America's Longest War: Vietnam, Johnson, and Public Opinion

Introduction

This paper introduces, discusses, and analyzes America's Longest War: United States and Vietnam 1950–1975 by George C. Herring. Specifically, it examines three topics from Chapter 6 and explains each according to what the author writes, citing specifics from the chapter. The Vietnam War is being compared increasingly to the war in Iraq, and as this chapter clearly shows, there are many reasons for that comparison. President Johnson began fighting an uphill battle as public opinion about the war started to swing against it, just as President Bush faced growing opposition to the war in Iraq.

The President's Decisions

President Johnson, partly on advice from such advisers as Clifford, Westmoreland, and Bunker, decided in late 1967 that new forces should not be sent to South Vietnam and that the country should be more prepared to fight on its own. As Herring writes, "Johnson's advisers agreed that from a long-range standpoint the key to achieving American objectives was South Vietnam's ability to stand on its own" (Herring 239). By early 1968, the President had informed South Vietnam that the United States would continue to send assistance and equipment, but only "limited manpower."

During this period, President Johnson also agreed — leaning heavily on the advice of Dean Rusk — that bombing in Vietnam should be cut back and that peace talks should resume with the North Vietnamese. Many of the President's decisions appear to have been guided by his closest advisers as well as by public opinion, both of which were important considerations for a man who may have been looking toward reelection at a time when sentiment was turning against the war. His decisions seem soundly based on the information available to him, but not all of that information was necessarily accurate, meaning his choices were not always grounded entirely in fact and evidence.

Johnson may have relied too heavily on his inner circle rather than on a clear-eyed assessment of what was actually happening in Vietnam. His decision not to send more troops appears wise in hindsight, yet at the time the South Vietnamese were simply not ready to defend their own country on their own — and perhaps they never were.

Public Opinion and Politics

The media can often sway public opinion, and the Vietnam War was no exception. The press consistently portrayed Vietnam negatively and with "an atmosphere of doom and futility" (Herring 241), and the American public began to view the war in the same light. Even though President Johnson had decided against deploying large additional troop numbers, a magazine story suggesting otherwise sparked protest and anger among many Americans. This massive outpouring of public opposition convinced many officials, including Dean Rusk, that the United States must "scale down involvement" in the war at all costs.

It was during this period, in early 1968, that Senator Robert F. Kennedy announced he would challenge President Johnson on a "platform of opposition to the war" (Herring 243). A serious rift had opened in America; more and more citizens were turning against the administration and the conflict in Vietnam, and the path seemed clear for Kennedy to take the White House. The administration attributed part of the problem to the media, pointing to nightly television coverage of death and destruction on the battlefield.

Herring argues, however, that the administration itself was at least "partially responsible" for the public's cynicism following the Tet Offensive, because officials had been too optimistic before Tet. The shock of that offensive's scale was therefore all the greater, and more and more Americans began to see the war as a losing battle. This dynamic is not difficult to understand, as a similar pattern appeared to be unfolding in Iraq — a continuing loss of personnel with no clear resolution in sight.

Conclusion