This paper applies the principles of game theory to examine why the South African government chose to end apartheid. Using a simplified three-player model — the white ruling government, the non-white ethnic population, and the international community — the paper identifies each group's strategies, objectives, and payoffs. The analysis classifies the scenario as a Bayesian dynamic game, given that each player operated with incomplete information about the others' motivations. The paper draws on historical scholarship and game theory concepts to explore how international sanctions, domestic protest, and ideological assumptions interacted to produce the eventual collapse of apartheid, while acknowledging that real-world complexity makes a definitive causal determination difficult.
The paper demonstrates applied theoretical analysis: it takes a defined academic framework (game theory, specifically Bayesian dynamic games) and systematically maps historical actors and events onto the framework's parameters. This technique shows how theoretical models can generate analytical insight even when they cannot produce a single definitive answer.
The paper opens with historical context drawn from Michener's The Covenant, then defines the game's players, strategies, and payoffs. It classifies the game type as Bayesian and dynamic, explains each player's decision calculus under incomplete information, and closes with a speculative section weighing competing explanations for apartheid's end. The Works Cited section follows MLA format throughout.
James Michener was a widely read chronicler of different periods of history. Largely a novelist, Michener based his works on factual information populated by fictional but representative characters alongside real historical figures. In his book The Covenant (1980), Michener detailed the history of South Africa from prehistoric times through the late 1970s. He devoted considerable attention to how apartheid came about and why it persisted for more than 300 years, culminating in its formal institutionalization in 1948 (Lodberg).
This paper examines why the South African government chose to end apartheid through the analytical lens of game theory.
Game theory requires three foundational elements: a set of players who are the decision-makers, a set of strategies representing the decisions and actions available to those players, and a payoff that gives the players reason to participate in the game.
For the purposes of this analysis, the players fall into three primary groups: the white ruling government of South Africa; the mixed-ethnicity population comprising Black Africans, coloreds, and Asians; and the international community. The strategies employed by these players included the government's enforcement of racial segregation — dividing the country's population into separate communities governed by separate rules — the non-white population's protests and disruptions of the ruling order, and the international community's imposition of sanctions and boycotts.
The payoff for the ruling class was the maintenance of racial and religious purity and exclusive political control. The mixed-ethnicity population protested and resisted because they sought equality and freedom. The international community, recognizing the human rights violations occurring within South Africa, worked to advance the interests of its non-white inhabitants. For the purposes of this analysis, the decision tree follows three core choices: the white government's decision to continue or discontinue apartheid; the non-white population's choice to protest — accepting the risk of imprisonment — or to acquiesce; and the international community's choice between applying pressure through sanctions or allowing the status quo to persist.
At first glance, it might appear that each player's objectives were transparent and that all parties had a clear view of one another's motivations. In reality, this was not the case. The white government, despite worldwide protests and exclusion from international sporting competitions (The Economist), believed it was acting in the country's best interests. Rulers held that they were caretakers of other races, acting on what they perceived as a divine imperative (Lodberg), and largely dismissed international pressure as misguided. The non-white population, denied access to international media coverage, assumed that the government's brutality stemmed purely from the power it wielded through its military and police — they could not see the advocacy being conducted on their behalf abroad. The international community, for its part, viewed apartheid not as a religious or paternalistic exercise but as the deliberate subjugation of human beings and a clear violation of human rights.
Because each group held assumptions about the others that were incomplete or mistaken — though not always deliberately concealed — this game is best classified as a Bayesian game: one in which unknown variables factor into the decisions of all players. It is also a dynamic game, because the players' responses to one another shifted dramatically and with regularity over time.
The government change scenario was not one of the variables examined here. It would change the game significantly because it is something that not even the South African government could foresee. This shows that sometimes it is effectively impossible to declare a winner in a real-world game, because the number of possible variables exceeds what any model can fully account for.
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