Johnson Controls, Inc. (886 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1989). The Supreme Court heard this case because they were concerned with an employer's gender-based fetal-protection policy. The question was whether an employer could exclude a fertile female employee from certain jobs because of its concern for the health of the fetus the woman might conceive. In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court struck down the employer's fetal protection policy as violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The Court held that this policy, which barred fertile women from jobs involving lead exposure or which could expose them to lead through the exercise of job bidding, bumping, transfer or promotion rights, constituted facial discrimination on the basis of sex. Moreover, the Court rejected the employer's argument that the policy was permitted under the bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) exception to Title VII (International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc. (886 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1989).

The court relied on the BFOQ defense in its decision. This defense is based narrowly on the cases of Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 332-337 (1977) and Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 122-125 (1985). The wording of the BFOQ defense contains...

The statute thus limits the situations in which discrimination is permissible to certain instances where sex discrimination is reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular business. Case law makes it clear that the safety exception is limited to instances in which sex or pregnancy actually interferes with the employee's ability to perform the job. This approach is consistent with the language of the BFOQ provision itself, for it suggests that permissible distinctions based on sex must relate to ability to perform the duties of the job (International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc. (886 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1989).