U.S. Involvement in Vietnam From

¶ … U.S. involvement in Vietnam from very different perspectives, even though they sound very similar in title and purpose. Author Hearden notes that the U.S. was gearing up for economic dominance even before it entered World War II, and that economic concerns have always been primary in the government's concerns and actions, and that they began to formulate a plan which included foreign economic expansion to help protect the United States from future economic collapse and depression. Hearden writes, "In other words, they looked to new frontiers in the markets of the world in hopes of preserving capitalism in the United States" (Hearden 61). Thus, the United States involvement in many foreign countries resulted from their economic goals and ambitions, rather than a desire for democracy and freedom around the world. He clearly details how economic concerns fueled post-war economic and social decisions, and introduces "have-not nations," such as Germany and Japan, that needed help building their economies after World War II.

All of this leads to a development of a "new world order" that helped create an attitude of economic success over military build-up and a reduction of colonial monopolies that America felt could "undermine American economic interests" (Hearden 62). All this leads to the situation in Vietnam, which, when hostilities began, was a colonial dependent of France. As the author notes, "Many Oriental nationalists, noncommunist as well as communist, were talking about the need for a united Asian crusade to end European rule in the Far East" (Hearden 62). The Americans felt this could threaten economics and commerce around the world, and so, they opposed these types of movements, and thus, were concerned about the outcome of a war in Vietnam. Most people believe the war was an effort to keep communism from spreading during the Cold War, but in fact, Hearden maintains the war was really a way to ensure American economic interests stayed intact in Asia and around the world. In fact, he ties much of American diplomacy after the war to economic issues, from the Marshall Plan to the occupation of Japan. All of these missions seemed humanitarian and safety oriented, but Hearden shows the economic side of them, making the reader wonder if any decisions in Washington actually depend on diplomacy and democracy. Hearden's essay indicates most decisions are based soundly on capitalism, whether we like the thought or not.

Even though America did not support imperialism or French colonialism in Indochina, they did help France repopulate Vietnam after World War II, and so in affect helped support France's colonial endeavors, even as they attempted to alter them in the United Nations. Great Britain also assisted France, and many believe their presence in Vietnam helped exacerbate an already tense situation, leading to a strong nationalistic movement growing in the country. Ultimately, the United States began to believe communism was the biggest threat to economic growth and prosperity in Southeast Asia, and so, they began to take much more of an interest in the Communist government in North Vietnam, and that government's attempt to subdue South Vietnam. The war may have been loosely based on communism, but at the root was the idea that economic diversity and capitalism were the most important aspect of the area, and that they must be maintained at all costs.

On the other hand, Robert J. McMahon has a different view of America's involvement in Vietnam; he sees it as a strategic movement to help curb communism and the threat of Soviet dominance after the war. However, he also maintains that the basis for involvement in Vietnam was economic, rather than humanitarian or democratic. In the first paragraph of his essay he writes, "Indochina became crucial to Truman administration planners by the late 1940s because of a perceived relationship between stability in Southeast Asia and economic recovery in Western Europe and Japan" (McMahon 73). In effect, this is the same argument Hearden uses, and so, the two authors agree that economics was the factor that helped convince the United States to aid France and eventually send troops to Vietnam. While this may not be the most palatable of reasons to many Americans, the authors both make a very valid case for this economic theory of involvement.

However, McMahon also shows the diplomatic side of the war, such as the Truman administration ignoring please from Ho Chi Minh to support his new communist government in the country. Instead, the country supported France's efforts to recolonize and control Vietnam, which ultimately led to war and U.S. involvement in that war. The reader must wonder just what would have happened in Vietnam if the U.S. had recognized Ho's government and supported it. Perhaps the war would not have occurred, as the ultimate outcome would be the same - communist control of Vietnam. The U.S. wanted France to stop fighting in Vietnam, but they would not openly criticize them, and in fact, ultimately sent in troops to help support the French, and then fight after the French pulled out of the country.

Both authors tie the initial policy on Vietnam back to President Roosevelt, and maintain President Truman was actually following diplomatic ideas formed before and during World War II. He writes, "The preservation of the colonial system stood as an impediment to the kind of world order most conducive to U.S. interests" (McMahon 74). Thus, both authors tie the involvement in Vietnam to U.S. interests, rather than humanitarian concerns. Hearden maintains it was principally economics that fueled the war, while McMahon maintains it was the worldwide threat of communism that really fueled the war. Both arguments make sense, and should be considered in the overall discussion of American involvement in Vietnam. Each essay makes valid points, and open up new ideas for the reader about government and foreign policy.

Comparative Essay # 2

Both of these essays discuss the Tet Offensive that took place in February and March 1968, and showed Americans that American warriors were not indestructible or even in control of the situation in Vietnam. Author Buzzanco calls the offensive a "crippling defeat" for the United States, and illustrates how the government reacted to the defeat. It also shows how the American people reacted, and how anti-war sentiments began to mushroom during this time. He follows the reaction of General Westmoreland, from saying the offensive had been a success, to noting that the communist tactics included psychological and political objectives that included intimidation, loss of faith in the southern government, and diverting and confusing U.S. forces. Their objectives were met during the offensive, and Westmoreland did admit that, even if he could not admit the South Vietnamese forces were soundly defeated during the offensive. Author Buzzanco writes, "Thus at the same time that Westmoreland claimed military success, he conceded that the Communists were engaged in psychological and political warfare" (Buzzanco 337). In fact, after the Tet Offensive, this disruption continued quite effectively, undermining U.S. troops and South Vietnamese loyalty and trust in their government and military.

McMahon paints Westmoreland as a general at the end of his rope, begging for reinforcements after discovering the North Vietnamese Army was much stronger and better prepared than first established. It also shows him waffling from one side to the other, at first optimistic and then pessimistic about the chances of the South Vietnamese forces if additional American troops did not arrive quickly. Westmoreland did not get the troops, and that too makes the reader wonder what would have happened had the additional troops arrived. Would they have been able to take advantage of the situation and beat the North Vietnamese? Of course, these questions will never be answered now, but they do make these two essays more interesting and disturbing. There were many aspects of the war that were no understood by the American people, and many government decisions that clearly could have affected the outcome and duration of the war. In addition, the author shows a cold, calculating military machine that was more concerned with continuing the war than on the inevitable outcome. The author notes, "[T]he brass had conceded that substantive success would not be forthcoming, but left it to the president to accept responsibility for subsequent military failures in Indochina" (McMahon 341). Amazingly, the military was manipulating Washington throughout the war, and that affected the outcome and the public perception of the war.

McMahon also connects the war, and the refusal to send more troops to the military to the economy, and shows how the world economy centered on American gold, and the gold-dollar crisis was a major factor affecting the country after Tet. Both authors paint a picture of a desperate military who knew they were doomed and wanted to shift responsibility for failure to Washington. They even paint a picture of military ineptitude, deception, and mismanagement that is difficult to read. The lies about the early results of Tet are difficult to read as well, especially in hindsight of what happened at the end of the war. It is clear the military leaders refused to take responsibility for defeat, and had grossly underestimated the power and abilities of the North Vietnamese. They could not admit such a great loss, and so they concocted lies, false assessments, and poor recommendations just to cover themselves and their reputations. These essays are so disturbing because they show the culpability of the American people. They make the reader wonder what falsehoods are underway in military actions today, and if in another thirty years, the same kinds of revelations will continue the lies, deception, and false assessments that made up the Vietnam War.

Both authors indicate how essential the Tet Offensive was and how it crippled the military and gave the North Vietnamese a clear advantage in strategy and intimidation. It also caused Westmorland to bring in more troops, which started more protests back home and in other parts of the world. McMahon continues, "The resulting back channel memoranda between Westmoreland and Wheeler demonstrated that the military understood that its position in Vietnam was untenable" (McMahon 338). Thus, as early as 1968, there were suggestions Vietnam was a war that could not be won, and yet it lingered on until 1975. As with the last group of essays, the reader must wonder what would have happened if the military would have pulled out of Vietnam after the Tet Offensive. Certainly thousands of lives would have been saved on both sides of the conflict. In addition, the outcome would have remained the same, as the Communists overtook the country after American forces pulled out in 1975. These two essays are deeply disturbing because they paint a picture of the American military that understood it was fighting a losing battle, and fought on anyway.

It is clear both authors have studied the Tet Offensive and America's role in the offensive during and after it occurred. It is also clear that they find the military's actions and behavior unacceptable, which is probably why they chose to write about it. These essays show different aspects of the Tet and the military reaction to it, but they both show a military that is extremely willing to bend the truth and mislead the government and the American people. It is almost as if the military sees itself as a separate entity from the government and the country, and that is sees itself as the most important arm of the government. In doing so, it places itself above examination and reproach, and that is extremely frightening to consider. In fact, it calls into question many other military engagements. World War II was an allied victory, but after that, our military seems to take itself too seriously, and perhaps that is the ultimate Vietnam failure.

Comparative Essay #3

Small's essay discusses in detail the Nixon administration's development and implementation of their Vietnam policy, which basically continued Johnson's policy of reliance on bombing and participation in the Paris Peace Talks. He also discusses the American people's growing dissatisfaction with the war - feeling involvement had been a mistake, and becoming more vocal about their dissatisfaction. Small writes, "When Nixon took office, 40% of the population considered the war to be the nation's most serious problem" (Small 407). Small shows how the war overshadowed all of Nixon's thoughts in office, and how politically important the war had become. In fact, Nixon believed he would not be reelected by the American people if he did not successfully end the war during his first term in office. In fact, Nixon felt he had the ability to end the war within six months of taking office, but of course, that did not happen.

Small also discusses the anti-war movement, which was largely made up of "unruly" band of young people, often college students, who very vocally opposed the war. The author maintains that the anti-war movement of "hippies" alienated many conservative Americans, who helped Nixon get reelected in 1972, even though America did not leave the war until 1973. The anti-war movement was made up mostly of liberals and young people who were enraged about the continuing involvement in the war. While they alienated many, many more Americans agreed with the anti-war sentiments, and began to demand an end to the war by gradually bringing troops home. It also played into the hands of the enemy, and helped give them bargaining power, because they knew Americans were tired of the war and were putting political pressure on the administration. The anti-war sentiments seem remarkably close to the sentiments about the Iraqi war today, and reading these essays has to make the reader wonder what policies and actions are going to be criticized when the Iraq war finally ends. Americans are equally tired of the war in Iraq, and yet, the administration is not bowing to pressure. Comparing these essays and the war today, it is difficult to see how Iraq is going to end, but it seems certain that it is not going to end any better than Vietnam did.

The lies and deception continued through the Nixon administration, only this time the military had their way - the administration was deceiving the American public and the North Vietnamese, because peace talks required no escalation of military activities during the peace talks. Nixon got around this by creating a system of deception about increased American bombings in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. Again, this indicates the highly political nature of the war, and the duplicity on the part of the military and the administration. It does not seem to matter who is in charge in the White House; there will always be duplicity and deception. In addition, Nixon seems more concerned about his image, insisting he would not be "the first American president to lose a war" (Small 412), indicating how important public perception is even in wartime. It also shows how important the influence of the media is, as several of these essays address attempts to mislead or avoid the media, and Nixon was no different.