The Watergate Scandal Introduction While the Watergate Scandal in American government erupted in June of 1972 when five men connected to President Nixon were arrested for breaking and entering the headquarters of the Democratic National Committee (DNC) in the Watergate building in D.C., the real scandal encompassed many more months and years that those of the...
The Watergate Scandal
Introduction
While the Watergate Scandal in American government erupted in June of 1972 when five men connected to President Nixon were arrested for breaking and entering the headquarters of the Democratic National Committee (DNC) in the Watergate building in D.C., the real scandal encompassed many more months and years that those of the summer of 1972. Indeed, Nixon’s presidency eventually became synonymous with Watergate, as the public began to view him with ever-increasing skepticism and scorn—scorn for a president who represented the abuses of power that the public was tired of seeing—abuses that had led to more and more American casualties in Vietnam, more and more lies told to the American public over popular media, more and more cover-ups of the truth and governmental conniption fits when the truth (such as the Pentagon Papers leaked by Daniel Ellsberg) came to light (Schulzinger, 1997). This paper will describe the Watergate Scandal and how it impacted the U.S. government.
Background and Relevance for Today
President Nixon was up for reelection that year in 1972. He had defeated Humphrey in 1968. Humphrey had been Johnson’s Vice President—but Johnson was not running for re-election and the nomination would have been Robert Kennedy’s, but RFK was assassinated in June of 1968, almost five years after his brother JFK was killed in Dallas, giving the presidency to Johnson. Johnson had escalated the conflict in Vietnam, which mired his presidency and pushed him from Office. RFK had the following, support and standing to take the White House back for the Kennedy’s, and Nixon surely had visions of political defeat at the hands of another Kennedy (he had lost to JFK in 1960). RFK’s death gave him a convenient path to victory and, though tragic, undoubtedly eased his stress about ever becoming president.
The 1960s had, in fact, been a decade of political intrigue and assassinations: JFK in ’63, Malcolm X in ’65, MLK, Jr. in April of ’68 and RFK two months later. These were not insignificant killings: these people were beloved public figures whose leadership and vision would be sorely missed by those who followed them. Obviously they were not beloved by all, and the fact that some in the country rejoiced while others wept indicated the extent to which the division and polarization of American society had developed. So in many ways the times were similar to current days—killings still abound (Seth Rich, Khashoggi et al.) and the nation is just as divided and polarized as ever.
The same problems persist as well: the illegal wiretappings that the Nixon administration engaged in and the subsequent cover-up are similar to the news that the Obama Administration engaged in the same type of spying of the Trump campaign leading up to the 2016 election and even beyond (Barone, 2018). Barone (2018) states, after all, that “defenders of the Obama intelligence and law enforcement apparatus have had to fall back on the argument that this infiltration was for Trump’s—and the nation’s—own good. It’s an argument that evidently didn’t occur to Richard Nixon’s defenders when it became clear that Nixon operatives had burglarized and wiretapped the Democratic National Committee’s headquarters in June 1972.” The irony, of course, is that Nixon’s Watergate scandal has always been viewed as a breach of trust of the government and an all-around very bad thing. Yet, today, such measures are viewed as necessary by those of the #NeverTrump movement: “The crime at the root of Watergate was an attempt at surveillance of the DNC after George McGovern seemed about to win the Democratic Party’s presidential nomination, just as the government misconduct in Russiagate was an attempt at surveillance of the Republican Party’s national campaign after Trump clinched its nomination” (Barone, 2018). Some lessons are never learned, it would seem.
Watergate
Nixon’s paranoia was intense, most likely because he himself was involved in shady dealings throughout his public tenure. With the upcoming election, he did not want to take any chances. He wanted to know what his opponents were up to—and so the idea to wiretap and bug the DNC office in the Watergate building in D.C. became the go-to idea. The brainchild was G. Gordon Liddy, who ran Nixon’s re-election campaign (Dean, 2014). The five burglars who were arrested attempting to wiretap the phones in the DNC office were Virgilio Gonzalez, Bernard Barker, James McCord, Eugenio Martínez, and Frank Sturgis. The men all had CIA connections and they had played roles in the anti-Castro movement that JFK’s CIA had helped to lead (Hougan, 1984). In other words, the same people with a particular power circle that wanted to maintain its power was responsible for the wiretapping. To understand Watergate in the context of who was involved and what their backgrounds were is to understand the larger power struggle that was in play—especially in the light of the fact that RFK was running for president against Nixon that year and that the break-in at the Watergate building occurred just one week after RFK’s assassination. In other words, with RFK out of the way, the CIA and Nixon both wanted to know what was going on in the minds of the next domino.
Liddy along with another CIA operative E. Howard Hunt, who was also linked to the assassination of JFK, were known as Nixon’s plumbers—i.e., the individuals tasked with stopping “leaks” out of the White House—a problem then as now. The problem that arose was that the Cubans arrested with McCord at the DNC offices were Hunt’s assets: he had recruited them as freedom fighters during the anti-Castro movement. Anything connected to Hunt would ultimately lead back to Liddy and therefore the President himself—so the public construed it.
Nixon’s role was debated: did he know, did he not know? Was this an instance of government operatives working on their own in order to gather intelligence to help them better do their job of preparing their president for the upcoming election? Some felt that, yes, this was the case, while others were certain Nixon had authorized the break-in. The Watergate prosecutor, however, felt that Nixon had not known about the break-in—but that when it came to covering up for those involved Nixon had to share in the blame (Hougan, 1984; Dean, 2014). The already skeptical public did not care. As more details came out about Watergate and who had orchestrated it, the gears began to turn against the administration.
Still, Nixon managed to win re-election that November and it appeared as though Watergate might be behind him. The burglars had been sentenced in January of 1973, but news was still coming out—news that would entangle Nixon directly. Congress was getting wind of perjury accusations and Nixon felt he had to distance himself from his aids and counsel by firing them. This was done in an effort to make it look like he was innocent of anything to do with Watergate. When he fired his White House Counsel John Dean, Dean went on to testify to Congress that he believed everything they wanted to know about Watergate was likely recorded on tapes that the White House secretly used to document everything said in the Oval Office. This testimony sparked a wild fire that quickly got out of control. Then (as now) a special counsel was appointed to investigate the scandal and then (as now) the President quickly began to resent the special counsel appointed and wish him to be fired. Nixon began losing control of the narrative as he become more and more isolated and public opinion grew increasingly irate towards the unseemliness of the scandal. Indeed, much of it was innuendo and nothing really out of the ordinary for American politics: the public was continuously being bombarded, however, by media representations of a Nixon administration that was totalitarian in the extreme—hell-bent on spying and knocking over opponents and anyone who got in its way. The image that the media developed of Nixon was one of a vengeful, suspicious, paranoid, power-hunger president who recorded every conversation in the White House out of his deep paranoia and suspicion of everyone. The reality is that the White House tapes were more likely something that Nixon had been ordered to make by his own handlers—as it would be naïve to suspect that presidents obtain power all on their own, without the aid of some group in the Establishment that wishes to remain abreast of all issues coming in and going out of the White House.
Nonetheless, the Nixon tapes became a big deal for the media, the public and for Congress. Nixon’s aids and closest advisors were indicted for conspiracy to cover-up the Watergate investigation. Nixon in an attempt to be transparent released an edited transcript of the White House tapes regarding the Watergate issue: this came in April of 1974—two years since the initial break-in of the Watergate building. The scandal had been on-going for that whole time (then as now with the Trump “Russiagate” scandal which is still going on two years into his presidency). The public’s frustration was coming to a head and the release of the transcripts momentarily helped to alleviate that frustration as it was seen as a moment of transparency in an otherwise sordid tale of conspiracy and cover-up (Dean, 2014).
However, the transcripts themselves helped turn even more people against Nixon. The character of the man (then as now with the character of Trump) was more the target of their anger than the content of the transcripts. Nixon was seen as vulgar, mean, inhumane, humorless, ambitious, vindictive and nasty. Basically, it was a look behind the door at the man in private—the public veneer gone. Nixon had gambled in showing this side of himself, but the political reality was that he imagined it would be better to show that he had nothing to hide. The reality for the public was that they viewed this side of Nixon as an embarrassment.
Nonetheless, the edited transcripts of the tapes did not show that Nixon had colluded or conspired—only that he had some pretty sobering and harsh views of America’s institutions, which, to be fair, were probably no different than most people’s. But from a President, this type of talk and language was viewed as heresy—especially from where mainstream media pundits were sitting: they viewed Nixon now as someone who had uttered heresy against the American ethos. Once the tapes themselves were released after the Supreme Court got involved, another story emerged—one in which John Dean was discussing the payment of “hush money” to the burglars to keep them quiet. Again, then as now, the same terms were flying around: “hush money,” “silence,” “foreknowledge,” “conspiracy.” The fact was that Hunt was blackmailing the White House in order to keep silence: Nixon wanted to pay. Congress viewed that as an impeachable offense—i.e., obstruction of justice. Further evidence was found on the actual tapes (some of which were deleted, which only fueled media speculation that Nixon was trying to hide something) indicating that the President was part of the plan to cover-up the nature of the Watergate break-in. Rather than face impeachment, Nixon resigned from office in August of 1974. He stated eloquently,
To leave office before my term is completed is abhorrent to every instinct in my body. But as President, I must put the interest of America first. America needs a full-time President and a full-time Congress, particularly at this time with problems we face at home and abroad. To continue to fight through the months ahead for my personal vindication would almost totally absorb the time and attention of both the President and the Congress in a period when our entire focus should be on the great issues of peace abroad and prosperity without inflation at home (Nixon, 1974).
Nixon handed over the White House to Ford, who promptly pardoned Nixon of any wrongdoing. Two years later Ford would lose the election to Carter, who promised to bring a new spirit of honesty to the White House and to American politics. That lasted four years—then America got back to its good old ways by electing Reagan and ushering in the era of neo-conservatism currently running the Establishment.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the Watergate Scandal has a lot of similarities to today’s Russiagate. In fact, Watergate serves as the model political governmental scandal and the reason every scandal of today is affixed with the ending –gate. Watergate was a kind of blow-off top in politics, the culmination of a decade of slaughter and intrigue. Whether Nixon really did anything differently from what any other president in modern times would have or has done is probably unlikely—but in American politics the facts do not always matter. Control of the narrative is what matters—and that control can make or break a president.
References
Barone, M. (2018). Obama’s spying scandal is starting to look a lot like Watergate.
Retrieved from https://nypost.com/2018/05/27/obamas-spying-scandal-is-starting-to-look-a-lot-like-watergate/
Dean, J. (2014). The Nixon defense: What he knew and when he knew it. NY: Viking.
Hougan, J. (1984). Secret Agenda. NY: Random House.
Nixon, R. (1974). Resignation speech. Retrieved from
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/spc/character/links/nixon_speech.html
Schulzinger, R. (1997). A Time for War: The United States and Vietnam, 1941-1975.
Oxford University Press.
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