Relativity of Moral Truth

Relativity of Moral Truth

The viewpoints on moral truth are varied within circles of philosophic thought. Moral ethics are, for the most part, relative, though on what grounds of relative truth is a subject of much discussion. Three positions will be discussed in this paper: the topic of the Divine Command Theory, Ruth Benedict's beliefs in cultural relativism, and Thomas Nagel's morality of rational consistency. Of the three, Nagel's relative moral philosophy outweighs the philosophies of the former positions; Nagel further examines the prospect of human nature as an individual, as opposed to the Divine Command Theory's reliance on metaphysical beliefs and Benedict's cultural thought with respects to a dubious collective "culture."

Divine Command Theory presupposes that ethical and moral truths have been brought upon by the demand of God. This belief has dated as far back as Socrates and Euthyphro in Ancient Greek philosophy, and is further strengthened by Descartes' metaphysical argument of God existence as the absolute sovereign. It then becomes the question on morals being good, because God commands that there be morals. The problem herein becomes the peoples' religious backgrounds. Divine Command Theory is "dependent upon God" (Austin, 2006), and that "moral obligation consists in obedience to God's commands" (Austin, 2006). Furthermore, suppose one argues against Descartes' proof of God's existence; then the non-existence of God would negate all form of morality that argues for this particular premise. It then follows that "if God is dead, everything is permitted" (Blackburn, 2005).

This leads to the discussion of a cultural relativism with regards to moral truth. Benedict's belief in cultural relativism focuses on the fact that different cultures have a set of their own moral codes, understood only through study of said community. Cultural relativism, as simply defined, is the "differences between cultures in their moral views and standards" (Li, 2007). This in itself is somewhat limited to the understanding of the definition of "culture" and "community." How does one differentiate between cultures without being too limited or too liberal in the definitions thereof? Are traditional beliefs, then, the background of cultural morality? What of the changing traditions of modern cultures? "Individual members of the same tradition may have very different experiences, which can lead them to different moral judgments or motivations to act" (Li, 2007).

A further discussion to Li's arguments against cultural relativism leads up to that of Nagel's relative moral position. Nagel owes his philosophy on moral truths to that of the "paradoxicality of the human condition" (Mulhall, 2007). That is, an individual's moral values are subject to that individual's objective outlook on the decisions made. It coincides with his puzzlement over the "randomness" (Mulhall, 2007) of the human moral ethics, and more than explains the arguments over an individual's breaking from his or her moral and religious leanings -- though Nagel does not dismiss either position from being a variable of moral decision. "An action may have multiple causes or diverse sources of impetus" (Li, 2007), which can or cannot be explained through cultural relativism and/or divine command theory.