Renault-Nissan Partnership Underwent a Significant

Renault-Nissan partnership underwent a significant maturation process over the last decade. Under Ghosn's leadership, the company stabilized, underwent a culture shift, then expanded sales and profits. The partnership began to fall short of its objectives in 2006, but at that point was still outperforming the industry peers. The company's response was to continue to push forward with its plans.

The vision of the Renault-Nissan Alliance is to become one of the top three automakers in terms of technology, quality and profitability (Leslie, p.2). As of 2008, the company felt that there were several means by which it could achieve this end. The firm had made investments in electric car production in India and Morocco (Leslie, p.2). In the face sales declines in mature markets, Renault-Nissan had placed added emphasis on the BRIC countries (Leslie, p.1) through joint ventures with firms such as Mahindra, AvtoVAZ and Dongfeng (Leslie, p.2).

Today, however, there are signs that the bloom is coming off the rose somewhat. The company is now forecasting its first loss. This is being attributed to a strong yen and a sales slump driven by the global recession (Kim & Massy-Beresford, 2009). This appears to indicate that the strength of the partnership throughout the past decade has begun to fade. However, this is not necessarily the case.

If we compare the performance of the firm today against the first disappointing year of the Alliance in 2006, we can see some similar trends. The first is that Nissan in 2006 failed to meet its targets and at the time unfavorable currency exchange was in part to blame. This has occurred again. It is probably unreasonable to take too unfavorable a view of the company's performance in light of their inability to manage translational risk as translational risk is typically very difficult to hedge. Accounting profit for a multinational entity may be used for goal-setting purposes, but its true value should be taken with a grain of salt in light of the fact that some of the losses are only translational and not transactional. It could also be argued, however, that Nissan has done a poor job of hedging its exposure, if those profits are being repatriated to Japan and the firm is losing money as a result of that exposure.

The other trend that we see is that sales slumps have hurt performance for the Renault-Nissan Alliance. The present financial crisis, in its infancy in the middle of 2008, has resulted in substantial sales reductions for all automotive companies. It is unreasonable to think that Renault-Nissan would be insulated from such systemic risk. A better measure of the effectiveness of the partnership would be with respect to firm-specific performance.

With respect to this financial performance, Renault-Nissan has not fared badly. Despite their recent focus on the BRIC countries, the company's largest markets are still North America and Western Europe (Lundgren, et.al.). In 2008, the Alliance had as major strategic thrusts to build out capacity in India and Morocco, plans that have now been put on hold (Kim & Massy-Beresford, 2009). However, this along is not evidence of the partnership failing. Rather, it is a prudent move, given the economic downturn. The two companies are in a position where they need to use some of their capital to finance ongoing operations, particularly at Nissan where they are about to begin losing money. Thus, it is reasonable to postpone investment projects until the economy begins to turn around.

The partnership may have hit a rough patch, but there is no evidence to support the view that its value has run its course. Indeed, the companies' willingness to adjust strategy to meet the current economic conditions is evidence of the partnership's strength, rather than weakness. Further evidence of the strength is that while the Big Three U.S. firms are all struggling for survival and the major Japanese firms are beginning to suffer as well, both Renault and Nissan are merely experiencing a setback in their plans.

Therefore, I am optimistic about the future of the Renault-Nissan Alliance. There are several factors contributing to this optimism. The first is that both firms are in solid financial position. While many other of the world's leading automakers struggled even through the economic expansion of the mid-2000s, Renault-Nissan was able to ride that wave to improve margins, sales and profits.

Another reason for optimism is that the company enjoys greater geographic diversification than many of the other major automakers. Today's global auto giants arose in markets with rapid diffusion of the automobile. Tomorrow's global auto giants will also arise in similar markets. The Alliance has a strong presence in the world's largest growth markets, with manufacturing capabilities in India, Brazil, China, Russia, Egypt, Southeast Asia, Mexico and Iran (Lundgren, et.al). The company is focused on low-cost vehicles that appeal to the consumers in those markets. This strategy has strong long-term growth potential.

Further optimism derives from their long-term strategic planning. While U.S. automakers are fighting for their very existence, struggling from one government bailout to another, the Alliance is forming joint ventures in China to product electric cars (Agence France-Press, 2009). Other automakers have become fixated on the short-term, while the Alliance has been building a long-term strategy based on technological leadership on electric cars (The Economist, 2008).

The goals of the Alliance are to be an industry leader on quality, technology and profitability. While they have suffered in terms of profitability in the past year, this is more due to systemic factors than any failure on the part of Alliance leadership. Indeed, their strong geographic diversification has insulated them to some degree from the worse of the downturn. The impending losses at Nissan and reduced profits at Renault due not reflect firm-specific risks and as such there is no indication that current performance is poor.

That the Alliance has continued to engage in long-term planning and deal-making, while judiciously postponing some of its most ambitious projects until the turnaround, demonstrates management strength and corporate vision. The firm's focus on electric cars is in line with their strategic objectives, as is their focus on the BRIC markets as the key drivers of revenue and profit. For these reasons, I am optimistic about the future performance of the Renault-Nissan Alliance.

Coloplast

Coloplast is the world's #2 producer of ostomy bags, and the #1 in Europe. Ostomy products represent 45% of the firm's sales; continence products 29% and wound/skin care 19%. The company markets its products through three channels -- retail/wholesale, direct to consumer and through hospitals/institutions (Brown, et al.). The company expanded production into Hungary in 2001 in order to maintain growth potential that would allow it to meet its aggressive long-term sales goals for 2012.

There are several risks facing Coloplast, however. The largest risk at present is that the governments of Europe are driving down reimbursements. This in turn reduces revenues for medical supply companies such as Coloplast. The main driver of prices for Coloplast is government regulation. Within Europe (80% of Coloplast's sales) individual national governments set reimbursement rates, which are a key determinant in product price. This means that Coloplast has little control over the prices it receives for its products (Brown, et al.).

There are several ways to mitigate this risk. Lobbying efforts may be utilized, but are unlikely to meet with success for a couple of reasons. One is that these efforts must be directed at each individual government, so the company would realistically be able to only deal with the largest governments. The other reason is that the impetus for the changes to reimbursement rates is the rising cost of health care. This in turn is the result of demographic shifts.

Thus, the price drivers are essentially out of Coloplast's control. Therefore, the company can mitigate the risks that result by recognizing the shift in the operating environment and altering its strategy accordingly. The demographic shift gives Coloplast the potential for increasing volume, given 84% growth projected in Europe (Nielsen et al., p.4). Combined with shrinking margins, Coloplast must improve volumes significantly, in order to maintain or improve profit levels. This will require further investment in overseas production. By May 2004, Hungary has joined the EU and is going to be forced to increase its corporate tax rates. Thus, Coloplast may need to look outside of the EU to find production capacity for continued expansion.

Each of the major risks highlighted reflects downward pressure on prices. Health care reforms in all of Coloplast's key markets are putting downward price pressure on Coloplast's products. These risk factors are both systemic and long-term in nature. As a result, Coloplast's solution should also focus on addressing these issues on a long-term basis.

Given that cost reduction is going to be required in order to maintain margins, Coloplast not only needs to consider offshoring more of its production and even development functions, but needs to improve its production processes on an organization-wide basis. At present, Coloplast has little coordination between its different facilities. Best practices are neither recorded nor shared among plants. Innovations in product are not transmitted throughout the organization. This means that there are production synergies between the different Coloplast facilities that are not presently exploited.

The company can mitigate the impact of health care reform therefore by improving its product processes. Their industry is beginning to shift from cash cow status to one characterized by tight margins and high volumes. Coloplast must become a low-cost producer, to use Michael Porter's terminology (Porter, 1980). This is going to force Coloplast to shift its core competencies.

The current core competencies for Coloplast are its experience and knowledge of its own products, its customer-focused product innovation, its value-added services and its extensive knowledge of the health-care systems in which it operates (Brown, et al.). These competencies are more congruent with an organization that is engaged in a differentiation strategy. This was an allowable mindset when Coloplast was able to leverage its knowledge of Europe's health care markets to gain healthy margins for its products. Now that those margins are under threat, the company must undergo a strategic shift. This means becoming exceptionally good at mass production.

To do this, the company needs to focus immediately on making improvements to its internal communications and enculturation processes. The firm right now is more of a collective of facilities than it is a cohesive unit working towards a unified goal. They have got away with this because of their dominant position in relatively protected markets. However, the new realities of the medical supply industry demand that they improve internally. This step is necessary simply to maintain their successful position in Europe, much less make the move to becoming a global firm.

Coloplast needs to redefine itself, first and foremost. The changes in the industry must be understood by management and communicated throughout the organization. Essentially, Coloplast is facing challenges and risk factors on a scope that the company has really not seen before. Thus, they must ensure that stakeholders throughout the organization understand the current situation, how it has changed, and how those changes are going to affect Coloplast going forward. The Hungarian experience has been positive for the company, but the risks the face are going to demand that they repeat this experience in order to enjoy continued success.

Coloplast is going to have to open up more markets. The European market is relatively saturated, with the strong growth prospects deriving strictly from the aging population. The rest of the world, however, is generally less saturated. Growth prospects outside of Europe are much stronger, at 197% by 2012 compared to 84% inside Europe (Nielsen, p.4). Although Coloplast has a strong market position mainly in Europe, the growth potential outside of Europe will allow Coloplast to do two things. First, it will allow the company to increase sales volumes to such a degree as to achieve its 2012 objective. Second, it will allow them to build out capacity in non-EU markets. A presence in Mexico, India or China would give them low production costs and access to large markets. Many markets are beginning to see upgrades to the health care systems. In the case of the U.S., Coloplast could potentially leverage the distribution network it already has as a result of its purchase of Sterling.

Coloplast's main risk factors all boil down to the high level of government regulation in their industry. The company has little control over the regulation itself, but it does have control over its response. Changing demographic factors are combining with the increased regulation and increased cost pressures to mark a dramatic shift in the business environment. The best way for Coloplast to mitigate these risks is to make the shift in its business model to match the changing environment. This means developing better internal communications, establishing a unified corporate culture, outlining not only the company's objectives for the future but how those objectives will be achieved, and implementing better coordination of production processes. This will allow them to make the shift to being a low-cost, high volume, global producer.

Novartis

Novartis is the #3 pharmaceutical company in the world (Homes, et al.). It has leveraged strengths in cardiovascular and hematology to enjoy considerable success. In recent years, however, Novartis has struggled somewhat. The company has significant exposure to patent expiry, which weighed on earnings in 2008. Novartis is also exposed to the U.S. dollar, which weighed on 2009 sales. The company's earnings rebounded strongly despite the exchange rate exposure (Greil, 2009). This contrasts with the underwhelming performance of its main competitors, Glaxo and Pfizer (Homes, et al.)

As with most pharmaceutical companies, Novartis engages extensively in strategic alliances. This despite the fact that main driver of value in the pharmaceutical industry is intellectual property. There are several benefits, however, to strategic alliances in this industry. Among them are cost sharing, risk mitigation, greater access to top research talent, technology acquisition, new market access and new product development (Bowen & Purrington, p. 8). Novartis is engaged in around 400 strategic alliances, approximately 100 with industry partners and the remaining 300 with academic institutions.

For the most part, strategic alliances in the pharmaceutical industry are with respect to developing new products, although there have been instances where groups came together for other reasons, such as to improve production processes (Bowen & Purrington, p.10). Although there are general trends with respect to the risks and rewards of strategic alliances, it should be noted that each alliance is unique. The parties establish the terms, costs and objectives of the alliance and these are typically formalized in contract (Brockstedt & Carr, 2005).

The cost of developing new drugs is substantial. It is a research and technology driven business, where talent and equipment are expensive. Further, the time frame to bring a new product to market is measured in years. Thus, the cost of developing any one product is substantial. Thus, it is often beneficial to split the costs, and thereby the risks, with other firms.

In some cases, it is the access to talent that drives the formation of a strategic alliance. This is often the case in academic partnerships. Novartis has the money, while universities often have top talent in need of money. The strategic alliance in this case is a pragmatic matter where the two parties bring different resources to the alliance. According to Novartis executives, "most of the science we build on and translate into medicine is generated at universities" (Bowen & Purrington, p. 9).

Alliances with corporations often take a similar shape. Novartis' largest such alliance, for example, essentially consists of Novartis financing the research of another firm, and then entering into a commercialization arrangement. Novartis gains access to technology and research talent; the other firm gains the capital needed to conduct its research and a means by which to bring the finished product to market.

Each strategic alliance must be carefully weighed with respect to costs and benefits. One potential cost is that the research may not yield a marketable product. For the company that is putting up the money (as Novartis generally does), this will result in a loss of that money. The other company, having received the money, faces a lower cost if the product does not reach market. Another cost for Novartis is that while it may retain marketing rights to a product it may not own the intellectual property outright. The deal must be carefully structured, therefore, to protect each firm's interest with respect to IP.

There are many benefits to such alliances, however. The partners are able to leverage their respective strengths in order to complete an expensive, time-consuming project. If either partner when alone, they may not have been able to pursue the project. The use of partnerships also has the benefit of giving firms access to more projects. Not every project reaches market, so it is important for pharmaceutical firms to become involved in as many projects as possible in order to smooth their revenue streams. Firms that are involved in relatively few projects will tend to have more volatile revenue and profit streams. Another potential benefit is that alliances strengthen inter-company relationships. This allows for further diffusion of information and technology, as groups of partners can converge on projects once opportunities to do so are identified (Brockstedt & Carr, 2005).

There are, however, several risks involved in setting out strategic partnerships. One risk is that the company could lose valuable intellectual property. In some instances, talent employed by a partner could bring the intellectual property to a competitor. The more partners and people that are involved in a project, the greater this risk. Another risk is that partners may be unable to fulfill their obligations, either due to key talent defection, organizational incompetence or even bankruptcy.

The rewards, however, are significant. By gaining access to wide range of talent and projects, pharmaceutical companies increase the change that they will be involved in a successful project. Additionally, they are allowing themselves to be focused on their own core competencies while simultaneously taking advantage of the core competencies of their partners. This is especially true of academic alliances, since a significant amount of top research talent is in academia rather than on pharmaceutical company payrolls.

Most industry leaders believe that the rewards of collaboration outweigh the risks, even given the risk of losing crucial intellectual property. Pharmaceutical companies have taken steps to ensure that their intellectual property rights are protected in the contracts into which they enter. The reason is because the partnerships leverage different strengths of different entities. This gives the partners significant synergies, and dramatically expanded access to new ideas and technologies.

This does not mean that pharmaceutical companies rely exclusively on strategic alliances. Companies like Novartis have strong internal research programs as well. These programs allow the company to maintain all intellectual property rights. However, if internal research was the only kind conducted, Novartis would be faced with decisions between mutually exclusive options. A few wrong decisions could cripple corporate profitability for years. This volatility is undesirable, since R&D budgets must be maintained for several years consecutively in order to yield viable products.

Nevertheless, it is almost universally acknowledged that the benefits of strategic alliances outweigh the potential risks. Firms have come a long in terms of protecting their intellectual property in the industry, and have understood the benefits of collaboration. As a result, the use of strategic alliances has increased significantly in recent years (Brockstedt & Carr, 2005), and companies like Novartis expect to continue expanding their use of partnerships (Bowen & Purrington, p.11).

Nestle

Faced with saturated developed markets, Nestle is seeking to increase expansion into developing markets in order to maintain its desired growth trajectory of 78% sales increase in ten years (Nestle: Good Food, Good Life). They hope that the developing world will amount to upwards of 50% of total sales in the coming decade, up from 1/3 today (Bell & Shellman, p.11).

The developing world represents many different opportunities for Nestle. First, the developing world is increasing in wealth. Per capita GDPs are rising rapidly in many developing countries. Nations such as India and China have large middle classes than does the United States. Population growth rates in many developing growth rates are high, and the median age in developing countries is typically much lower than that in developed nations.

The growing wealth and middle classes in the developing world give Nestle another major opportunity, termed "premiumization" (Bell & Shellman, p.12). For most of Nestle's history, there was little demand for premium products in developing markets as few consumers could afford them. However, the new wealth in many such countries has given rise to a new market segment, selling higher-end and aspirational products in these nations. Nestle already has the products, which were typically developed for Western markets, and they already have global distribution capabilities as well (Nestle: Good Food, Good Life). The company's information management system, GLOBE, can also help them to identify opportunities to move premium goods in developing markets. This is a critical component of their strategy, since premium goods are not mass market as they are in the West.

Another significant opportunity with the so-called "popularly-positioned products (PPP)" (Bell & Shellman, p.11). These products give Nestle the ability to expand into an emerging market consumer base that is just entering the middle class. This group is less susceptible to economic downturn, especially given that the PPP line is nutritionally sound. This line is also highly congruent with Nestle's overall corporate strategy.

There are several potential challenges, however. Many emerging markets are subject to considerable economic fluctuation, compared with Western markets. When the economies of these markets hit a rough patch, sales growth and market penetration of premium products is likely to suffer. For many emerging market consumers, such products are part of an aspirational lifestyle, one that they are likely to curtail in conditions where well-paying works is drying up.

One of the major challenges that Nestle can expect to face in the developing world is with respect to supply chain management. The company has been strong in this area before, but they will need to develop stronger distribution and marketing capabilities in the developing markets. For a period of several years they will essentially operate in a dual economy -- their traditional operations in these countries and a more Western-style system that reaches the middle class. This reflects the almost dual nature of many emerging economies.