George F. Kennan's Long Telegram and Cold War origins

Cold War Era

When we remove the threat of nuclear war that loomed large during the Cold War era, it then becomes possible to engage in rational discourse on the subject. It is a subject that is endless in the complexities of the events and the powerful people behind those events. This paper concerns itself with those powerful world leaders, and events, using primary source documents and interviews, then, analyzing those sources to a measure of understanding the people and events today. The Cold War was a critical period in the history of the world, and it is the impact of the Cold War that continues to be a major influence on how world leaders respond to international threats and events today. Understanding the Cold War era, will help in putting into perspective and understanding the dynamics that concern each of us in the world today.

George F. Kennan (Part I)

U.S. Ambassador to Russia, George F. Kennan's "Long Telegram (1946)," is a primary source for researching and understanding the Cold War era. The document, a telegram sent by Kennan from his embassy post in Russia in 1946 to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, was a summation of Kennan's impressions of the post World War II U.S.-Soviet relations. The telegram was meant to brief Kennan's boss, the Secretary of State, who, in turn, would brief the President on Kennan's perceptions. Kennan probably knew that the telegram would make the usual presidential cabinet rounds: Secretary of State, the President, Vice President, Press Secretary, Chief of Staff, and others in the president's inner circle. The telegram made the rounds of the inner circle, but was also circulated to key figures in the Senate and the House. This, Kennan admits during a 1996 CNN interview, surprised him, because he believed that the telegram would receive a cursory review, and then the policymakers would proceed as they chose without being influenced by Kennan's first-hand observations and recommendations. Kennan said:

was sometimes surprised and shocked at the enthusiasm with which this telegram was received and the things that I had to say generally -- not just in the telegram -- were received in Washington (CNN, Personal Interview, 1996)."

Kennan's telegram, in 8,000 words, succinctly explains the mood in the U.S.S.R., and Kennan's ideas about the volatility of the situation in the U.S.S.R. Kennan described the antagonistic moods between the U.S.S.R. And the U.S. In the moment, which in historical hindsight shows an extraordinary sensitivity to the situation and perception in analysis. Kennan's telegram advises that there was no opportunity for a peaceful coexistence between the U.S. And the U.S.S.R. because of the opposing forces of capitalism and communism. Historians agree with Kennan's assessment, citing in part the U.S.S.R.'s goal of expansionism (Murin, Johnson, Fahs, Gerstle, Rosenberg, Rosenberg, 2008, 826).

As a result of the antagonistic mood, and because the U.S. had proved itself militarily superior with its show of force nuclear against Japan, the race for nuclear armament between the U.S. And the U.S.S.R. ensued (Murin, Johnson, Fahs, et al., 887). In the telegram, Kennan offers an important insightful caution, which proves to be historically accurate. Kennan writes:

Intervention against USSR, while it would be disastrous to those who undertook it, would cause renewed delay in progress of Soviet socialism and must therefore be forestalled at all costs (Kennan, the Long Telegram, 1946)."

His words, telegraphed from Moscow in 1946, proved not only insightful, but served as an accurate assessment of what actually happened during the Cuban Missile Crisis in October, 1962 (Murin, Johnson, Fahs, et al., 887). This was the moment in Cold War history when the two super powers faced off in a show of potential strength. At the behest of Cuba's communist leader, Fidel Castro, the Soviet Premier, Nikita Khrushchev, following a failed coup attempt by Cuban expatriates living in America, and sponsored by the Kennedy administration (887). Khrushchev, in a show of support for communism, sent and assembled Soviet missiles in Cuba aimed at the United States (887). In a show of rational leadership, but after much muscle flexing and tension, President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev faced off, and, in the end, Khrshchev dismantled the missiles (887).

A moment in time about which Kennan so accurately assessed in his telegram, was avoided, and it was clear that Kennan's prediction of the disastrous outcome of such an event was well understood by the world. But Kennan's words proved even more prophetic, because following his caution about intervention against the U.S.S.R., Kennan also said that intervention would interrupt the natural progress of Soviet socialism (Kennan, 1946).

National Security Council White Paper, 68

The National Security Council (NSC) White Paper, 68 (April, 1950) was written in a post World War II atmosphere of fear and distrust. China had fallen to Communism, and it was an expression of the fear of communist expansion. The NSC was attempting to assess the political instability of the situation that existed, and the distribution of power in the world between communism and capitalism. It accurately measures the mood of the public on both sides as one of anxiousness and fear of nuclear armament and war. This document was intended as a working tool for policy making in the Cold War era by the member nations of the NSC.

The document pays a particular attention to the military capabilities of both sides, and warns of the Soviet capability and threat, and perhaps, in historical hindsight, even exaggerates the capabilities and strength of that moment in time. But the point of the exaggeration is not so much that the Soviet Union had the capability and strength, but that it was a mindset of the Soviet Union to present that image of its position to strike out at the free world, such that it would progress towards the exaggerated strength and capabilities. This is emphasized in the section that describes the fundamental design of the Soviet government, and in describing the communist expansion.

The NSC document is meant to encourage the member nations to respond to the threat of communism by uniting, with the United States as the military protectorate of sorts. It actually expresses in clear terms that the U.S.S.R. is a threat to the free world, and that the U.S. has the power to initiate a successful strike against the U.S.S.R., which would ostensibly eliminate the threat posed by the U.S.S.R.'s capabilities. The report takes on a tone almost encouraging that to happen. It was very much the public mood of the time that would have supported that initiative. That the world came so close to the use of nuclear confrontation during the Cuban Missile Crisis is indicative of this, and it was only the ability of JFK to resist the military and other forces that would have plunged the world into nuclear war and disaster.

The single purpose of this document was to provide the rationale for an assault against the U.S.S.R. It provided the basis for foreign policy for most of the Cold War era, and that is supported by the poised position of the United States and other free world nations to strike out, and by the build up of nuclear arms in the U.S. And across Radio Free Europe (Murrin, Johnson, et al., 859-860).

The Sources of Soviet Conduct" by "X" in Foreign Affairs, July 1947

George Kennan, under the working title of X, wrote an article for quarterly publication, Foreign Affairs, in July of 1947. That Kennan wrote under a pseudonym is telling that his position in the paper might not have been consistent with that of the administration in which he served as U.S. Ambassador to Russia. Kennan frames his article in the confines of ideologically incompatible philosophies of communism and capitalism. He emphasizes, however, that both forces are politically driven, and it is the political body behind each philosophy that serves as the measure of its potential detriment to the other. This particular article seems to encompass more of a sense of impending doom that might be described as a mass paranoia of the Cold War era. It is a fearful article, one that details threat of the Soviet Union, not so much as a philosophy, rather as the machine driven by fundamentalists and fanatics who, aside from philosophy, would still remain a threat to society.

The Truman Speech

President Harry S. Truman came into office in the post World War II era to face the problems of the Cold War. The urgencies of the political upheaval around the world were numerous, and in his speech delivered before a session of joint Congress, Truman makes his case for America's need to respond to calls for help from nations in the free world. In this case, Truman is referencing the call from Greece for financial and economic assistance for Greece and Turkey. Both countries, Truman surmised, were vulnerable to the forces of communism, because of their post war economic instability and hardships.

Truman reports on the conditions of both countries, reminding Congress, and the world, that both countries were allies during the war, and their state of post war devastation is as a result of the war. The vulnerability that a country is cast into when it faces economic devastation and political upheaval, the case with both Turkey and Greece, compels the U.S. To respond to the calls of these nations on a humanitarian level, a political level, and in the interest of the free world at large.

Truman's goal is to appeal to the sense of responsibility, and the fear of communist expansion, in order to generate American economic and financial support for both Greece and Turkey. He was playing to an in tune audience, because Congress was already in a Cold War frame of mind, and the manifestation of that was going on around the country as people and institutions reacted to the threat of communism.

Truman suggests that there are two directions that a country's leadership can take; that of communism, or free enterprise capitalism. He says:

One way of life is based upon the will of the majority, and is distinguished by free institutions, representative government, free elections, guarantees of individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion, and freedom from political oppression.

The second way of life is based upon the will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the majority. It relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled press and radio; fixed elections, and the suppression of personal freedoms (Truman, 1949)."

Clearly, the Congress, already in the defensive frame of mind, responded to the argument made by Truman, and took the necessary steps for Truman to support Greece and Turkey with economic and financial assistance (Murrin, Johnson, et al., 827).

Conclusion (Part II)

The Cold War era was a prolonged period of contentious coexistence between the ideologies of capitalism and communism. The events that drew the world to the brink of nuclear disaster were, in historical hindsight, events precipitated by the inexperience and poorly advised and poorly informed actions of American political and military leaders in response to a ruthless and enslaving communist policy of expansion. At the end, the world can only be grateful that communism has, for the most part, proved itself unsuccessful, a flawed theory of government and economics. It remains, however, uncertain as to whether or not capitalism will prove itself more tangible and successful a political and economic blending of theories, or whether or not it, too, will succumb an as yet unknown greater force; only to have outlasted its flawed counterpart in communism.

It is interesting to note that while people tend to consider the Cold War in terms of the United States and the former USSR, that now, as then, China loomed almost quietly in the background. In the historical accounts of the Cold War, the focus is on the U.S. And Soviet relations, with the policies between them serving as the driving forces of the Cold War era. China, however, as a communist nation, was very much in the moment of the Cold War. Now, we see China emerging as a more prominent player in world politics and in the global economy. China, having perhaps drawn a lesson from the failed communist political philosophies that brought down the Soviet Union, has evolved its brand of communism into a pseudo one; combining the economic elements of capitalism with the political ideologies of communism, and the result is that modern day China looks very different from the Communist China or Soviet Union of the Cold War era. It begs the question of whether or not China's new and third formula is one that will survive the antiquated communism of the former Soviet Union, and the capitalism of the United States and other Cold World era free world nations.

The five primary documents used in this study reflect the poised position of the free world to embark upon the disastrous course of nuclear war, which Kennan so succinctly warns against in his "The Long Telegram." Kennan is on target when he suggests that the forces of communism will work its way through the U.S.S.R., and would essentially result in the deterioration of that government. Each player's position is well documented and presented in the primary documents, and they interact with one another: Novikav's ideas, expressed in his own telegram, that the U.S. would use its economic advantage to infiltrate foreign governments could conceivably be borne out by President Truman's 1947 speech before a joint session of Congress. The NSC White Paper 68 uses a language that encourages striking out against the U.S.S.R. The birth of the political rhetoric, which would flow for the next forty years, is reflected in these primary source documents.

The tension of the Cold War is expressed in these documents, although the hindsight reflection and analysis of historians helps to define the events, the strategies, rhetoric, and ideologies serves to further the understanding for those people who are of an age and mind to be politically active today, but whose own life experiences do not include the Cold War era. They are perhaps closer to the Cold War than even they realize, for their immediate family members did experience it. For each person who is living today, the Cold War has impacted their lives. Each of us, today, is in some way a product of the Cold War, and understanding the Cold War lends itself to understanding our own lives today.

Annotated Bibliography

Carter, Dale, and Robin Clifton, eds. War and Cold War in American Foreign Policy, 1942-62. New York: Palgrave, 2002.

The advantage of historical perspective is time, and this book is the reflection of that advantage in assessing the Cold War in America's foreign policy by each of the post World War II presidential administrations. It also reflects the advantage of being removed from the events in such a way that perspectives slanted by emotional events can be assessed in a purely historical way. This is not a work of revisionism, but is a historical reporting of the Cold War era. The advantage is what the editors of this book refer to as the state of historian "discipline." As noted by the editors, even the terminology and use of words such as "foreign relations, international history, foreign policy," and "diplomatic policy," are used in the book with a prescribed meaning in the description of the historical events. This kind of forethought given the language and the historical accounting of the period advances the understanding of the events, the people involved in those events, and the public's reaction to the events.

Collins, Carole J.L. "The Cold War Comes to Africa: Cordier and the 1960 Congo

Crisis." Journal of International Affairs 47.1 (1993): 243-269.

Often times the Cold War is thought of as a state of affairs between the United States and the Soviet Union. This journal article helps to shed light on the Soviet Union's goals of expansion, and that while the United States was its nemesis in capitalism, the Soviet Union focused its attention on the advancement of communism on a world scale. To discuss that expansion in terms of a non-super power, third world country, is to bring the point of expansion to the forefront in discussion. It also serves to show the vulnerability of third world countries, and how that vulnerability lends itself to super power manipulations. This journal article discusses this in terms of the 1960 Belgian Congo Crisis, which was as important a third world event as was the Cuban Missile Crisis. It also examines how the decolonization of the third world countries by the European super powers left those countries in a vulnerable state, providing a historical perspective, and reflection on lessons learned.

Harris, Oliver. "Cold War Correspondents: Ginsberg, Kerouac, Cassady, and the Political

Economy of Beat Letters." Twentieth Century Literature 46.2 (2000): 171.

This is both an important and interesting journal article, and it brings the journalist's perspective to the study of the Cold War. Journalists were on the front lines of reporting on the Cold War, and the journalistic style was perhaps more pure than what we see today in journalistic reporting. That purity was lacking in the political party affiliations that is detected in the post Cold War journalistic reporting. Also, the authors here rely upon letters exchanged during the era by prominent political figures like Allen Ginsberg. It reports, too, on the trial of the Rosenbergs, accused of being spies, for which they were subsequently found guilty of, and then executed. The article ties together the pieces of the Cold War era in a way that dissects the paranoia of the period. The paranoia was a strong driving force on both sides of the Cold War lines.

Hinds, Lynn Boyd, and Windt, Theodore Otto. The Cold War as Rhetoric: The Beginnings, 1945-1950. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1991.

This book discusses the Cold War in terms of the rhetoric employed during the era. The rhetoric is complex, and it is the reason contemporary historians like Dale Carter and Robin Clifton give so much thought to the use of terms like international relations, diplomatic policy, and foreign policy. These kinds of words were the rhetoric of the Cold War era, and expertly employed by politicians in an almost code-like way of communicating between one another in the public arena. Hinds and Windt are, in some ways, decoding the Cold War period by breaking down the rhetoric, showing that specific word combinations evoked certain and specific actions. That these actions and reactions were intended, or predicted by either side employing the rhetoric, and that the use of rhetoric was calculated and intended.

Kennan, George. The Long Telegram, 1946.

This is a primary source document, and was written by the U.S. Ambassador to the U.S.S.R., who was telegramming the U.S. Secretary of State his impressions of the post war USSR. It is important for its historical perspective of in time details, but also because Kennan is warning against the more pervasive idea of aggression against the Soviet Union. His advice for patience, and his suggestion that given time, the Soviet Union would succumb to its own flawed system, proved prophetic, although Kennan does not minimize the threat posed by the Soviet Union. Kennan understood with clarity that many others of the time seemed not to possess, that nuclear confrontation would not yield winners or losers, only disaster.

Kennan, George. "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" by "X" in Foreign Affairs, July 1947. A primary source document, this document reflects the personal ideas of George Kennan, whose personal ideas were not necessarily those of the administration, which he served under as U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union when he wrote the document. The document serves explores Kennan's impressions of political philosophies of America and the Soviet Union. It suggests, too, that those philosophies aside, and the leadership of the Soviet Union, being a fanatical one, would continue to pose a threat to society. This article is a cautionary one, expressing hope that the United States will prevail in along a rational course of action when testing the patience of the Soviet Union. In the end, Kennan surmises, the will of the American people would be strong enough to deter any threat of war, because it is not inherent in the nature of Americans not to be aggressors, but defenders of their home and principles.

Medhurst, Martin J. Cold War Rhetoric: Strategy, Metaphor, and Ideology. Revised ed.

East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 1997.

These authors take the important element of Cold War rhetoric and expand upon its analysis by incorporating into their discussions the additional elements of metaphor, ideology, and strategy. The book goes into detail as to the specific speeches by world leaders throughout the Cold War era, which are particularly directed towards conveying the mood and mind of the speaker as regards the relationship between the world super powers. The speeches cited and analyzed throughout the book are based on primary source documents, and the analysis of the documents reflects a broad and open minded analysis within the framework of historical examination. It connects the pivotal political statements with the strategies of the parties, which in turn expressed the ideologies under which the nations of the world were operating as governments. This level of analysis and use of primary documents is essential to furthering the understanding of the period in which those political expressions were made.

National Security Council White Paper, 68, 1950.

This is a primary source document that analyzes the post World War II balance of power between the free world countries and the communist countries; most notably, the United States and the U.S.S.R. The document substantiates the need to be nuclear armament prepared and responsive, even pre-emptive. It establishes the frame of mind of the leadership of the member nations in the National Security Council, and demonstrates that there was a prevailing thought that the Soviet Union would arm itself with nuclear weapons, and use those weapons without hesitation against non-communist countries.

Siracusa, Joseph M. "The "New" Cold War History and the Origins of the Cold War."

The Australian Journal of Politics and History 47.1 (2001): 149.

This journal article examines the Cold War in terms of the individuals, the agencies, the political spying, and puts it into the contemporary context as defined by more recent government definitions. It begins by citing the remarks of Clinton administration Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's remarks about the era. Albright described the era as a time of.".. relentless and institutionalized tragedy." This journal article takes Albright's comments and, in a journalistic style, puts them into context of the greater picture of the Cold War itself.

The article is useful for the segue between the periods, and for introducing concepts, which would then have to be elaborated upon through the use of more succinct and extensive works. The article is valid for this purpose because it reflects the framing of the era in terms of a standing American presidential administration, and that insight is useful, although not important. The usefulness of the article in several ways is why it is used for this study.

Truman, Harry S. Doctrine Speech, 1947.

This primary document elaborates the American approach to stemming the expansion of communism by providing free nations economic and financial assistance. It is a policy that, begun in the post war era of the Cold War, continues today, but with a different goal. It can be viewed as a strategy of the Cold War, one about which Nikolai Novikav warned in his telegram to the Kremlin while in the United States serving as the Soviet Ambassador to the United States. The speech is focused on providing economic and financial aid to Greece and Turkey, and Truman makes his case for assistance to both countries, warning Congress that the failure to do so would put Greece and Turkey in a position to be swallowed by communism. Truman warns that Greece is already experiencing the internal turmoil of terrorists (presumably communist insurgents).

Whitcomb, Roger S. The Cold War in Retrospect: The Formative Years. Westport, CT:

Praeger Publishers, 1998.

This book is yet another benefit of hindsight, and analyzes the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union in the moment of that era. Whitcomb focuses on the intentions and capabilities of the Soviet Union, presenting the contemporary analysis of that perspective. He limits his study in this book to the years of the necessary, but unlikely alliance between the Allied forces during World War II, and the period following the war, when the players went back to their separate sides, and the atmosphere grew increasingly cold. Whitcomb contends that it was the position of mutual antagonisms that fueled the Cold War, and he focuses on that as his thesis in a way in which the other works work around that idea in developing their respective theses. Zeroing in on the mutual antagonism that existed keeps the discussion in this book brief, but succinct in making the point of Whitcomb's thesis. It proves useful to a study on the Cold War because it explores the mutual antagonism in terms of culpability without bias.

White, Timothy J. "Cold War Historiography: New Evidence Behind Traditional

Typographies." International Social Science Review (2000): 35.

In this journal article, Timothy White attempts to examine the Cold War era in terms of a "new evidence," which is really the contemporary perspective void of the closeness that lends itself to emotional impact on historical reporting. He really does not introduce any new evidence by way of documents, but the newness of the perspective that is gained by time and distance from the actual events of the Cold War. It is what he describes as the "...passion that surrounded writing Cold War history.. (35)." It is important to have the discussion as to the importance of the distance in contemporary perspectives in any study about the Cold War era. In this way, White's journal article proves useful, because it covers the thesis in a concise and measured way using specific examples of leadership and events.

Wisseman, Nicholas. "Falsely Accused: Cold War Liberalism Reassessed." The Historian

Wisseman's journal article is of particular interest, because it examines the "liberal" American statesman, one of the driving forces behind the paranoia of the Cold War era. He brings a perspective to the study by introducing figures other than the heads of the government, such as the University of Illinois's President George D. Stoddard, who, in 1946, seemingly wrapped up in the prevailing air of paranoia, actually created an on-campus security office, the purpose of which was to perform surveillance of the university's student body for "subversiveness." It was an extraordinary period of people reacting to the rhetoric of the era, which served to heighten anxieties as well as fears. This is the kind of thing about Kennan warned against in his "The Long Telegram," and which manifested itself in some of the most intriguing and interesting social events in American history. The study of the Cold War era cannot be full informed without closely examining the paranoia that existed on both sides of the political ideological line.