America's Longest War: Vietnam, Johnson, and Public Opinion
This paper analyzes Chapter 6 of George C. Herring's "America's Longest War: United States and Vietnam 1950–1975," focusing on three interconnected themes from late 1967 and early 1968. The paper examines President Johnson's strategic decisions regarding troop deployments and peace negotiations, the role of media coverage and political opposition in turning American public opinion against the war, and the domestic economic crisis — including inflation, a balance-of-payments deficit, and the London gold market closure — that compounded Johnson's difficulties. The analysis draws parallels between the Vietnam-era political environment and the U.S. involvement in Iraq, arguing that public opinion, media framing, and economic strain collectively shaped American foreign policy during this pivotal period.
- Introduction: Overview of Herring's book and Vietnam-Iraq parallel
- The President's Decisions: Johnson's troop and bombing decisions in 1967–68
- Public Opinion and Politics: Media coverage and Kennedy's anti-war challenge
- The Gold Crisis: Economic strain, inflation, and the gold market crisis
- Conclusion: Social upheaval, policy consequences, and Iraq comparison
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What makes this paper effective
- The paper grounds each thematic section in direct textual evidence, quoting Herring with page numbers to support its claims rather than relying on broad assertion.
- It draws a contemporary parallel to the Iraq War throughout, giving the historical analysis a clear argumentative purpose and relevance beyond pure summarization.
- Each of the three body sections maintains a tight focus on a single theme — decisions, public opinion, and economics — creating clear, digestible analytical units.
Key academic technique demonstrated
The paper demonstrates textual analysis with evaluative commentary: it does not merely summarize Herring's chapter but adds a layer of critical judgment — for instance, questioning whether Johnson relied too heavily on advisers and whether he had accurate information. This technique shows how to engage with a secondary source both descriptively and critically.
Structure breakdown
The paper follows a straightforward thematic structure: a brief framing introduction, three body sections each organized around a distinct topic drawn from the chapter (presidential decision-making, domestic public opinion, and the economic gold crisis), and a short concluding paragraph that synthesizes the themes and returns to the Iraq parallel introduced at the outset. Each body section opens by naming its theme, introduces supporting quotes, and closes with the writer's own interpretive commentary.
Introduction
This paper introduces, discusses, and analyzes America's Longest War: United States and Vietnam 1950–1975 by George C. Herring. Specifically, it examines three topics from Chapter 6 and explains each according to what the author writes, citing specifics from the chapter. The Vietnam War is being compared increasingly to the war in Iraq, and as this chapter clearly shows, there are many reasons for that comparison. President Johnson began fighting an uphill battle as public opinion about the war started to swing against it, just as President Bush faced growing opposition to the war in Iraq.
The President's Decisions
President Johnson, partly on advice from such advisers as Clifford, Westmoreland, and Bunker, decided in late 1967 that new forces should not be sent to South Vietnam and that the country should be more prepared to fight on its own. As Herring writes, "Johnson's advisers agreed that from a long-range standpoint the key to achieving American objectives was South Vietnam's ability to stand on its own" (Herring 239). By early 1968, the President had informed South Vietnam that the United States would continue to send assistance and equipment, but only "limited manpower."
During this period, President Johnson also agreed — leaning heavily on the advice of Dean Rusk — that bombing in Vietnam should be cut back and that peace talks should resume with the North Vietnamese. Many of the President's decisions appear to have been guided by his closest advisers as well as by public opinion, both of which were important considerations for a man who may have been looking toward reelection at a time when sentiment was turning against the war. His decisions seem soundly based on the information available to him, but not all of that information was necessarily accurate, meaning his choices were not always grounded entirely in fact and evidence.
Johnson may have relied too heavily on his inner circle rather than on a clear-eyed assessment of what was actually happening in Vietnam. His decision not to send more troops appears wise in hindsight, yet at the time the South Vietnamese were simply not ready to defend their own country on their own — and perhaps they never were.
Public Opinion and Politics
The media can often sway public opinion, and the Vietnam War was no exception. The press consistently portrayed Vietnam negatively and with "an atmosphere of doom and futility" (Herring 241), and the American public began to view the war in the same light. Even though President Johnson had decided against deploying large additional troop numbers, a magazine story suggesting otherwise sparked protest and anger among many Americans. This massive outpouring of public opposition convinced many officials, including Dean Rusk, that the United States must "scale down involvement" in the war at all costs.
It was during this period, in early 1968, that Senator Robert F. Kennedy announced he would challenge President Johnson on a "platform of opposition to the war" (Herring 243). A serious rift had opened in America; more and more citizens were turning against the administration and the conflict in Vietnam, and the path seemed clear for Kennedy to take the White House. The administration attributed part of the problem to the media, pointing to nightly television coverage of death and destruction on the battlefield.
Herring argues, however, that the administration itself was at least "partially responsible" for the public's cynicism following the Tet Offensive, because officials had been too optimistic before Tet. The shock of that offensive's scale was therefore all the greater, and more and more Americans began to see the war as a losing battle. This dynamic is not difficult to understand, as a similar pattern appeared to be unfolding in Iraq — a continuing loss of personnel with no clear resolution in sight.
Conclusion
It is clear from all of the events of late 1967 and early 1968 that America was facing profound changes, not only in foreign policy but also on the home front. People were discontent, and the war seemed endless. The economy was in worse shape than it had been in twenty years, with no signs of improvement. Johnson faced enormous difficulties both abroad and at home, and the country was experiencing a period of intense social upheaval. Ultimately, some of Johnson's decisions would come back to haunt him, and the war dragged on for years, generating ever greater unrest and negative public opinion. Public opinion, when strong enough, can change the course of history — and public opinion finally compelled America's withdrawal from Vietnam. Whether the same would someday be said of Iraq remained an open question.
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