American Air Power in World War II: Strategy and Combat
This paper examines American air power during World War II, tracing the development of strategic and tactical doctrine from the interwar period through major combat operations in Europe. Drawing on primary reports from the Army Air Forces, David Spires's Patton's Air Force, and firsthand accounts from airmen, the paper covers pre-war preparation, the evolving relationship between air and ground commands, the flexibility of tactical air units such as the XIX TAC, and the personal experiences of crew members and POWs. It also addresses the role of body armor in protecting fliers and concludes by reflecting on the extraordinary dangers faced by WWII airmen.
- Introduction to American Air Power Leading Up to WWII: Pre-war assets, industry conversion, and early air planning
- Doctrine and the Air-Ground Command Struggle: Evolving doctrine and air-ground command authority disputes
- Air Power Flexibility and Versatility During WWII: XIX TAC cooperation with ground forces in France, 1944
- Personal Accounts: Airmen in Combat and Captivity: B-17 gunner's letter and Zemke's POW experience
- Body Armor and Crew Protection: Development and use of flak suits for aircrews
- Conclusion: Reflecting on WWII airmen's danger versus modern air warfare
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What makes this paper effective
- It grounds abstract doctrinal arguments in concrete primary sources — the Army Air Forces report to the Secretary of War, field manuals, and Spires's detailed historical account — giving the analysis credibility.
- The paper balances macro-level policy history (air-ground command disputes, FM 100-20) with vivid human detail (the B-17 gunner's letter, Zemke's POW ordeal), creating a compelling range of evidence.
- The conclusion effectively connects WWII air combat to modern imagery of aerial warfare, giving the paper a reflective, resonant closing rather than a dry summary.
Key academic technique demonstrated
The paper demonstrates synthesis across heterogeneous source types — institutional reports, military histories, personal memoirs, and letters — weaving them into a coherent narrative about the evolution of U.S. air power doctrine. This multi-source synthesis shows how secondary scholarship and primary accounts can reinforce each other to build an argument.
Structure breakdown
The paper opens with dictionary definitions of strategic and tactical air power, then moves through a roughly chronological arc: pre-war preparation and assets, interwar doctrinal debates, the air-ground command struggle, operational flexibility in 1944 France, personal human accounts from airmen, crew protection measures, and a reflective conclusion. Each section corresponds to a distinct theme while contributing to the overall argument about how American air power matured during the war.
Introduction to American Air Power Leading Up to WWII
Strategic Air Power: "…designed or trained to strike an enemy at the sources of his military, economic, or political power." Tactical Air Power: "…using or being weapons or forces employed at the battlefront; of, relating to, or designed for air attack in close support of friendly ground forces…" — Merriam-Webster Online
The United States Air Force Museum's section on WWII Combat Europe features a lengthy report from the Commanding General of the Army Air Forces, sent to the Secretary of War. In Section One, the report stressed several points that led to the development of both strategic and tactical methods for defeating the Nazis in Europe. The following points were addressed in a section called "Assets and Liabilities":
There were 30,000 civilian pilots in America in 1939, many of them willing to train pilots for the war effort. The DC-3 was readily available as a reliable transport plane. Production of the B-17 Flying Fortress bombers and the B-24 Liberator began in 1938, and mass production of those aircraft began in 1941. American industry showed remarkable flexibility in converting to the war effort: "Only in America would a piano company believe that it could convert to building aircraft wings in a few months, and do it"; "a tire manufacturer built fuselages and tail surfaces"; a "former pickle plant turned out airplane skis and floats…and a manufacturer of girdles and corsets began making parachutes."
In a section called "Blueprints for Air Power," the Commanding General wrote that the Army Air Forces began preparations for war "long before Pearl Harbor." Prior to 1935 — when the General Headquarters Air Force was established — the Army's air power was under the "piecemeal direction of Corps Commanders." A ten-year program had been set up, providing some preparation for WWII, although "the Army Air Forces received but a small fraction of the promised funds."
Following WWI, according to David N. Spires's Patton's Air Force, "many army air leaders came to view close air support of army ground forces as second- or third-order priority." The most important use of air technology after WWI, Spires argues, was preventing enemy reconnaissance. In the early 1920s, tactical air strategy focused on maintaining more planes in the air than the enemy so that operations below could be observed. The second most important use of air power was "interdiction, or isolation of the battlefield by bombing lines of supply and communications behind them" (p. 1). Third in priority was "attacking enemy forces at the front, in the immediate combat zone" — a strategy that, prior to WWII, was considered "the most dangerous and least efficient use of air resources."
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