Sharp writes that the statements of President Wilson in the 1918 speeches were the bases of the peace settlement, which was eventually made. (Sharp, 2006, paraphrased) The primary decision making body of the gathering in Paris is reported by Sharp to have been the 'Council of Ten' which was comprised by the French, Italian and Great Britain prime ministers and the U.S. president including the respective ministers of foreign affairs and two delegates from Japan. Sharp reports that the 'Council of Four' including Lloyd George, Clemenceau, Wilson and Vittorio Orlando formed the critical decision making body. It is reported that it took the promises of Lloyd George and Wilson to assure the full support of the British and U.S. forces were Germany to attack France again to convince Clemenceau to demonstrate more flexibility. A decision was made to postpone addressing the issue of Germany making reparations. (Sharp, 2006, paraphrased)

Orlando is reported to have angrily left the conference in April although he returned in May. The new government of Germany is reported to have had little choice about signing the treaty because failure to sign would result in an invasion. The primary targets of 'The Economic Consequences of the Peace' are reported to have been Wilson, Lloyd George and Clemenceau reported to have been "caricatured as the wily Welsh wizard, the cynical defender of France and the failed American Philosopher-king." ((Sharp, 2006, p.267)

Sharp reports that it was the peacemaker's responsibility to determine the cause of the war and that, which would ensure prevention of conflict in the future. Wilson held that multinational empires have effective "denied their subjects proper expression of their cultural and political rights and an international system that did not allow the good sense of informed and rational public opinion to curtail the aggressive behavior of autocratic states." (Sharp, 2006, p.268)Wilson held that the lacking of means of smaller nations to back of their claim of self-determination and...

Wilson conceptualized nationality as civic instead of ethnic since in his opinion that someone's birth did not bear upon the individuals allegiance to state and that individuals have the right to self-determination of their nationality. (Sharp, 2006, paraphrased)
Emerging from the peace conference was a document that was primarily "an Anglo-American document, relying on delay and the force of world opinion to deter preemptive aggressive attacks." (Sharp, 2006,p.268) Sharp reports that questions remain about the ability of the document to ensure that preemption would not occur the outcome is that the League fell and Italy was Nazi Germany's Ally. Sharp concludes by stating "The League did undertake good work in minority protection, disease control, and in hindering trades in drugs and women for prostitution. It oversaw the government of the Saar and Danzig and had responsibilities for former colonial territories. It did make a difference in disputes involving small powers but, in its main mission, to transform the way in which international relations were conducted and to prevent another major war, it failed." (2006, p.271)

Both Sharp and Macmillan acknowledge the huge challenges faced by the peacemakers that met in Paris to form the Versailles Treaty and both of the authors that the outcome could have been much worse or met greater failure. The challenges were great and the organization of the forum was almost nonexistent since as noted by Sharp the participants had not been prepared for peacemaking as it had in reality come much sooner than they had anticipated.

References

Alan Sharp,(2006) Peacemaking after World War I, in G. Martel (ed.), Companion to Europe 1900-1945, Blackwell, Oxford, 2006, pp. 261-75.

David a. Andelman, a Shattered Peace: Versailles and the Price We Pay Today, New Jersey, John Wiley and Sons, 2008, pp. 1-3, 4, 6, 9, 10-11, 13-14.

Margaret Macmillan, (2005) Making War, Making…