Western vs. Asian Warfare Theories Before Westernization

Introduction: Comparing Western and Asian Military Thought

There is considerable value in comparing Western and Asian formations of war — prior to Westernization — after 1815, since this was the period in which imperialism was at its height and Asian forces were able to test their methodologies against those of the West. However, a sustained examination of history reveals that for the most part, Asian forces were not nearly as sophisticated as their Western counterparts, a deficiency that resulted in their ensuing colonization, the deprivation of their natural resources at the hands of British and other European powers, and their ultimate adoption of Westernized methods of combat.

There are, nonetheless, meaningful similarities between the two traditions. Well before the nineteenth century, it was Asians who invented gunpowder and initially introduced it to the West, which rapidly incorporated it into military use through guns in the twelfth century (Needham, 1986, p. 7). In more recent times — particularly after 1815 — both Asian and Western powers shared similar notions regarding warfare, most notably the concept of total war. Yet a careful analysis reveals that Western nations, particularly those influenced by Carl von Clausewitz's seminal work On War, were considerably more refined and advanced in their approach than most Asian forces of the period.

Total War: A Shared but Differently Practiced Concept

One point of commonality between Western and Asian theories of war was the concept of total war. This was demonstrated in a number of martial encounters involving these regions, perhaps most dramatically by Adolf Hitler during his World War II campaign, particularly in Poland (Hitler, 1939). In many respects, Hitler's attempts to completely exterminate his enemies — including women and children — and the death camps and gas chambers employed for that purpose exemplified the values of total warfare.

Clausewitz addressed this subject through the related concept of absolute war, the central tenet of which holds that, due to the very nature of war, opponents will strive to exploit every available advantage against their opposition, mobilizing every resource, man, woman, and child. Clausewitz was, however, among the first theorists to rationalize war in moral terms, and he did not ultimately advocate absolute war. He placed a higher emphasis on political objectives, which he believed could be fulfilled without the total extermination of a foe. Nevertheless, his acknowledgment of the concept — and his moral rejection of it — was significant, since he viewed war as "the continuation of Politick by other means" (Clausewitz, 1984, p. 87).

Asian Total War and the Taiping Rebellion

Asian warriors after 1815, and prior to Westernization, were not as morally or ethically restrained as the Prussian theorist. While Asian militias certainly had political objectives behind their numerous battles, they were not above employing total warfare in ways that may have served as a precursor to Hitler's tactics a century later. This is particularly evident during the Taiping Rebellion, which pitted the upstart Taiping Heavenly Kingdom against the imperial forces of the Qing dynasty. The Taiping side made a point of arming every available citizen to aid in the conflict, which lasted more than a decade before the rebels were finally defeated by the imperial forces.

With death tolls exceeding those of virtually any other war in the nineteenth century, total war tactics were practiced on both sides, each of which wasted no opportunity to slaughter the opposition and burn and loot its territories in an attempt to gain advantage. Some of these tactics are reminiscent of Sherman's March during the American Civil War, during which Union forces marched through Confederate territory destroying and razing everything in sight for a devastating psychological effect (Eicher, 2001, p. 768). Yet the widespread slaughter of people in the name of total war remained a principal point of divergence between Asian and Western powers during the nineteenth century.

Conclusion: European Strategic Advantage in the Nineteenth Century

Despite the points of commonality found between the continents of Europe and Asia during the majority of the nineteenth century, it is clear that the formations and techniques of the Europeans were vastly superior to those of Asians. What is particularly striking about this conclusion is that it is not limited to battlefield performance alone. Clausewitz's acknowledgment of — and moral distaste for — the proclivities of total warfare attests to a philosophical sophistication that many Asian war theorists could not claim to match during this century. Although Clausewitz and other Western strategists drew lessons from Asian thought in earlier centuries, Asia lagged considerably behind Europe in military practice for the duration of the nineteenth century.