American Air Power in World War II: Strategy and Combat

Introduction to American Air Power Leading Up to WWII

Strategic Air Power: "…designed or trained to strike an enemy at the sources of his military, economic, or political power." Tactical Air Power: "…using or being weapons or forces employed at the battlefront; of, relating to, or designed for air attack in close support of friendly ground forces…" — Merriam-Webster Online

The United States Air Force Museum's section on WWII Combat Europe features a lengthy report from the Commanding General of the Army Air Forces, sent to the Secretary of War. In Section One, the report stressed several points that led to the development of both strategic and tactical methods for defeating the Nazis in Europe. The following points were addressed in a section called "Assets and Liabilities":

There were 30,000 civilian pilots in America in 1939, many of them willing to train pilots for the war effort. The DC-3 was readily available as a reliable transport plane. Production of the B-17 Flying Fortress bombers and the B-24 Liberator began in 1938, and mass production of those aircraft began in 1941. American industry showed remarkable flexibility in converting to the war effort: "Only in America would a piano company believe that it could convert to building aircraft wings in a few months, and do it"; "a tire manufacturer built fuselages and tail surfaces"; a "former pickle plant turned out airplane skis and floats…and a manufacturer of girdles and corsets began making parachutes."

In a section called "Blueprints for Air Power," the Commanding General wrote that the Army Air Forces began preparations for war "long before Pearl Harbor." Prior to 1935 — when the General Headquarters Air Force was established — the Army's air power was under the "piecemeal direction of Corps Commanders." A ten-year program had been set up, providing some preparation for WWII, although "the Army Air Forces received but a small fraction of the promised funds."

Following WWI, according to David N. Spires's Patton's Air Force, "many army air leaders came to view close air support of army ground forces as second- or third-order priority." The most important use of air technology after WWI, Spires argues, was preventing enemy reconnaissance. In the early 1920s, tactical air strategy focused on maintaining more planes in the air than the enemy so that operations below could be observed. The second most important use of air power was "interdiction, or isolation of the battlefield by bombing lines of supply and communications behind them" (p. 1). Third in priority was "attacking enemy forces at the front, in the immediate combat zone" — a strategy that, prior to WWII, was considered "the most dangerous and least efficient use of air resources."

Doctrine and the Air-Ground Command Struggle

By the mid-1930s, strategic bombardment had become the most widely accepted doctrine among leaders of the Army Air Corps. The U.S. Army Training Regulation 440 (Employment of the Air Forces of the Army) listed "strategic bombardment" as a priority "equal to that of ground support" (Spires, p. 3). That itself represented a shift from earlier strategy. By the April 15, 1940 Army Field Manual, Employment of the Aviation of the Army, the use of tactical aviation in wartime was "rekindled" — due in large part to German blitzkrieg victories.

Notwithstanding this increased credibility, Spires notes that following maneuvers in Louisiana and North Carolina in 1941, "a shortage of aircraft, unrealistic training requirements, inexperience, and divergent air and ground outlooks on close air support led both General Arnold and Lt. Gen. Lesley J. McNair, Commanding General of the Army Ground Forces, to declare" joint training between air and ground commanders "unsatisfactory." By the spring of 1942, the "state of air-ground training" in the Army was "cause for genuine concern" (Spires, p. 4).

A predictable yet seemingly restrained power struggle unfolded during the buildup to U.S. engagement in Europe, between ground forces and air command units. A Field Manual issued on April 9, 1942 (Aviation in Support of Ground Forces) offered "much to satisfy the most ardent air power proponents in the newly designated Army Air Forces (AAF)" (Spires, p. 4). The manual established layers of authority: ground commanders would initiate requests for air power through air support parties, which would then be sent to air support command for approval. If approved, air support command would issue orders to aircraft. The central tension, however, remained: would ground command control air command?

By July 1943, following major fighting in North Africa — where German air power had proven far stronger than the Allies had anticipated — an Army Field Manual (FM 100-20) used capital letters to announce a new attitude regarding U.S. air power. Its key message read: "LAND POWER AND AIR POWER ARE CO-EQUAL AND INTERDEPENDENT FORCES…NEITHER IS AN AUXILIARY OF THE OTHER." In lower case, the manual continued: "The gaining of air superiority is the first requirement for the success of any major land operation." The first mission priority was developing "improved communications equipment" and a "reliable early warning radar network." Second was "interdiction — aerial attack on enemy lines of communication and supply behind the front line — designed to achieve isolation of the battlefield." Third was "close air support — attacking enemy forces near or on the front line." This doctrinal shift codified in FM 100-20 fundamentally reordered the relationship between air and ground forces for the remainder of the war.

One clear example of versatility within air commands, and of cooperation between ground forces, Tactical Air Command, and strategic air power, occurred in September 1944, when the XIX TAC "embraced air support responsibilities on three fronts" (Spires, p. 103). In eastern France the TAC flew "armed reconnaissance and column cover missions" to support the Third Army's advance into the Metz river area; it kept watch on Patton's flank and flew "interdiction sorties" against Nazi forces withdrawing from southern France; and it played the "key tactical air role in Brittany" during the sieges of the Breton fortified port facilities. Patton, meanwhile, garrisoned the "north bank of the Loire River thinly" with VIII Corps and "relied entirely on his air arm to alert him to and blunt any tactical threats from the Germans" (p. 104). The air command "greatly benefited from Ultra intelligence on German locations," and from the outset the "watch on the Loire" became largely an air force operation, marking "an historic milestone for tactical air power."

Air Power Flexibility and Versatility During WWII

Another classic example of the sophistication that the XIX TAC had achieved in coordination with Patton occurred on September 7, when a squadron of F-3s located a long German vehicle column along the Loire River near Châteauroux. The pilot radioed the 406th Fighter Group, which "expended all of its ordnance and ammunition" (Spires, p. 106). When the 406th group departed to rearm, many vehicles were already destroyed and on fire. Upon returning, the group completed the mission; in total, some 132 motor transport vehicles and 310 horse-drawn German war vehicles were demolished. Spires describes this mission as "the most outstanding example of reconnaissance-fighter-bomber coordination that, by September 1944, had developed into a routine but very effective system."

Even more remarkable, on September 9, XIX TAC forces — led by General Weyland — learned that a large number of German troops might be prepared to surrender. Reconnaissance aircraft flew over the long column, and surrender terms were offered. The Germans were informed that if the terms were not accepted, the XIX TAC would "return to attack them" (Spires, p. 107). Upon confirmation that 20,000 Germans would surrender, Army General Simpson invited Weyland to attend the ceremony. Weyland "was pleased to hear that the XIX TAC's aerial presence overhead received primary credit for compelling the surrender." It was unprecedented: never before had "an air commander been present or received such laurels when one ground unit surrendered to another." The XIX Tactical Air Command's role in this surrender stands as one of the most distinctive achievements of American tactical air power in the European theater.

"Dying can't be hard, it's the uncertainty which makes one fear it," wrote a gunner aboard a B-17, to his mother, in September 1943, from "somewhere in England." "All of the family pictures are before me on the table," he continued. "I can close my eyes and imagine myself in our own living room at home, talking with you." He wrote that his family should "feel resigned," but in a way, "happy for my sake" — a puzzling statement, he acknowledged, meant to convey that he considered himself fortunate to still be alive.

That he remained alive was remarkable, given the constant casualties and the stream of new replacements arriving daily. "In combat mess almost every face is unfamiliar," he wrote. "We are not fighting for our country, but each of us for our own family, for our own plot of ground back home." He closed by writing that he would be "seeing you all again, sometime, somewhere" — a suggestion that the reunion might be in heaven. "Until then, lots of love, your son." [Note: The writer did survive the war but preferred his name not be used in this published letter.]

Conclusion

Green, Daniel. World War II Guide to Air Power: Body Armor ("Flak Suits"). [Information online] (Accessed 3 September 2004); available at http://www.ww2guide.com.

McManus, John C. Deadly Sky: The American Combat Airman in World War II. Novato, California: Presidio, 2000.

Merriam-Webster Online. "Strategic," "Tactical." Available at

Middlebrook, Martin. The Schweinfurt-Regensburg Mission. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1983.

Spires, David N. Patton's Air Force: Forging a Legendary Air-Ground Team. Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2002.

USAF Museum. Report of the Commanding General of the Army Air Forces to the Secretary of War: Section One: Before Pearl Harbor: Assets and Liabilities, 2004.

USAF Museum. Report of the Commanding General of the Army Air Forces to the Secretary of War: Section One: Before Pearl Harbor: Blueprints for Air Power, 2004.

Zemke, Hubert, as told to Freeman, Roger A. Zemke's Stalag. Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1991.