American Society and the US Withdrawal from Vietnam, 1968–1973

Introduction

The significance and impact of the Vietnam War on the social fabric and people of the United States is a subject of continual discussion and media analysis. As one critic observes: "For many Americans, the Vietnam War is ancient history, notorious but irrelevant. Yet the war and its consequences affected foreign policy for years, and still do... The deployment to Bosnia, bombing of Serbia, and deployment to Kosovo again raised fears of 'another Vietnam.'" (Attarian 2000, p. 288) This reflects the way in which the war shaped the national psyche for many years and affected how Americans saw themselves and their role in the international arena — a consequence closely tied to the perceived failure of the United States to achieve a decisive victory in the conflict.

There are a wide range of differing, and often antagonistic, views about the reasons for the American withdrawal from Vietnam. This debate is closely linked to broader arguments for and against America's involvement in the region in the first place. While some critics view the eventual US retreat as a direct consequence of social and public pressure at home, others deny that this was the central reason for the decision to leave Vietnam.

There is a general consensus in scholarly research that the decision to leave Vietnam was far more complex than any single cause. From one point of view, the central causative factors were political: there was a fear of escalating the war in an already tense Cold War environment. Others point to party politics and fears about upcoming elections as additional factors in the decision to reduce military action.

While these arguments and debates will be examined in this paper, the literature makes clear that America's actions in the final years of the war resulted from a combination of factors, influences, and pressures, as well as projections about the necessity of further escalation. The central focus of this paper, however, is on the role that American society played in the military and governmental decision to cease operations in Vietnam — and while all factors must be acknowledged, the social dimension receives primary attention here.

The way in which the Vietnam War divided the nation and created pockets of both opposition and approval has been well documented in scholarly articles and the popular media. As Attarian (2000) states:

"For the first time, America had lost a war — a war that had divided the country, inflicted traumatizing casualties, and wrecked America's army. A sense of defeat, disillusion, futility, and revulsion for foreign wars lingered. Most Americans came to believe that Vietnam was a war America should have avoided yet could have won, but for constraints on the military." (Attarian 2000, p. 288)

This quotation succinctly summarizes the general views of the time: disappointment in some quarters and, in others, resentment at the government's decision to become involved in the first place. The retreat from Vietnam must therefore be understood against the complex and intertwining emotions and feelings that characterized American society during this period.

The literature points to a number of political reasons for the decision to retreat. However, two cardinal factors had a decisive effect on policy decisions in government: the expression of opposition to the war by the American people, and the pervasive influence of the media.

While space does not permit an extensive analysis of every major event leading up to the decision to retreat, a few key developments should be noted — especially with regard to their impact on public perception of the war's course. One of the most visible cracks in US resolve and the hope for a rapid victory was the Tet Offensive in 1968. As Attarian (2000) states:

Historical Overview

"As fighting intensified, American battle deaths soared, from 1,369 in 1965 to 14,592 in 1968, the year of the Tet Offensive (Tet being the Vietnamese lunar New Year holiday), in which communist troops attacked throughout South Vietnam. Although repulsed with staggering losses, the offensive made the war seem unwinnable." (Attarian 2000, p. 288)

This resulted in growing discontent with the war on the part of the American public. "American discontent with the war, which had been rising, surged." (Attarian 2000, p. 288) While there was a brief resurgence of hope for a political solution after Nixon became president and talks with North Vietnam commenced, these hopes were dashed, and the only foreseeable outcome appeared to be a further escalation of the conflict and deeper American involvement.

The main developments following the Nixon administration's entry into the conflict can be summarized as follows. Nixon began withdrawing troops while increasing negotiation efforts. Major US offensives in 1972 suggested possible success and led to ceasefire negotiations, which produced a ceasefire agreement in 1973 — one that eventually broke down. Crucially, regardless of the complex military and diplomatic maneuvering, the American public's perception was that more Americans were being killed each month with little sign of victory. This public perception was to play a vital role in the departure of American troops and the fall of South Vietnam in 1975.

The decision to retreat from Vietnam had many social as well as political causative factors. As Michael Lind notes in Vietnam: The Necessary War: A Reinterpretation of America's Most Disastrous Military Conflict (1999):

"The matter turned on America's sensitivity to casualties; the danger was that rising losses would make Americans unwilling to wage the Cold War. If saving South Vietnam was too costly, then we should have abandoned the effort. As it turned out, he argues, our high losses destroyed our will and led to our defeat." (Lind 1999, p. 34)

This view connects to a central cause of the decision to leave Vietnam: the will of the people and the effect that this factor had on political decision-making in government. One must also account for internal political doubts about the war's progress — doubts that were in turn fueled by increasing negative public sentiment and the anti-war movement. For example, Lind (1999) refers to President Johnson's fears that "saturation bombing or invasion of the North would provoke Soviet or Chinese intervention, risking superpower confrontation." (Lind 1999, p. 83)

Brief Background: Key Events Leading to Withdrawal

Critics also point to fear and indecision on the part of government as contributing to the eventual failure of the war effort:

"...anxieties to prevent communist superpower intervention and North Vietnamese civilian casualties; protect America's image overseas; avoid calling public attention to the war; and preserve moneys for Great Society social programs tightly constrained the war effort. Sheer indecision also hurt." (Attarian 2000, p. 288)

It must also be recognized, however, that these fears and doubts were largely driven by public views and perceptions of the war — and especially by the opposition mounted by various anti-war organizations across the country.

As noted above, the Tet Offensive negatively affected public support for the war and increased social disapproval of its continuation. Before the offensive, public approval ratings for the war stood between forty and fifty percent; after it, they dropped to less than twenty percent. (Attarian 2000, p. 288) While some Americans felt the war should be prosecuted more aggressively, a large and vocal segment of the population was fierce in its condemnation. The diverse anti-war movement therefore represented a growing opposition that would have a profound impact on later decisions in the campaign.

This public and social opposition can be measured by the movement's trajectory: what began as relatively low-key social protest developed into an increasingly active and aggressive opposition to the war. As Vickers (1989) notes, "the size and intensity of U.S. intervention was met by escalation in the size and intensity of opposition to the war here at home." (Vickers 1989, p. 100) Vickers and many other scholars state categorically that the anti-war movement was "a critical factor in preventing the U.S. from achieving victory over communist forces in Vietnam," and that:

"American public opinion indeed turned out to be a crucial 'domino'; it influenced military morale in the field, the long drawn-out negotiations in Paris, the settlement of 1973, and the cuts in aid to South Vietnam in 1974, a prelude to final abandonment in 1975." (Vickers 1989, p. 100)

As the war intensified, so did public opposition, and protest shifted into active resistance. A new stage of anti-war resistance emerged between 1967 and 1969, driven by "a growing sense of power in numbers and a growing frustration at the lack of any visible response by the administration to the movement's growth." (Vickers 1989, p. 103) This resistance took various forms, including draft resistance, obstruction of induction centers, troop trains and other war-related operations, and symbolic civil disobedience. (Vickers 1989, p. 103)

Conclusion

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Television Coverage of the Vietnam War II, viewed 7 May 2010, <

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