Party system change in Colombia

¶ … strength of the Liberals and Conservatives in Colombia, given that none of the parties are able to effectively 'fix' the guerrilla and drug trade problems. The paper looks at the underlying theoretical issue i.e., how best to understand changes in the party system within Colombia. We will first, however, look at the origins of the parties within Colombia, and then move on to a discussion of the other issues.

Bushnell (1993) states that "the divide between Liberals and Conservatives in Colombia began in the second half of the nineteenth century, and that only in the present century [20th] have they existed on a permanent, year-round basis" (Bushnell, 1993; 92). He says that the Civil War of 1839-1842 was a watershed for the formation of political parties in Colombia, because during this time, "alignments were forged, which solidified into patterns that were to last" (Bushnell, 1993; 92). He argues that, from their formation, there were no social and economic differences between the two parties, and that the Liberal-Conservative dichotomy "originated in a conflict between tienda and hacienda, with Liberals representing commercial and professional interests, and Conservatives the large landholders" (Bushnell, 1993; 93).

He continues, "both parties were multiclass and nationwide the parties were among the few unifying forces in a nation sorely fragmented geographically and culturally" (Bushnell, 1993; 94). We can see that the state of both parties in Colombia from that day to this has not changed much: the nation is still largely fragmented, geographically, and the guerrillas and narcotraficantes use this to their advantage, in outwitting any political manoeuvres that are taken by either the Liberals or Conservatives, in an attempt to overcome the scourge that these groups place on all Colombian citizens. Actions, such as signing huge tracts of land over to FARC, obviously do not help in the battle against these factions.

Hume (1742; in Scarrow, 2002) equates parties, facts and sects, and argues that the origins of parties, facts and sects are in human nature, and that, as such, they are ineradicable, and therefore acceptable. He says "as much as legislators and founders of states ought to be honoured and respected amongst men, as much as ought the founders of sects and factions be detested and hated; because the influence of faction is directly contrary to that of laws. Factions subvert government, render laws impotent, and beget the fiercest animosities among men of the same nation, who ought to give mutual assistance and protection to each other" (Hume, 1742; in Scarrow, 2002). He goes on, "and what would render the founder of parties more odious, is the difficulty of extirpating these weeds, once they have taken root in any state" (Hume, 1742; in Scarrow, 2002).

We begin to see that Hume's (1742) analysis of the origin of parties, facts and sects has great relevance on the current political situation in Colombia, as both main parties - Liberals and Conservatives - have had great trouble in eradicating the many active guerrilla forces from Colombia.

Washington's Farewell Address (1796; included in Scarrow, 2002) decries factionalism. He says that, "Respect for it's [the government's] authority, compliance with it's laws, acquiescence in its measures, are duties enjoined by the full maxims of liberty" (Washington, 1796; in Scarrow, 2002). He goes further, "All obstructions to the execution of the laws, all combinations and associations, under whatever plausible character, with the real design to direct, control, counteract, or awe the regular deliberation and action of the constituted authorities, are destructive of this fundamental principle, and of fatal tendency."

This passage, which is nearly 300 years old, goes some way to explaining why people in Colombia still trust their governments, Liberal or Conservative, as being able to do something to 'fix' the guerrilla and drug trade problems within the country, as these are (in Washington's words), 'obstructions to the execution of laws'. The political parties in Colombia are still so strong precisely because the problems within Colombia are still so strong: the people have a will to follow their chosen parties, to be able to rid Colombia of these problems. The current 'Creo en Colombia' campaign, following Uribe's recent election, shows the power of people's beliefs in their politicians: the country feels tangibly uplifted through Pastrana's hard line stance against guerrillas, and his co-operation in Plan Colombia (which aims at eradicating the illegal drug industry).

Washington (1796) ends his statement by saying, "parties in free countries are useful checks on the administration of government, and serve to keep alive the spirit of liberty": this, again, is very apt for the case of Colombia. As we have seen, the people need to believe in the power of their government to be able to do something about the guerrilla and drug trade problems, but Colombians are also resigned to the fact that governments can be corrupted (witness the Samper government's acceptance of money from narcotraficantes for their election campaign): both political parties are so strong, as the Colombian people take Washington's words to heart, interchanging parties (often in response to corruption), in order to eradicate corruption and as (in Washington's words) "useful checks on the administration of government" (Washington, 1796; in Scarrow, 2002).

An analysis of Michels' classic text, Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchic Tendencies of Modern Democracy adds to the political thought built up in this paper, with regard to Colombia, as taken from Hume and Washington.

Michels concerns himself with the "unravelment and detailed formulation of the complex of tendencies which oppose the realization of democracy," as "matters of exceeding difficulty" (Michels, 1915). Despite this, however, he finds democracy to be "classifiable as tendencies dependent (1) upon the nature of the human individual (2) upon the nature of the political struggle (3) upon the nature of the organization (Michels, 1915).

He argues further, in his Chapter 1, that "the democratic external form which characterizes the life of political parties may readily veil from superficial observers the tendency towards aristocracy, or rather, oligarchy, which is present in all political parties," saying that the best field to throw light on these matters is the "intimate structure of the democratic parties, and among these, of the labour parties" (Michels, 1915). He goes further, "In the conservative parties, except during elections, the tendency towards oligarchy manifests itself with that spontaneous vigour and clearness which corresponds with the essentially oligarchic character of this party" (Michels, 1915).

He concludes Chapter 1 by saying that, "the principal aim of socialist and democratic parties is the struggle against oligarchy in all its forms," and that "the state of dependence that results from the existing social and economic conditions renders an ideal democracy impossible" (Michels, 1915).

Michels' ideas about democracy, and its exercising, clearly, therefore, have relevance to the political party structure of Colombia, and the changes in the party system within Colombia. Michels' ideal democracy has no route to emerge in Colombian politics, as the people of Colombia do not vote for democracy: they vote in a democratic manner, but they vote not for democracy, rather for the party they think is less corrupt, and whom they think will rid the country of the double scourges of guerrillas and the drug trade.

Aldrich, in his 1995 book, Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in America, argues that, "political parties lie at the heart of American politics," and quoting E.E. Schattschneider (1942) says, "political parties create democracy, and democracy is unthinkable save in terms of parties" (Aldrich, 1995). He tells us later in the book that by parties, he means, "both the individual parties and the system of competition for control and use of elective office that the two major political parties constitute" (Aldrich, 1995; 277), and says that, "a political party is an institutionalised coalition, one that has adopted rules, norms and procedures" (Aldrich, 1995; 284).

He, furthering this point, then quotes Fiorina (1980), saying, "the only way collective responsibility has ever existed, and can exist, given our institutions is through the agency of the political party; in American politics, responsibility requires cohesive parties." Colombia certainly has cohesive parties, and their very cohesiveness comes, in part, from being so diametrically opposed to each other: in this, strength to act towards common goals is found.

He further argues that, in Colombia, as in many other countries, "divided partisan control of the government seems to have been the rule since 1952" (Aldrich, 1995), with "unified control being the exception." He further says that, "as a highly endogenous institution, there is no one form of the major political party in America. Rather the major party is defined, at any point, in relation to the extant government and other political institutions of the time (Aldrich, 1995; 285), that "the institutional form of parties, at any given time, is designed to solve particular problems in the specific historical context" (Aldrich, 1995; 286).

This particular form of defining parties applies, particularly well, to the change in party governance within Colombia, whose parties become defined, in people's minds, as reinforced by media campaigns, through their policies towards the dual problems of guerrilla activity, and the drug trade. The Liberal and Conservative parties are therefore in a battle to "out-do" each other, in terms of producing the most workable, viable and therefore, acceptable, policy towards these issues, at any given time during their time in office, or their election campaigns. This model of Aldrich's therefore explains political party change within Colombia rather well: a focus on issues of immediate security concern at any particular time in history define the political strategies of Colombian parties.

Aldrich ends his book by saying, "In America, democracy is unthinkable, save in terms of a two-party system, because no collection of ambitious politicians have been able to think of a way to achieve their goals in this democracy, save in terms of political parties" (Aldrich, 1995; 296).

Dix (1989) synthesizes all of these opinions on the party political system in Latin America, in his paper on cleavage structures and party systems in the continent. This paper analyzes, for the first time, comparative questions within a Latin American context, such as why in some cases, conflicting interests and ideologies favour the emergence of broad aggregative coalitions, and in other cases, favoured fragmentation.

He concludes that the democratic experience has been brief in Latin America, and that it has often been interrupted by military rule, or (in the case of Colombia) by civil war. He also argues that, in Colombia, one problem faced by the construction of democratic government is that other groups, with conflicting interests have always tried to intervene, for example, the Church, or guerrillas, such that one party (or both main parties, as is the case) can never represent all interests from all sides. He argues, therefore, that there will always be oscillation between the parties, sustaining the parties, and that, as such, both Liberals and Conservatives have remained strong.

Dix (1989) also offers another reasoned argument as to why Liberals and Conservatives have remained strong within Colombia: they represent "continuous" party systems, that have not evolved, or changed much, over time, since their formation, despite marked increases in social and political mobilization. He argues, therefore, that party loyalty is a lifetime devotion, and that "party identification is practically universal" (Dix, 1989).

He says, further, that the coming of universal suffrage in Latin America did not lead to the "class-mass" parties familiar in Western party systems, but rather led to 'catch all' parties (Dix, 1989). Single-class parties are not usual in Latin America, especially Colombia, and the "catch all" parties that arose, instead, "eschew dogmatic ideology in favour of pragmatism, and appeals to 'the people', 'the nation'...that electorally seeks (and receives) the broad spectrum of voters that extends the party's reach well beyond that of one social class, or orn religious denomination, that develops ties to a variety of interest groups instead of relying on the organizational and mobilizational assets of one (such as labour unions)" (Dix, 1989).

He then moves on to point out that Colombia does not fall within this "catch-all" party model, but rather has 'vertical' parties, similar to Uruguay, Honduras, and Paraguay (Dix, 1989). Whilst not classified as "catch-all" under his definition, he does liken vertical parties to his "catch-call" parties because they are both non-ideological, and pragmatic, and both can successfully mobilize the support of a broad range of social classes (Dix, 1989). He argues, though, that they are perhaps less than catch-all, on the other hand, in that at election time they rely more on the mobilization of committed constituencies linked to the party by clientistic ties, by a kind of inherited loyalty than on searching out new supporters among the uncommitted and undecided (Dix, 1989).