BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill: Impact and Lessons Learned

Overview of the Disaster and Its Causes

On April 20, 2010, the BP Deepwater Horizon spill dumped more than 4.1 million barrels of crude oil into the Gulf region over 87 days (Walsh et al., "On the Edge"). The oil and gas industry had developed new technologies in pursuit of valuable energy supplies, venturing into deeper waters farther from the coastline (National Commission 85). Regulators, however, failed to keep up with the industrial expansion and new technology — often because of industry's resistance to more effective oversight (Juhas 11). This led to a major shortfall in the supervision of offshore drilling. Companies cited for negligence included well owner BP, Switzerland-based rig owner Transocean, and cement contractor Halliburton. A major blowout — a high-pressure surge of gas, mud, and oil that shot up from the oil reservoir — killed eleven crewmembers and seriously injured several others (Klein 12). In the end, fire engulfed and destroyed the oil rig. The media sent the world daily images of the uncontrolled spill. Environmental groups, politicians, everyday citizens, and civic leaders have classified it as a major failure in corporate governance and social responsibility (National Commission 89).

Probable causes for the accident are many. The companies involved were immediately criticized for failing to operate in a "safe and workmanlike manner" and for failing to take necessary precautions to keep the well "under control at all times" (Schooner 13). It is believed that BP's management process did not adequately identify or address risks created by late changes to well design and procedures, nor did it ensure that cement was adequately tested (National Commission 90). There is also evidence that BP, Transocean, and Halliburton failed to communicate effectively among themselves regarding lessons learned from an earlier near-miss disaster. As cited in the 2011 National Commission Report to the President:

"The well blew out because a number of separate risk factors, oversights, and outright mistakes combined to overwhelm the safeguards meant to prevent just such an event from happening. But most of the mistakes and oversights at Macondo can be traced back to a single overarching failure — a failure of management. Better management by BP, Halliburton, and Transocean would almost certainly have prevented the blowout by improving the ability of individuals involved to identify the risks they faced, and to properly evaluate, communicate, and address them. A blowout in deepwater was not a statistical inevitability." (90)

There are also indications that certain time- and money-saving decisions resulted in increased safety risks that personnel had not fully considered. One cost-cutting decision was to install a continuous set of threaded casing pipes from the wellhead down to the bottom of the well (Smith 28). This can be problematic in deep, high-pressure wells because it seals off the space between the casing and the bore hole, leaving workers unable to detect leaks that can travel up around the casing pipe — as the BP Deepwater blowout is suspected to have done. In addition, the long string gives gas more time to percolate into the well (Klein 13). A preferred alternative in high-pressure deepwater drilling is a "liner" design, in which drillers install and then cement in place a short string of casing in the lower reaches of the well before casing the rest of the well (National Commission 93). This design allows the driller to watch for leaks while the cement is setting. It takes more time and is more expensive, but it is considered a much safer method.

The BP Deepwater Horizon spill is considered unique among oil catastrophes because of its magnitude, duration, emission source, and the unprecedented use of dispersants and controlled burns (Schooner 15). It devastated the $3 billion fishing industry in the Gulf, which provides one-third of all seafood consumed in the United States (Smith 26). There were also massive impacts on neighboring communities, businesses, and wildlife. Local residents experienced breathing difficulties, headaches, burning eyes and throats, vomiting, abdominal pains, chest pains, skin sensitization, and cardiovascular issues (National Commission 95). Children, the poor, and the elderly continue to appear disproportionately affected by such medical problems since the spill (Juhas 13). Complaints of ailments reported two years later ranged from persistent fatigue to headaches and chronic coughs. Experts expressed concern over human exposure to crude oil, vapors, contaminated seafood, and the chemical dispersants used to break the oil apart (National Commission 91). BP and the U.S. government employed a number of mitigation techniques to stop the spread of the spill — including Corexit, controlled burns, protective booms around vulnerable wetlands, and skimming — but the scale and geographical scope of the disaster proved too great (Sisson 20).

BP excavated nine miles of already fragile shoreline with earth-moving equipment and altered erosion patterns with sandbag dams and sheet-metal pilings in an attempt to keep oil out of the marshes (Schooner 15). This proved detrimental because the coastal ecosystem functions as both a marine-life nursery and a critical physical barrier protecting the local area from hurricane storm surges (Juhas 14). BP also removed hundreds of thousands of cubic yards of oil-soaked sand, hastening erosion that may weaken Louisiana's storm defenses (Sisson 20). Giant tar balls and oil deposits more than 100 feet long continued to wash ashore, and Tropical Storm Lee later uncovered buried oil deposits more than 18 inches thick (Smith 23).

Environmental Consequences for Wildlife and Ecosystems

The environmental impact of the spill was substantial and far-reaching. Scientists are still assessing the effects of the estimated 170 million gallons of oil that flooded into the Gulf. More than 8,000 birds, sea turtles, and marine mammals were found injured or dead in the six months following the spill (Weeks 682). Wildlife managers, rescue crews, scientists, and researchers documented many immediate impacts on wildlife. Oil coated birds' feathers, making it impossible for them to regulate body temperature and remain buoyant on the water. Area mammals ingested oil, which caused ulcers and internal bleeding. Many sea turtles were found coated in oil, and dead and dying deep-sea corals were discovered miles from the well.

The oil disaster also contributed to an unbalanced food web, striking at the peak breeding season for many species of fish and wildlife (Weeks 683). The oil's toxicity is believed to have immediately impacted egg and larval organisms, diminishing or even wiping out those age classes (National Commission 97). Without those generations, population dips are certain to affect food webs for years to come. Scientists will continue to monitor fluctuations in wildlife populations into the future. Experts note that four years after the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil disaster, the herring population collapsed — and twenty years later, it had still not recovered (Australian National Research Center, 2011).

Sea life has exhibited alarming deformities and declining populations since the oil spill (Smith 28). Shrimp have been reported with tumors on their heads, defects on their gills, and missing eyes. According to various fishermen, brown shrimp catches dropped by two-thirds, white shrimp were virtually wiped out, and overall catches fell to ten percent of normal levels (Weeks 683). Reports also emerged of fish without eye sockets or gill covers, and fish with large pink masses on their bodies. Many blue crabs were found with misshapen or missing claws and holes in their shells. Tests of oysters revealed elevated levels of nickel and vanadium, while arsenic, cadmium, lead, and mercury levels also remained high. Prior to the spill, only one-tenth of one percent of Gulf fish had lesions or sores. After the spill, many locations showed 20% of fish with lesions, with rates as high as 50% in some areas (Juhas 14).

Fishermen, scientists, and seafood processors blamed the 2010 BP oil disaster for these changes. The solvents used in the cleanup were powerful enough to dissolve oil, grease, and rubber (Guarino, "BP Oil Settlement"). While effective at clearing oil, they were detrimental to both the environment and human health. Prior research indicated that the dispersants had the potential to create mutations and contained chemicals called polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons, known to alter the chromosomes and genome of sea life (Smith 27). They were used nonetheless in an attempt to contain the uncontrollable spill (Weeks 683). Scientists have found significant amounts of oil on the Gulf floor, and oil that has already washed into wetlands and beaches will likely remain for years (Juhas 15). The full environmental impact may not be apparent for quite some time.

Economic Impact on Fishing, Tourism, and Local Communities

The oil spill caused a significant decline in commercial fishing and outdoor recreation, both of which sustained local economies (Weeks 682). Over 3 million people took recreational fishing trips in the Gulf in 2008 (National Commission 101). At the peak of the disaster, 40% of Gulf waters were closed to commercial and recreational fishing, according to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (Schnoor 17). Many state parks were also closed, leading to a dramatic loss in revenue. Gulf Coast seafood restaurants experienced disruptions in their supply chains and lost customers who feared contamination (Sisson 20). Fishermen stated that economic conditions were already difficult before the BP spill due to imports, high fuel prices, and hurricanes, but the spill dealt another devastating blow to their livelihoods (Walsh et al., "On the Edge").

Tourism represents the largest non-governmental sector of the Gulf Coast economy in Mississippi (National Commission 101). Many resorts, hotels, and casinos saw canceled conventions and beach vacations, which hurt business across the region. The New Orleans Convention and Visitors Bureau received $5 million of the $15 million in tourism-marketing funds that BP gave Louisiana to respond to the negative publicity from the spill (Juhas 15). New Orleans in turn advertised the fact that the spill was 100 miles from the French Quarter — its most popular tourist destination — which helped improve tourism rates. Television campaigns featured clean beaches and people swimming in Gulf waters. The overall marketing push helped attract 8.3 million travelers in the latter half of 2010, generating an estimated economic benefit of $5.3 billion for the city that year (Bruce, "BP's Image").

Conclusion: Lessons Learned

Change is evident. Regulators have toughened inspections, and oil companies have adopted more rigorous safeguards. University and corporate laboratories are developing new cleanup technologies, and spill drills are now a regular part of coastal community emergency preparedness planning. Experts are working to create a more reliable blowout preventer and safer drilling techniques. Government has developed a greater recognition of the environmental and economic risks associated with over-reliance on fossil fuels and is pursuing new taxation on the burning of oil and other fuels. There is renewed effort to find cleaner, lower-cost alternatives to oil — to safeguard human life, wildlife, the environment, and the overall global ecology.