U.S. Reliance on the National Guard in World War II

Introduction to the National Guard

The National Guard is a militia of the United States of America. The U.S. Constitution has authorized this militia and specified its different functions and roles within both the federal and state governments. According to Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution, Congress has been granted the authority "to call forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions" ("National Guard," 2013). The power to organize, arm, and discipline the militia was granted to Congress; however, it remained the responsibility of the individual states to appoint officers and train the militia. The Second Amendment contained further provisions regarding the regulation of the militia ("National Guard," 2013).

In general, the National Guard is answerable to state jurisdiction during peacetime. Governors have the authority to suppress local unrest and disorder using the National Guard. The 1967 riots in Newark and Detroit are examples of governors employing the National Guard to manage overwhelming domestic circumstances. The National Guard is also used to assist in local-level disasters such as floods, earthquakes, and severe storms. In wartime, the National Guard is incorporated into the United States' active service, with the President acting as commander-in-chief ("National Guard," 2013).

The equipment and human resources of the National Guard are standardized to match U.S. Army regulations. Recruitment and mobilization are voluntary, and the federal government is responsible for compensating those who serve. Volunteers are paid even for time spent in field training or drill periods ("National Guard," 2013).

War in Europe and America's Entrance into World War II

The armed forces of Nazi Germany were unleashed by Adolf Hitler on the morning of September 1, 1939, against Poland. The people of Europe, already fearful of another war after the brutal conflict of World War I, watched anxiously for the response of France and Great Britain. Both powers had previously accepted Hitler's demands and threats. However, when Hitler violated the Munich Agreement, the Allies made the firm decision to stand behind Poland. They declared war on September 3, after which the world witnessed the brutal events of World War II (Sligh & Beaumont, 1992).

It is important to note that after World War I, Americans were determined to stay out of European conflicts. The American government and people quickly concluded that their participation in World War I had been a costly mistake, and that they must avoid involvement in future wars. They adopted policies aimed at reducing international tensions while maintaining a strong defensive military posture. The late 1920s proved an especially difficult period as the country suffered through the Great Depression, which caused millions of Americans to endure prolonged hardship. Although the Great Depression affected other countries as well, it was in the United States that people continued to suffer for many years (Winkler, 2000).

Moreover, the United Kingdom and France had been indebted to the United States but failed to repay those debts when America needed them most. This perceived betrayal prompted the United States to revise its foreign policy, adopting a strategy of neutrality and turning inward. The country embraced a policy of isolationism and self-reliance, focusing primarily on domestic affairs. These were the principal reasons why the American government and people resisted entering World War II (Winkler, 2000).

It was not entirely surprising to Americans that Europe had become embroiled in yet another brutal war, as this outcome had been predicted by early twentieth-century isolationists. Many Americans believed that European antagonism, domestic political rivalries, and longstanding grudges would inevitably lead to violent conflict (Sligh & Beaumont, 1992).

Nevertheless, President Roosevelt was deeply troubled by events in Europe. During his first term he had focused primarily on domestic problems, but his anxiety grew in the late 1930s as he observed the rising ambitions of Italy, Germany, and Japan, convincing him that the United States would unavoidably be drawn into World War II (Fleming, 2001). Given the isolationist attitudes of Congress and the American public, he devised a plan to rebuild the nation's defenses while ensuring that Hitler's opponents received substantial aid. As the historian Robert A. Divine noted, "Roosevelt shared the isolationist desire to keep the United States out of armed conflict, yet he also followed a seemingly interventionist policy of rendering aid to anti-fascist nations" (Sligh & Beaumont, 1992, p. 5).

Background: The State of U.S. Armed Forces in 1939

As Europe became engulfed in war in September 1939, the United States Army ranked seventeenth in the world (Doubler, 2003). To augment this force, the National Guard could play a decisive role, even though the militia was neither well-equipped nor adequately trained for a conflict of such scale. When President Roosevelt assessed the situation, however, he moved quickly to approve an increase in the Guard's size and authorize more appropriate training for its volunteers. Even so, this fell short of what the Army believed was necessary to prepare soldiers for modern warfare. Roosevelt remained cautious about committing to such consequential action for a public that was, for the most part, isolationist in outlook (Sligh & Beaumont, 1992).

The Army, too, was reluctant to undertake the training and reorganization of the National Guard. One major reason the United States ultimately chose to rely on the Guard during World War II was that the Guard's officer corps was represented by the National Guard Association, which possessed one of the most effective political lobbies of that era (Sligh & Beaumont, 1992).

This inescapable involvement in World War II placed the U.S. Army and General George Catlett Marshall, who had just been installed as Chief of Staff, in a difficult position. They faced the critical challenge of acquiring sufficient men and materiel to defend the United States and the Western Hemisphere against any expansion of the European war. Like Roosevelt, Marshall encountered opposition from a Congress heavily influenced by isolationist, conservative, and parochial politics (Bunting, 2005). In addition, the National Guard Association of the United States (NGA) complicated Marshall's task, as it operated as a quasi-independent military force with strong ties to the political lobby (Sligh & Beaumont, 1992).

As the voice of the Guard's officer corps, the NGA sought federal funding and a prominent role in national defense. Yet both Marshall and the NGA failed to foresee that World War II would fundamentally transform the way American society raised and maintained its armed forces for the next four decades. In time, neither the Army nor the National Guard would resemble what they had been before the war (Sligh & Beaumont, 1992).

The Army that General Craig had handed over to Marshall was far from strong. As noted, it ranked seventeenth in the world. Despite Roosevelt's persistent lobbying of Congress to increase defense spending, the U.S. Army numbered only about 180,000 officers and men. Some 50,000 troops were stationed in Hawaii and other territories outside the continental United States, including the Philippine Islands and the Panama Canal Zone (Sligh & Beaumont, 1992).

Within the continental United States, units were dispersed across one hundred and thirty posts — remnants of the Indian Wars era for the most part (Doubler, 2003). Nine infantry divisions and two cavalry divisions formed the combat units, yet these existed largely as paper organizations: none were anywhere close to authorized peacetime strength. The Second Division, the largest, had approximately ten thousand men — still four thousand short of its required number (Sligh & Beaumont, 1992).

In 1938, Roosevelt had paid considerable attention to the Army Air Corps, believing it would serve as the primary means of defending the United States against a seaborne attack. He persuaded Congress to fund the production of ten thousand aircraft per year in order to deter Hitler and his Nazi forces. However, he issued no orders to increase the number of ground officers and soldiers or to improve training, despite the Army's insistence that both were urgently necessary (Sligh & Beaumont, 1992).

By September 1939, the Army Air Corps contained approximately twenty-six thousand men and two thousand aircraft. As with the infantry, it suffered from severe manpower shortages and obsolete equipment (Sligh & Beaumont, 1992). The Army's combat capability thus rested primarily on its infantrymen. Driven by isolationism and tight military budgets, the Army had done very little to advance military aviation or the mechanization of warfare (Doubler, 2003).

The National Guard and the Army Reserve were the two principal reserve organizations available to the U.S. Army at that time. Fortunately, their combined numbers exceeded those of the Regular Army. According to 1939 figures, "the Army Reserve contained a total of 119,773, with 104,228 in the Active Officer Reserve Corps and 12,408 inactive reserve officers" (Sligh & Beaumont, 1992, p. 21). The Enlisted Reserve Corps numbered approximately three thousand men. Critically, the Army Reserve had no formed units — it consisted solely of individual soldiers available as fillers for an expanded Army (Sligh & Beaumont, 1992).

By comparison, the National Guard was far stronger than the Regular Army in terms of organized units. Unlike the Reserve, the Guard maintained 18 infantry divisions and 4 cavalry divisions. That said, the Guard had also suffered the consequences of the postwar era and the Great Depression (Sligh & Beaumont, 1992).

Conclusion

It is undoubtedly correct that the National Guard units played an integral part in the victories of the United States in both World Wars, especially in World War II. In both conflicts, the National Guard divisions functioned as a prepared and solid force, organizing and deploying rapidly as soon as hostilities began. Without the National Guard's involvement in World War II, the initial American ground response might have taken considerably longer than the several months it actually required. While the primary fighting burden in winning World War II ultimately fell on draftees, the National Guard made a tremendous contribution by buying the time needed for Army units to assemble, train, and prepare to confront the enemy (Doubler, 2003).

Another major contribution of the National Guard in World War II was the guardsmen's ability to adapt to mechanized warfare, quickly mastering the operation of new technologies including tanks, machine guns, and aircraft. This adaptability was a significant factor in America's ultimate triumph. Experienced and capable officers within Guard divisions organized and guided enlisted men effectively, proving themselves leaders who could fight and coordinate armed forces simultaneously (Doubler, 2003).

In the end, the "guardsmen came home at the end of World War II knowing that they had helped to secure freedom throughout the world while greatly elevating America's status as a world power" (Doubler, 2003). After the war, the National Guard emerged as a successful, self-sustaining volunteer militia and subsequently evolved into a federally supported military force. A survey of American military history reveals that the United States has almost always relied on volunteers recruited through state militia units. The state defense forces that exist today are the direct organizational descendants of those traditional militias. The U.S. Army has consistently depended on the National Guard and similar reserve forces for the defense of both the nation and the homeland (Cooper, 1997).

References

Bunting, J. (2005, Nov.–Dec.). George Marshall: An American for all seasons. Humanities, 26, 22+.

Cooper, J. (1997). The rise of the National Guard: The evolution of the American militia, 1865–1920. University of Nebraska Press.

Doubler, M. D. (2001, Summer). The National Guard at war. Joint Force Quarterly, 1, 63+.

Doubler, M. D. (2003). Civilian in peace, soldier in war: The Army National Guard, 1636–2000. University Press of Kansas.

Fleming, T. (2001). The new dealers' war: Franklin D. Roosevelt and the war within World War II. Basic Books.

National Guard. (2013). Questia.

Nelsen, J. T. (1993). General George C. Marshall: Strategic leadership and the challenges of reconstituting the Army, 1939–41. Strategic Studies Institute.

Sieg, K. G. (2005). America's state defense forces: An historical component of national defense. State Defense Force Journal, 1(1), 1–5.

Sligh, R. B., & Beaumont, R. (1992). The National Guard and national defense: The mobilization of the Guard in World War II. Praeger Publishers.

Winkler, A. M. (2000). Home front U.S.A.: America during World War II. Harlan Davidson.

World War II. (2013). Questia.