ trump-war-terror-drones/567218/.
Sadat, L. N. (2012, Fall). America's drone wars. Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, 45(1-2), 215-222.
Sterio, M. (2018, Summer). Lethal use of drones: When the executive is the judge, jury, and executioner. Independent Review, 23(1), 35-39.
Terrill, W. A. (2013, Winter-Spring). Drones over Yemen: Weighing military benefits and political costs. Parameters, 42, 17-21.
Yolcu, F. H. (2019, Winter). We kill because we can: From soldiering to assassination in the drone age. Insight Turkey, 21(1), 225-234.