Scott's Mexico Campain in 1847

Article Review

Thesis: US General Winfield Scott is rightly called the Napoleon of the West for his use of combined-arms divisions in the French style in the Mexico Campaign (1847), in which he proved that the French system was appropriate for the American way of war in that it facilitated the overcoming of enemies (Mexican forces) with superior numbers and defenses.

Main Arguments by Author:

· “A key task of military historians is to explain how military transformations affected military power and effectiveness over time.”[footnoteRef:1] The author, Arndt, proceeds to explain the history of how the French system came to be upheld in the US in the 19th century. [1: Jochen Arndt, “The True Napoleon of the West: General Winfield Scott’s Mexico City Campaign and the Origins of the U.S. Army’s Combined-Arms Combat Division” Journal of Military History 76, no. 3 (2012), 649.]

· “During the Mexico City campaign, Scott and his Army of Invasion of Mexico faced an adversary who enjoyed the advantages associated with superior numbers and the tactical defensive.”[footnoteRef:2] Scott needed an exceptional organizational structure to help him advance and overcome this formidable enemy. [2: Jochen Arndt, “The True Napoleon of the West: General Winfield Scott’s Mexico City Campaign and the Origins of the U.S. Army’s Combined-Arms Combat Division” Journal of Military History 76, no. 3 (2012), 651.]

· Thanks to Scott’s interest in French military ideas, the Army of Invasion of Mexico was organized according to the French system of quasi-independent combat divisions that united all three combat arms—infantry, artillery, and to a lesser extent also cavalry—within a single organizational unit.”[footnoteRef:3] This gave the US Army flexibility, mobility, and resilience, allowing Scott to be aggressive in the execution of his tactics. [3: Jochen Arndt, “The True Napoleon of the West: General Winfield Scott’s Mexico City Campaign and the Origins of the U.S. Army’s Combined-Arms Combat Division” Journal of Military History 76, no. 3 (2012), 652.]

Who is the author? Academic/work background? Other writings?

Jochen S. Arndt is a military historian, who has written numerous works, such as the book Arndt, The Battle Tactics of General Winfield Scott's Army of Invasion of Mexico: An Analysis of Their Origins, Application, and Success, published by Austin State University, in 2007.[footnoteRef:4] He has also written articles on the encounters between British soldiers and the Xhosa during South Africa’s Cape Frontier Wars, for instance, in “What’s in a word? Historicising the term ‘caffre’in European discourses about Southern Africa between 1500 and 1800.”[footnoteRef:5] At the time of publication of the Scott article reviewed here, he was a PHD candidate in history at the University of Illinois Chicago. His background as a scholar and his many published works help to establish him as an authority on the subject of which he writes, and his prose is equally as compelling, so that even did he lack the apparent credentials his words in the article on Scott would be sufficient to demonstrate his mastery and command of both his craft and his subject. [4: Arndt, Jochen Steffen. The battle tactics of General Winfield Scott's Army of Invasion of Mexico: An analysis of their origins, application, and success. Stephen F. Austin State University, 2007.] [5: Arndt, Jochen S. "What’s in a word? Historicising the term ‘caffre’in European discourses about Southern Africa between 1500 and 1800." Journal of Southern African Studies 44, no. 1 (2018): 59-75.]

General reflection about the article. How does it relate to your understanding of the role of the U.S. Military? Did the author make a clear argument and provide adequate evidence. Would you recommend this article? Why or why not?

The article explores the role of General Winfield Scott in the Mexican-American War and how his tactics and strategies laid the foundation for the US Army's combined-arms combat division. The author argues that General Scott's Mexico City Campaign was a significant military achievement that demonstrated the effectiveness of combined-arms tactics, including artillery, cavalry, and infantry.

The article also provides adequate evidence to support the author's argument, including primary sources, such as General Scott's own reports, and secondary sources, such as other historians' accounts of the campaign. There are maps or footnotes on every page that give more detail about the sources as well as terms for what the author is describing—for instance, Arndt explains, “In this work the term “tactics” refers to troop maneuvers to and from as well as on the battlefield, and the use of weapon systems with the objective of destroying or dislocating the enemy army.”[footnoteRef:6] The author also briefly touches on the political context of the war and how General Scott's successes impacted the United States' expansionist ambitions. [6: Jochen Arndt, “The True Napoleon of the West: General Winfield Scott’s Mexico City Campaign and the Origins of the U.S. Army’s Combined-Arms Combat Division” Journal of Military History 76, no. 3 (2012), 651.]