Army Force Management and Military Disruptive Technology
This paper analyzes the Army's force management processes under the ARFORGEN framework, focusing on two key deficiencies: insufficient advocacy for military disruptive technology spending and inadequate intelligence regarding emerging disruptive technologies. The paper examines how critical skills for future forces must be identified rapidly and accurately, and introduces the concept of Black Swan events as a framework for understanding unpredictable but massively impactful threats. Drawing on Mitchell's six-stage model of military disruptive technology and Taleb's Black Swan theory, the paper argues that the Army must build stronger collaborative relationships between military intelligence, scientific, and commercial communities, and must actively engage Congress to fund next-generation disruptive military capabilities.
- Introduction: Force Management and Change: ARFORGEN framework and force management challenges
- Identification of Future Critical Skills: Critical skills identification and Black Swan risk
- Disruptive Technology in War: Defining military disruptive technology and its importance
- Six Stages of Military Disruptive Technology: Mitchell's six-stage model and Stage 2 vulnerability
- Conclusion: Policy recommendations for Army and Congress
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What makes this paper effective
- Clearly frames a two-part thesis early — insufficient champions for military disruptive technology spending and weak intelligence about emerging threats — and returns to both dimensions throughout the paper.
- Bridges civilian business theory (Christensen's disruptive innovation, Taleb's Black Swan) with military doctrine and procurement realities, making abstract concepts operationally relevant.
- Uses Mitchell's six-stage model as an analytical scaffold, allowing the author to pinpoint precisely where vulnerabilities in the Army's force management process occur (Stage 2) rather than making broad, unsupported generalizations.
Key academic technique demonstrated
The paper demonstrates effective cross-domain theory application: concepts originally developed for commercial markets (disruptive innovation, Black Swan events) are systematically mapped onto military planning contexts. Each transferred concept is explicitly defined, sourced, and then recontextualized for the defense environment, showing graduate-level ability to synthesize across disciplines rather than relying on single-field literature.
Structure breakdown
The paper opens with a problem statement situating force management within change management theory, then narrows to two specific analytical gaps. A section on critical skills identification establishes the operational stakes. The disruptive technology section defines terminology, introduces the six-stage model, and identifies Stage 2 (Congressional spending decisions) as the critical vulnerability. The conclusion ties strategic, tactical, and operational dimensions together and issues a policy recommendation directed at Army–Congressional engagement.
Introduction: Force Management and Change
Change management in the short term is a substantive challenge for any organization. When change management extends far into the future, the challenges increase exponentially. To establish and field a mission-ready force, the Army must shape the force of the future. For the Army to be prepared for an uncertain future, change management theory and force management practice must coalesce into a sustainable, cost-effective plan. This force management plan must manifest a high degree of flexibility and agile responsiveness in order to be "prepared to combat uncooperative and adaptive enemies" (ARFORGEN, 2006). Overall, the Army must be able to "synchronize resources, predict the impact of future requirements on funding, and optimize the use and reuse of forces" (ARFORGEN, 2006).
The use of computer modeling has enabled predictive processes that can synchronize global Army capital, interfacing with the program objective memorandum (POM) of the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). The key benefit of machine modeling is the capacity to integrate the "actual force requirements with projected force structure" (ARFORGEN, 2006). While the machine modeling capacity is laudable, computerized systems are only as good as the data input for processing. There is a strong need to ensure that ARFORGEN systems protect the integrity of data and use high-quality data — such as that reflected in out-of-the-box disruptive military technology. Further, it is imperative that ARFORGEN processes include technology warning methodologies capable of heading off Black Swan events (Taleb, 2007).
This paper discusses and analyzes the processes employed to identify the projected force structure and critical skills needed by the force of the future, arguing that they are insufficient along two dimensions: (1) champions of spending on military disruptive technology, and (2) intelligence related to military disruptive technology. A model is proposed and discussed for addressing these barriers to achieving the goals of ARFORGEN.
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