Supreme Court International Union, UAW

Supreme Court

International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc.

In 1991, the United States Supreme Court handed down the opinion in United Auto Workers v. Johnson Controls. Petitioners were a group including employees affected by respondent's fetal-protection policy, filed a class action in the District Court, claiming that the policy constituted sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended. In this case these plaintiffs were challenging the fact that the respondent, Johnson Controls Inc., had implemented a policy to disallow females of childbearing age to work in an environment with significant lead exposure unless they could prove they were infertile (International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc. (886 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1989).

The District Court granted summary judgment for defendant-respondent Johnson Controls. 680 F.Supp. 309 (1988). Applying a three-part business necessity defense derived from fetal-protection cases in the Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits, the District Court concluded that, while there is a disagreement among the experts regarding the effect of lead on the fetus, the hazard to the fetus through exposure to lead was established by a considerable body of opinion and that petitioners had failed to establish that there is an acceptable alternative policy which would protect the fetus (International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc. (886 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1989).

The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed the summary judgment by a 7-to-4 vote. 886 F.2d 871 (1989). The majority held that the proper standard for evaluating the fetal-protection policy was the defense of business necessity; that Johnson Controls was entitled to summary judgment under that defense; and that, even if the proper standard was a BFOQ, Johnson Controls still was entitled to summary judgment. The court held that the proper standard for evaluating the policy was the business necessity inquiry applied by other Circuits; that respondent was entitled to summary judgment because petitioners had failed to satisfy their burden of persuasion as to each of the elements of the business necessity defense under Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642; and that, even if the proper evaluative standard was bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) analysis, respondent still was entitled to summary judgment because its fetal-protection policy is reasonably necessary to further the industrial safety concern that is part of the essence of respondent's business (International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc. (886 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1989).

The Supreme Court heard this case because they were concerned with an employer's gender-based fetal-protection policy. The question was whether an employer could exclude a fertile female employee from certain jobs because of its concern for the health of the fetus the woman might conceive. In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court struck down the employer's fetal protection policy as violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The Court held that this policy, which barred fertile women from jobs involving lead exposure or which could expose them to lead through the exercise of job bidding, bumping, transfer or promotion rights, constituted facial discrimination on the basis of sex. Moreover, the Court rejected the employer's argument that the policy was permitted under the bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) exception to Title VII (International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc. (886 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1989).