2014 Midterm Elections: Fear, Demographics, and Voter Turnout

Introduction

As was widely expected, the Republicans took the House and Senate in the 2014 midterm elections, shifting the balance of power in the United States government. The election was viewed by many as a referendum on President Obama's policies. The President said so (Martosko, 2014), conservative commentators said so (Krauthammer, 2014), and voters in exit polls expressed similar sentiments (Raedle, 2014). While this argument makes for effective political rhetoric, it ignores the fact that Obama ran for re-election in 2012. The Affordable Care Act had been passed, but nobody had yet seen its benefits — only heard the fearmongering. The economy was stagnant in 2012, compared to two strong quarters in 2014, and the unemployment rate had been declining for four straight years. If there was ever a time when a referendum on Obama's policies might have cost him, it would have been in 2012, not in the 2014 midterms — unless voters were looking for a way to punish the President without actually electing a Republican to the White House.

So what actually caused the results of the 2014 midterms? Was it a referendum on Obama's policies, or is that just political smoke? The broad trends point to Democratic strength in presidential elections going forward, but the Electoral College is not the same thing as congressional elections, and midterms differ fundamentally from presidential contests. With those realities in mind, this paper examines some of the key drivers behind recent electoral patterns.

Demographics and Turnout Patterns

The first issue is demographics, because the composition of the electorate differs significantly between midterms and presidential elections. Turnout is far lower in midterms, and that decline is steepest among groups that typically vote Democratic. In 2008, voters between the ages of 18 and 44 made up 46% of the electorate and voted heavily for Obama. In the 2014 midterms, that same age group accounted for only 32% of voters. This represents millions of reliably Democratic voters staying home, and the predictable effect on midterm results followed. Older voters, who made up 54% of the electorate in 2012, comprised 67% in 2014 (Judis, 2014).

These raw numbers do not even account for racial composition, where Democratic voters also stayed home in large numbers. Obama had carried upwards of 90% of the African American vote and had mobilized Black voters in ways that typically do not occur. In normal electoral cycles, African Americans are among the most disenfranchised groups in America, but they turned out specifically for Obama, and that enthusiasm carried other Democrats along with him. In 2014, there was no Black president on the ballot, and many Democratic candidates were actively distancing themselves from Obama and his policies — a strategy that failed decisively.

Was It a Referendum?

Judis (2014) argued that many midterm voters — who already skew Republican — used the opportunity to register opposition to Obama's policies, and that the number of people holding this sentiment was higher in 2014 than in 2010. However, there is a flaw in his reasoning. In 2010, more Democrats had legitimate chances of winning. Gerrymandering had effectively removed Democrats from the ballot in many 2014 contests, giving Democratic voters little reason to turn out. Judis also draws comparisons with 2006 and 1994, making the fair point that among voters who do participate in midterms, many view them as an opportunity to cast a ballot against the sitting president.

Judis (2014) also notes that Obama's strategy of staying out of the midterm fight essentially allowed Republicans to define the perception of his policies. He appeared weak to many voters, unwilling to defend his own record. Furthermore, Obama remaining on the sidelines meant that African American and young voters largely followed suit — his personal popularity among those groups does not transfer to other Democratic candidates unless he actively cultivates those associations. Most Democratic candidates in 2014 ran away from Obama's record, which only worsened their standing. It was a deeply counterproductive strategy, and it failed accordingly.

The policies that became focal points of the supposed referendum included the rollout of the Affordable Care Act, as cited by Judis (2014); fearmongering over ISIS and Ebola, as noted by Krauthammer (2014); and the threat of terrorism more broadly (Edsall, 2014). Democratic candidates largely cowered from defending the ACA as well. One might be cynical about an electorate that genuinely believes Republicans will do a better job managing the budget deficit (Edsall, 2014), but a flawed software rollout that most people never used, and vague fear about events unfolding on other continents, hardly constitutes a credible basis for electoral judgment. That may be precisely why more educated voters continued to support Democratic candidates.

Demographics remain the most critical explanatory factor in the 2014 midterms. Older white voters participate in midterms at high rates and have historically trended Republican. White middle-class voters, operating largely on low political information, often cast reflexive ballots against the sitting president — a pattern that also held for the two presidents before Obama. Voters who feel angry are more likely to turn out in midterms than voters who are satisfied (Judis, 2014). But the 2014 midterm results do not represent a broad national trend, because the midterm electorate is simply not representative of the presidential electorate, nor of the American public as a whole.

Conclusion

What stands out most about 2008 is that it appeared, at least on the surface, to be an election that transcended fear. Framing a campaign around hope during a recession and two ongoing wars was a remarkable political achievement. But by 2014, the country had returned to a fear-dominated political culture, with battle lines more sharply drawn than at almost any point in recent memory. That is precisely why demographics, media, and mobilization matter as much as they do: when your demographic doesn't vote at the same rate as the opposition's, you lose. The 2014 midterm results were not a genuine referendum on Obama's policies in any meaningful sense — he had already survived such a test in 2012. Most voters who claimed anger over the ACA were not even directly affected by it, and they were never likely Obama supporters to begin with. There was no sea change in broad public sentiment. The 2014 midterms largely reflected the structural status quo — the enduring fear and conflict between different classes of Americans — and, most simply, a reflection of who showed up to express that conflict at the ballot box, and who did not.

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