Shackford and Gooch Inc v. The Town of Kennebunk case analysis

Shackford & Gooch, Inc. et al. v. The Town of Kennebunk et al. [1984] Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

The case of Shackford & Gooch, Inc. et al. v. The Town of Kennebunk et al. revolves on two distinct impasses. The first is the disagreement at the heart of the case, between the Shackford & Gooch fish market and the abutting Bartleby's Dockside Restaurant. This disagreement concerns the decision by the latter to construct a rooftop deck without a permit and the zoning objection of the former. But a second disagreement, that which gives significance to the case, is that between the Zoning Board of the Town of Kennebunk and the original ruling of the Superior Court. The ruling by the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine will be aimed at resolving both the appeal to the original decision by Shackford & Gooch and the cross-appeal by Dockside.

Issues

The facts of the case center on Dockside's decision to erect a roof deck and to seek a parking ordinance for its additional capacity. At the outset, Dockside adhered to the poor advice of a building inspector and proceeded in its construction without a permit despite nonconforming structural details. When Shackford & Gooch objected, the Zoning Board order Dockside to halt construction. According to its initial statement, "the Board found in its remand hearing that Dockside's roof deck was not in compliance with the side yard, rear yard, or shoreland zoning setback requirements of the Kennebunk ordinance. The Board thus considered the deck to be an expansion of a nonconforming structure requiring a variance." (Glassman, II)

The Superior Court of York County, however, diverged with the board's decision and argued that the vertical construction did not constitute a zoning expansion. The Court ordered the board to issue Dockside its permit. In its objection, Shackford & Gooch appealed the decision to the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine where an opinion was delivered by Justice Glassman on December 31st, 1984.

Rule

In its examination of the case, the Supreme Judicial Court made the case that the disagreement between the two merchants in question was overshadowed by the implications of the actions of the Superior Court. Here, Justice Glassman rules, the Court overstepped its authority by intervening with the carriage of the regulatory duties of the Zoning Board of Kennebunk. In its assessment, the Supreme Court would ultimately sustain the appeal by Shackford & Gooch on the ground that it was consistent with the original regulatory interpretation of the Zoning Board. According to Glassman, no specializing circumstances or hardships justified Dockside's construction without the proper permits. Therefore, According to Glassman, the court affirms "the Board's denial of Dockside's variance appeal. The ordinance provides that the Board may grant a variance if the applicant can demonstrate "unusual difficulty or particular hardship." Kennebunk, Me., Zoning Ordinance § 7.6(C)(2)."

Analysis

In the decision provided here above, Glassman employs a standard established in a series of cases relating to the interaction between judicial bodies and local or municipal zoning boards. In several precedent-setting cases, findings tend to favor the empowerment of municipal zoning boards to enforce regulatory parameters as they see fit provided these are concurrent with existing legislation. According to Glassman, "when the Superior Court acts as an appellate court reviewing an action of an administrative board, we directly examine the record developed before the board. See Driscoll v. Gheewalla, 441 A.2d 1023, 1026 (Me. 1982); see also Nancy W. Bayley, Inc. v. Maine Employment Security Commission, 472 A.2d 1374, 1377 (Me. 1984). On review of an action taken by a zoning board of appeals, we may not make factual findings independent of those of the board, nor may we substitute our judgment for that of the board. Mack v. Municipal Officers of the town of Cape Elizabeth, 463 A.2d 717, 719-20 (Me. 1983)." (Glassman, II)

This denotes that as it relates to the present case, any decision by the Superior Court should be intended as support of the duty of the Board in enforcing its regulations and maintaining its authority in controlling construction and development. And as the text by Hinkel (2011) demonstrates, permits serve a critical purpose in providing for oversight and enforcement by any Zoning Board. According to Hinkel's text, which also provides a look into the present case, identified "building permits [as] another way to enforce zoning ordinance. A building permit will be refused unless the proposed improved and its intended use comply with zoning." (p. 66)

The actions of the Superior Court of York County, by contrast, constitutes a judgment made on "factual findings independent of those of the board" and may also be interpreted as "substituting" court "judgment for that of the board."

Also important to maintaining the board's original findings, beyond the rule of law relating to Dockside's lack of permit, is the original case of Shackford & Gooch. According to established rule on the subject, the appellants were in full right to be protected by the Zoning Board's original decision. In events where some harm might result for the appellant, it is incumbent upon the Zoning Board to intervene. According to Glassman, "the opponents appeared before the Board and as abutting landowners demonstrated they would suffer particularized injury as a result of the Board's action. See Harrington v. Town of Kennebunk, 459 A.2d 557, 559 (Me. 1983); Pride's Corner Concerned Citizens Association v. Westbrook Board of Zoning Appeals, 398 A.2d 415, 417-18 (Me. 1979)."

This denotes existing precedent justifying the Zoning Board's decision to halt construction on the Dockside roof deck. This is critical in establishing the entitlement of the Board to act in the manner that it did. The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine could determine on this basis that the Zoning Board of Kennebunk acted appropriately and should therefore have been spared the intervention and determination of the Superior Court of York County.

Conclusion