Air Power Doctrine Development: 1903 to World War II

Introduction

Air doctrine is essentially an innovation of the 20th century whose origin can be traced back to 1903, when the Wright brothers flew the first airplane (Bakshi, 1999). However, the first fledgling use of air power occurred during World War I (1914–1918), where airplanes were initially employed for scouting, artillery detection, and reconnaissance. This was followed by the use of air power for air-to-air combat and restricted bombing and strafing missions. Air power doctrine continued to grow through the years as significant developments took place in both military and civilian settings. This paper examines the major developments in the history of air doctrine from 1903 to the end of World War II. The analysis of these developments is linked to the works of different theorists, including Sun Tzu, Mao, Jomini, Clausewitz, and Douhet.

Brief History of Air Doctrine Developments

According to Bakshi (1999), the history of air power doctrine can be traced back to 1903, when the first airplane was flown by the Wright brothers. Since then, air power doctrine has undergone significant developments as societies across the globe have continued to evolve. One of the major events that marked the history and application of air power doctrine occurred during World War I (1914–1918). This period marked a significant turning point in the history of air power doctrine by determining its initial application. During this period, air power doctrine was utilized for scouting, artillery detection, and reconnaissance — uses geared toward gaining an advantage over adversaries. The use of air power for these purposes paved the way for its application in combat. In addition to scouting, reconnaissance, and artillery spotting, air power was later used for air-to-air combat and limited bombing and strafing missions.

The period between World War I and World War II marked the greatest developments in the history of air doctrine. During this period, air power was essentially a new technological high-ground. As noted by Green (2010), air power was an unprecedented intellectual achievement during this period. Germany and the USSR developed the concept of Land-Air Battle Doctrines as part of their air power strategy. Maritime nations, however, differed from continental powers like Germany, viewing air power as an autonomous outgrowth of a new dimension of power. Japanese air power doctrines, meanwhile, heavily emphasized the creation and aggressive exploitation of naval aviation. The application of air doctrine between 1903 and World War II was thus shaped by the ideals and views of different theorists who influenced how nations and adversaries conceived of war.

The initial period in the history of air doctrine begins with the Wright brothers' first flight in 1903 (Bakshi, 1999). The successful invention of the first airplane marked a significant turning point in the history of aviation. For the Wright brothers, the invention was the culmination of a series of gliders they had designed, created, and tested since 1899. When designing the first airplane, they noted that the issue was not primarily getting into the air but determining what to do once the plane was airborne (Paur, 2009). To resolve this, the brothers observed birds to inform their design. They employed a wing-warping technique, which culminated in the creation of a successful airplane on December 17, 1903.

Pre-World War I: 1903–1914

The history of air power doctrine is closely connected to the development of this first successful airplane and flight. According to Hall (2011), the idea of air power in the military domain emerged nearly at the same time as the field of aviation itself. The invention of the first successful airplane paved the way for the conceptualization of air doctrine in the period between 1903 and World War I. The accelerating characteristics of World War I influenced the development of air power as nascent air forces faced extraordinary conditions. Air forces began examining a variety of available military applications, and by 1918, techniques and equipment had been developed for nearly every form of aerial mission.

The exploration of different military applications that contributed to the emergence of air power can be understood through the views of theorists like Carl von Clausewitz and Baron Antoine Jomini. Clausewitz's theory of war emphasizes the idea of strategic centers of gravity that serve as the focal point in a war (Barlow, 1992). He argues that the center of gravity is not merely a source of strength or critical capability, but an effects-based concept: striking the center of gravity with adequate force causes an adversary to lose balance and fall. In his theory, Jomini referred to the center of gravity as "decisive strategic points," arguing that the key to victory lies in attacking the enemy at the decisive place and time. Clausewitz's theory emphasizes a specific effect — the collapse or fall of the adversary (Echevarria II, 2002).

The concept of "center of gravity" seemingly influenced the conceptualization of air power doctrine. Clausewitz postulated that the center of gravity was vital to compelling an adversary in war or bending him to one's will (Hall, 2011). Air power emerged as a concept that would give one side an advantage by striking the adversary's center of gravity to achieve a desired effect. Even though the center of gravity is traditionally seen as an adversary's armed forces, it takes many forms and degrees of accessibility. Air power represented one such degree or form of accessing an enemy's force. The inception of air power made it possible to initiate strategic strikes against an enemy without making contact in conventional sea or land warfare, thereby circumventing the enemy's forces and striking directly at his center of gravity (Hall, 2011).

In light of Clausewitz's theory and the invention of the first airplane, the emergence of air power doctrine was characterized by increased research and technological advancement. Research focused on promoting the seamless and effective incorporation of airplanes into military settings. Technological advancements involved the exploration of techniques and equipment designed to capitalize on the advantages of air power. Militaries across the globe adapted the Wright Flyer and subsequent models for combat operations (Francis, 2020). In the United States, this process included the establishment of the Aeronautical Division of the U.S. Army Signal Corps in August 1907, followed by the creation of the Aviation Section of the Signal Corps through a 1914 federal law — a significant step representing the statutory integration of air power into the military organization.

Following the Imperial Russian War Ministry's conclusion in 1909 that the airplane had great untapped military potential, airplanes were recognized as key tools in the reconnaissance role (Kainikara, 2005). By 1911, airplanes were part of many military missions and army maneuvers in Russia. That same year, an Italian officer dropped several small bombs on a Turkish camp in North Africa — one of the earliest instances of aerial bombardment (Mark, 1994). Many countries, including the United States, Germany, and Russia, made steady progress in organization, technology, and equipment for air power between 1912 and 1914. However, progress — especially in Russia — was not rapid enough to meet the demands placed on air power at the start of World War I.

The First World War (1914–1918) marked a significant period in the history of air doctrine. Numerous developments took place during the war and shaped the application of air power as a potent military tool and strategy. Air power gained significant traction during this period as it was used for scouting, artillery spotting, and reconnaissance. Adopted by many militaries worldwide as a new technological high-ground, air power doctrine was applied broadly across the conflict. The early application of air power in initial stages of the war paved the way for its later use in air-to-air combat and bombing missions, though early bombing operations remained limited in scope.

World War I: 1914–1918

The first clearly defined air power doctrine emerged toward the end of World War I, even though substantial imaginative assumptions had circulated earlier regarding the use of the airplane as a weapon of war (Kainikara, 2005). Annexes to the Second Hague Convention of 1907 served as one of the early factors shaping air power doctrine, as the airplane was recognized as a weapon of war, though the same annexes prohibited attacks against villages, towns, hospitals, and houses.

The first serious and protracted aerial conflict in the history of mankind took place during World War I and shaped the definition of air power doctrine. This conflict was fought over the Western Front and served as the precedent for all future aerial battles. Aerial conflict at the Western Front reached its peak between 1917 and 1918, during which the air forces of different nations developed into well-organized units with clear mission capabilities — including bomber squadrons, observation units, and fighter squadrons.

Bomber squadrons played a major role in the aerial conflict at the Western Front and significantly influenced the development of air doctrine. From May 1917 to May 1918, bombing had become a critical part of aerial conflict as airplanes proved themselves dangerous weapons of war. During this period, nearly 27 day and night attacks were made by German Gotha bombers against English targets, dropping approximately 11,935 kg of bombs that killed 835 people and injured 1,972, and causing property damage worth £1,418,272 (Kainikara, 2005). While these numbers were trivial compared to the casualties from Europe's trench warfare, the attacks demonstrated the devastating capacity of the airplane to transcend the battlefield and strike beyond fighting armies. Following these attacks, a dedicated Bomber Wing was created within the Royal Flying Corps and tasked with strategic bombing missions. The Royal Air Force was subsequently established as an autonomous service based on the recommendations of General Jan Smuts.

The strategic bombing that characterized air power toward the end of World War I can be attributed to theorists such as Giulio Douhet, Viscount Hugh Trenchard, and William Mitchell. According to Biddle (2019), Giulio Douhet — commander of the Italian Army aviation section before the war — was the most assertive and vocal early advocate of air power. Douhet's vision was influenced by the connection between airplanes and chemical warfare. He postulated that wars could be rapidly won by implementing a strategic air power campaign against the enemy's homeland, viewing the enemy's civilian population as a key strategic target (Hall, 2011). For Douhet, air power could singlehandedly bring a nation to its knees as a tool of strategic bombardment.

Viscount Hugh Trenchard's theory of war established four principles of air power: achieving mastery of the air; destroying an enemy's production and coordination through strategic bombing; maintaining the battle free of enemy interference; and preventing the enemy from maintaining the battle. Trenchard introduced the concepts of "air control" or the "air method" and argued that air power could substitute for ground and naval forces as a cost-effective strategy with minimal friendly casualties (Kainikara, 2005). Trenchard differed from Douhet, however, by arguing that strategic bombing campaigns should be conducted within the confines of international law to limit collateral damage.

For General William Mitchell, aerial advantage and superiority would be realized through uninterrupted attacks on an enemy's air power — both on the ground and in aerial battle. Mitchell advocated for the independence of air forces as a means of enhancing the efficacy of air power (O'Neill, 2011). The key tenets of his air power doctrine included strategic bombardment of vital population areas and industrial centers, as well as air defense measures to enable the conduct of strategic bombing.

The ideas of Douhet, Trenchard, and Mitchell dominated air power doctrine during World War I, particularly toward the war's end as strategic bombing and the establishment of independent air forces became widespread. Warring nations adopted these strategies based on these theorists' ideas and used them as the premise for gaining advantages over their enemies. As evident in the major concepts these theorists developed, air power doctrine toward the end of World War I centered on the idea that air power could be used to bring an enemy to his knees — consistent with the progressive expansion principle of guerrilla warfare developed by Mao (Ogan, 1994).

Conclusion

Air power doctrine has undergone a continuous evolution as societies and the military have grown and changed. The origin of air power doctrine can be traced back to 1903, when the first successful airplane was developed by the Wright brothers. This invention paved the way for the emergence of the aviation industry and the eventual integration of airplanes into the military setting. The period between 1903 and the end of World War II was characterized by various events that served as significant milestones in air doctrine's development. From 1903 to the end of World War II, air doctrine experienced major developments encompassing the concepts of aerial bombardment, strategic bombing, industrial targeting, and air superiority. These developments, shaped by the intellectual contributions of theorists including Clausewitz, Jomini, Douhet, Trenchard, Mitchell, Sherman, Sun Tzu, and Mao, demonstrate that air doctrine is a dynamic concept whose ideas must continue to evolve to meet current and future needs.