Service and Obligations in an Unequal World

People have a variety of motives for doing service work. Kymlicka (n.d.) outlines two views of why people perform service work, one being that service work is a duty, and the other being that service work is a gift, in other words a noble exercise. The roots of the duty position are with the principles of social justice, mainly that service work is performed because it is one’s duty, especially when one is more fortunate. Justice, in that view, is a matter of outcomes, and it is up to each individual to ensure that outcomes are just for as many members of society as possible.
The other view, that service work is a gift, Kymlicka claims is rooted in virtue, in the sense that one can gain virtue through the performance of this work. The disparity of outcomes in this view is natural, but one with means can nevertheless improve their moral standing through the performance of service work. Kymlicka suggests that this view is rooted in religious views of ethics, wherein Abrahamic religions have a perspective and charity and justice are not linked. This runs in contrast to the social justice view, wherein charity is naturally linked to social justice, and is specifically performed with social justice in mind.
The role of self-interest in the performance of service work is clear in the gift view, because one can improve his or her standing in society, and increase one’s virtue, through the performance of service work. There is still self-interest in the justice view, however. One’s performance of one’s duty allows for the satisfaction that one is contributing to a greater level of justice than might exist otherwise. The service work may be framed as altruistic, but is not strictly so. In either case, self-interested goals are not problematic if they exist. Taking a utilitarian view, the outcomes of the service work are positive, so the motivations are not relevant.
Mulhall and Swift (n.d.) discuss the connection between service and justice, noting that justice is established as equivalent to fairness, in that if everybody was equal, then society would be designed in an equitable manner, to preserve as close to fairness of outcomes as possible. In an unequal society, service still serves a justice role for many, because it allows them to bring about outcomes that are closer to what this fairness would look like that would otherwise be possible. But for many, justice is not necessarily the same thing as fairness, so for many there is a disconnect between service work and justice.
Cohen (n.d.) also dissects this connection, in particular the argument that inequality in society is a naturally occurring phenomenon, and acceptable if the net result is that the poorest see their lives better than they otherwise would be. Charity and service work is one of the means by which that can happen. Thus, service is going to help to deliver at least some justice. The wealthy must make their contribution, and in doing so will help to establish some justice. This proposition echoes the virtue argument that is rooted in religion – it is virtuous to perform service work because that is a means by which the wealthy can contribute to justice. For this argument to work, there needs to be a separation between justice and fairness, because outcomes are still not going to be fair in a society that has an unequal design, and acceptance that equity gaps are only going to be filled partially – very partially at that.
The role of the government in service work is an entirely distinct issue, but it would be difficult to argue that government should compel people to do service work. At the point at which work becomes compulsory, it is no longer service work. A government can provide incentives – and does through tax breaks on charitable donations, including in kind donations, but has no moral requirement to do so, as this is not specifically the function of government.
Cross-cultural service work can have issues, in particular when the view that the recipient has of the work is significantly different from the views of those performing the work. There may be instances where some service work is culturally inappropriate – it is neither warranted nor wanted by the culture receiving the “benefit” of the work. A more appropriate framework would either see cultures perform service work internally, or the recipient determine what sort of service work should be done, and would be acceptable and inappropriate within its cultural context.


References

Cohen, G. (no date). Justice and inequality: The incentives argument.

Kymlicka, W. (no date). Altruism in philosophical and ethical traditions: Two views.

Mulhall and Swift (no date). The basics of justice as fairness.