Rousseau and Kant the Enlightenment

Rousseau and Kant

The Enlightenment refers to the period in European history when writing and thought were characterized by an emphasis on experience and reason. This showed that there was a mistrust of religion and traditional authority, and one result was the gradual emergence of the ideals of liberal, secular, democratic societies. The Enlightenment is associated with a materialist view of human beings, an optimism about human progress through education, and a general utilitarian approach to society and ethics. The emphasis on learning in the Enlightenment would contribute to the development of various systems of learning, the founding of universities and colleges, and the development of philosophical systems such as the one offered by Kant. Freedom is all that is required, says Kant, and he means here the freedom to use one's reason.

In the era of enlightenment, a number of major developments in the intellectual life of the time took place that would profoundly affect human thought and the development of reason through education thereafter. The development of new political ideas would extend intellectual and political freedom beyond what had existed before. This would lead to new conceptions of human equality and would thus also affect the education offered, extending general education to the populace at large rather than confining it to the upper classes. John Locke and Thomas Hobbes represented the beginning of a real political science in the seventeenth-century, and their conceptions of how government developed and what government should and should not do would be refined and extended by Rousseau and others and would eventually become the basis for the constitutional democracy of the United States. Jean-Jacques Rousseau was an important force in the philosophical thought of the eighteenth century. He was an especially powerful influence in the development of educational theory and was one of the primary sources for the political theory that would infuse the age of revolution, notably the American and French Revolutions. Rousseau's thought developed from the events of his life, and he himself indicated how important life experiences were in the educational development of the individual, as he noted that ". . The character and outlook of any one of us is largely the result of the influence which parents, other relatives, teachers, and circumstances have brought to bear upon us. . ." (Copleston, 1959, p. 63).

In his writing, Rousseau was neither embarrassed nor reticent of taking on the established ideas of his day or of challenging accepted thought. Rousseau was antagonistic to a number of modes of thought and analysis. He saw art and literature as social ills that produced moral bankruptcy. He opposed scientific thought and viewed much scientific thought as no more than superstition. For Rousseau, both the arts and sciences derived from human vices:

They arise out of evil, and they lead to evil consequences. They produce luxury and generate weakness. The military virtues of the Romans were extinguished in proportion as the latter cultivated the fine arts (Copleston, 1959, p. 63).

This view had an impact on how Rousseau viewed the education of his era:

An expensive education is provided which teaches everything but moral probity and integrity. Literary, artistic and scientific proficiency are honored, but moral virtue goes unrewarded (Green, 1955, p. 228).

Rousseau's ideas on education are embodied in his book Emile, which is also a profession of religious faith. Rousseau had written on education before. The book is about an imaginary pupil, Emil, who is educated solely by his tutor in what might be called a scientifically conditioned environment. Rousseau said it would be absurd to try to duplicate this setting, for it is only a device used in the book to facilitate the demonstration of the author's principles. The book also embodies the essence of Rousseau's view of human nature and the relationship of the human being to the world in which he or she lives, and this will also be important in how Rousseau's political thought develops. In the beginning of Emile, Rousseau states that everything is good as it comes from the hands of Nature, but he also seems to contradict himself later in the book. He says several times that those with a primitive innocence can be guided a long way and that this is the original character of all human beings, but he also says that there are some with violent natures whose ferocity develops at an early age. The latter should have their education speeded up lest we have to chain them up for our own protection. Education for Rousseau means inculcation in civilization and a moral training including the ability to control the passions. The purpose of education for most is to preserve the goodness that comes from Nature:

A natural education can, to a large extent, preserve intact the pristine goodness, innocence and happiness of the individual from infancy through childhood and puberty to manhood. By a "natural education" Rousseau means an education which interferes as little as possible with the free, natural development, both physical and psychological, of the child (Green, 1955, pp. 227-230).

In the second book of Emile, Rousseau offers some of his more revolutionary conceptions of education. This is the so-called "negative education" phase as Rousseau says that what should be done is the exact opposite of what is usually done. The first important precept is that education is made for the child and not the other way round. The child is not a miniature adult and has his or her own ways of seeing, feeling, and thinking. Nature has already inculcated certain knowledge, and the individual needs to be protected from anything that will impede his or her natural growth of body and mind (Dent, 1992, p. 10).

Immanuel Kant takes a different approach in defining the relationship between reason and authority, challenging both scientific knowledge and moral thought, and coming down on the side of a priori knowledge and morality rather than experience or sentiment. For Kant, both scientific knowledge and morality should be assured in the universe:

According to Kant, skepticism results form the error of seeking a basis for certainty where it cannot be found, in the content of experience. The grounds of certainty, he asserts, are located in the form of reason itself. Accordingly, he undertakes an intensive examination of the nature of thought to show how we can have certain knowledge of both scientific facts and moral duties (Denise, Peterfreund, and White, 1996, 180).

Kant discusses the concept of practical reason in terms of his metaphysics of morals and specifically with reference to the idea of the imperative as it relates to words such as "good" and "ought." What Kant feels has to be explained is the meaning of the term "good" when applied to the will, and to accomplish this Kant uses the concept of duty, the most important element for Kant in his conception of the moral consciousness. Kant distinguishes between acts that are performed out of duty and acts which are performed for the sake of duty, stating that those acts performed in accordance with duty but not from duty have no moral worth. In making this distinction, Kant sets out a moral principle in keeping with his view that morality does not derive from nature but from the mind. What is important in moral terms is what is intended and not necessarily what actually occurs. An event occurring without intent is less valuable than an event occurring with intent. In two separate instances, the act might be precisely the same, but the act with moral intent is important while the one without intent is not. For Kant, the will that acts for the sake of duty is the good will. The concept of duty implies the need to overcome some obstacle in order to act.

Kant finds that moral principles must be grasped entirely a priori. His moral theory is based on his concept of the good will. For Kant, moral knowledge is a priori, or existing before and indeed in spite of the fact. That is, there are moral precepts which determine how men ought to behave, and these precepts do not depend on actual behavior. Instead, there are truths, moral precepts, which are to be applied to all behavior. We might say that we ought to tell the truth, for instance, and this tells us how to behave. Even if we all tell lies, though, this does not change the fact that we ought to tell the truth, so the precept does not depend on our behavior. We need not even be aware of the moral precept for it to be valid and applicable. Our moral knowledge and the moral precepts we seek to understand have their origin in the practical reason, which is reason in its practical, or moral, function.