Treaties Made between Germany and UK under Hitler

Through Hitler’s Eyes

Introduction

Weinberg indicates in Chapter 3: The World Through Hitler’s Eyes that the two driving factors of Hitler’s view on foreign policy had to do with race and space—i.e., the Jew problem (or the Aryan ideal) and the Master Plan for the expansion of Germany—i.e., Lebensraum (the push to increase Germans’ living space). Weinberg states that Hitler had a fixed view of the world, that it emanated from these two points, and that it was consistently discussed through the 1930s in Hitler’s writings and discourses.[footnoteRef:1] [1: Gerhard Weinberg, Through Hitler’s Eyes (), 32.]

Hitler’s Goals

Weinberg argues that Hitler believed that the space Germany required was primarily in the East, in Russia. This belief was a major aspect of his foreign policy and was emphasized in his book "Mein Kampf".[footnoteRef:2] The war that came about at the end of the 1930s was a result of this belief, as Weinberg puts it: Hitler acknowledged that wars resulted in casualties but argued that they were necessary for gaining land essential for the racial survival of the German people. Weinberg states that Hitler believed that wars should be fought for a significant purpose, such as acquiring a substantial amount of land, and considered the German borders of 1914 as inadequate for this purpose?.[footnoteRef:3] Weinberg asserts that Hitler's expansionist program had a potentially limitless character, too.[footnoteRef:4] He says Hitler envisioned a long-term trend towards world conquest, with the idea that space should be adjusted to an expanded population, which implied an ongoing cycle of conquest and expansion [2: Ibid 35.] [3: Ibid 35.] [4: Ibid 36.]

As Weinberg puts it, the whole of Hitler’s energy was bound up with this idea of expansion, sacrifice, and racial purity. He argues that Hitler promised to lead Germany as an absolute dictator in a series of wars. He was explicit about his intentions, stating that he had enough energy to lead the German people in shedding blood not merely for boundary adjustments but for securing enough land and space for the distant future of the nation. His vision was to acquire land that would compensate many times over for the bloodshed it would entail?. For that to happen, Hitler would need power; thus, Weinberg posits that Hitler confidently promised his followers that once in power, he would implement a forceful dictatorship in Germany and that he did not shy away from this ambition. Weinberg says Hitler’s plan included the strengthening of Germany's military capabilities following the elimination of its republican structures and ideologies and that he intended to guide the nation as an unquestioned dictator through a succession of wars that would help him to achieve his goals for the country.[footnoteRef:5] [5: Ibid 51.]

Thus, the goals of Hitler, according to Weinberg, were to preserve the racial purity of Germans and to obtain enough land for them (in the East) so that they could have a sustainable future. These were the motivating factors in Hitler’s aims. Weinberg points to Hitler’s discussions and writings as the sources for his argument.

Hitler’s Means

The means for obtaining these goals were war and dictatorship.[footnoteRef:6] It would be necessary for Hitler to have sole power over Germany and for a war with Russia to occur so that Germany could achieve the desired land. He would also have to convince the public to support him and his goals. [6: Ibid 51.]

Hitler's approach involved convincing the German public of his beliefs and policies through public meetings. He emphasized that if granted power, he would ruthlessly and brutally establish a dictatorship in Germany. This dictatorship was intended to build up Germany's military might after the dismantling of its republican institutions and ideas.

He also needed an ally—which he found in Italy. Weinberg notes that Italy’s alliance with Germany gave more weight to the idea of pursuing Lebensraum.[footnoteRef:7] Since both Germany and Italy were fascist powers, there was not much question of there being open conflict between the two states, and thus the possibility of coordination and collaboration was apparent. This was more than could be said for any of the other countries. Germany could not trust France or the Soviet Union, though it did try to win them over in different ways, primarily by appealing to the UK for help. Hitler believed that to persuade England into an alliance, Germany would need to abandon its world trade and naval goals, which had previously threatened England and led to its alliance against Germany with France and Russia.[footnoteRef:8] His new policy, focused on acquiring land in Europe for food production, would shift the competition away from global trade and potentially reduce hostility between Germany and England. Additionally, Hitler perceived France and Russia as threats to England, and the rising trade power of the United States as a third concern, thereby positioning Germany as a strategic partner for England against these threats [7: Ibid 45.] [8: Ibid 44.]

Hitler saw war not as a necessary evil so much as the preferrable option for achieving his ambitions, according to Weinberg.[footnoteRef:9] But he also so the necessity for making concessions along the way in order to gain time and support from the countries he could not trust. Thus, Weinberg argues that Hitler was willing to temporarily hold back on his ambitions for colonies and world trade as a strategic move to gain England's support. Treaties were always simply temporary in the overall plan, however.[footnoteRef:10] This tactical, political and diplomatic maneuvering on the part of Hitler included refraining from a ruthless pursuit of these goals, which might have jeopardized the support he sought from England. Similarly, he was willing to set aside the South Tirol issue as a tactical concession to maintain the needed alliance with Italy. However, Hitler's ultimate intentions were grander, as evidenced by his plans to annex large areas of northern Italy once Italy left the Axis?, as Weinberg says.[footnoteRef:11] [9: Ibid 37.] [10: Ibid 37.] [11: Ibid 47.]