British Intelligence Tactics Against the IRA During the Troubles

History of the IRA

The Provisional IRA formed in response to a conflict between the Irish Republican Army and the British state in Northern Ireland that lasted from 1969 to 1998. What is commonly referred to as "the IRA" in the West was actually a breakaway faction and is better known as PIRA in Ireland. However, because it stood as the fighting force and public face of the Irish resistance, it is typically referred to simply as the IRA. The IRA was a formal fighting force up until the 1970s, when fears of British infiltration caused it to reorganize as a secret organization with a cell structure. The IRA published its Green Book, which laid out the rules of being an IRA volunteer. Meanwhile, on the political front, Sinn Féin negotiated behind the scenes with the British state throughout the period known as the Troubles (1969–1998) (O'Brien, 1999; Tonge, 2002).

The IRA struggled with security and with gaining control of any territory. Whatever impact it achieved through its use of snipers, bombing campaigns, and guerrilla-style violence was ultimately superficial, because the group remained on insecure footing and could point to no territory it controlled. The IRA also struggled with the fact that a political peace with the British seemed to represent a "sell out," and pursuing such a settlement would undermine the vision and mission of the group. As a result, a negotiated peace was not viewed as an appropriate strategy to promote openly, though it was a course of action quietly supported behind the scenes.

The Troubles began in 1969 as war broke out between Irish nationalists and unionists, the former mainly Catholic and the latter mainly Protestant. Violence against nationalists had occurred in Northern Ireland, and the victims felt persecuted and vowed to avenge themselves against the "wave of sectarian violence" that had swept through the region (Bamford, 2005, p. 582). As the Irish Republican Army was perceived to have been remiss in its defense of Irish Catholics in the North, the Provisional IRA formed to address what its members viewed as the systematic persecution of Catholics in Northern Ireland — a region that was officially part of the United Kingdom and not independent in the same sense as the Irish Republic.

The Provisional IRA targeted the UK's economic infrastructure within Northern Ireland as well as politicians and the broader social order. The British forces cracked down hard on what they viewed as unlawful dissent, and in 1972 Bloody Sunday occurred when British soldiers fired on protestors demonstrating against the British state in Northern Ireland. Seven months later, the IRA conducted Bloody Friday, with dozens of car bombs detonated across Belfast and Londonderry (Bamford, 2005). The purpose of this attack was to force the British to the negotiating table to discuss a full withdrawal from Ireland. However, that demand was a non-starter for talks, and the standoff continued. The IRA's aim at that point was to cripple the economy of Belfast through a sustained terror campaign (Maloney, 2010).

Five years later, the Provisional IRA converted itself into a cell structure as mass arrests were occurring and its ranks were being dismantled by British intelligence. Co-founder and devout Catholic Seán MacStíofáin believed violence was necessary to end Northern Ireland's occupation by the British, but he was arrested in Dublin in 1972. He went on a hunger strike, and because of his popularity his action caused further civil disturbances. After his release in 1973, he was barred from re-entry into the IRA and his influence waned. Eventually, the IRA agreed to disband, and a political resolution was reached with Sinn Féin leading the way.

IRA Ideology and Objectives

The ideology at the heart of the IRA was to use force — to demonstrate to the British through shocking violence that the Irish nationalists meant business. MacStíofáin's idea was that the best tactic was escalation, in the hope of wearing down the British, since there was realistically no way the IRA could achieve a conventional strategic victory. Because the IRA believed in force but was small in terms of actual numbers, it had to rely on volunteers and guerrilla-style tactics to pursue its aim of escalation. Those tactics — car bombings such as those on Bloody Friday and targeted sniper fire — succeeded in killing British soldiers and civilians, but failed to achieve the long-term objective of driving the British out of Northern Ireland or compelling them to meet MacStíofáin's demands. His demands consisted of the following:

1) The right of Ireland to decide its own political future by acting as a single state rather than a divided one;
2) A declaration of intent by the British state to withdraw fully from Northern Ireland by January 1975; and
3) The unconditional release of all IRA members or volunteers arrested and held as political prisoners (Coogan, 2002).

Once MacStíofáin was arrested, the IRA became a far more secretive organization with a much less defined structure. The Green Book served as the ideological guide for the IRA from the late 1970s onward. In 1974, the IRA targeted department stores and public housing in both London and Northern Ireland. The British Ambassador to Ireland was assassinated in 1976. In 1979, a member of the Royal Family was murdered. In 1984, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was targeted. MP Ian Gow was killed in 1990, and in 1991 Downing Street itself was the target of a mortar attack (Rogers, 2000). Because of the cell structure of the IRA, it was difficult to determine who was directing individual attacks.

The Green Book gave sufficient warning to any volunteer considering joining: "Loose-talk costs lives. In taxis / On the phone / In clubs and bars / At football matches / At home with friends / Anywhere!" No one was supposed to discuss their work in the IRA with anyone: "Whatever you say — say nothing." A black-masked figure holding an automatic weapon on the cover of the book reinforced the point that this was not a war one could write home about. It was a war of attrition, and there would be no honors for fallen comrades. The first line of the book adequately captures the level of paranoia within the IRA throughout most of the Troubles: "The most important thing is security!" (IRA Green Book, 1977, p. 2).

Underlying this insistence upon secrecy was a nationalistic and religious culture of anger and frustration toward the British state, one that had been nurtured for generations among many young Irish men. Those who saw the fight against England as noble and necessary could be attracted to the IRA — but they were warned it would not be something they could place on a résumé. This was a war waged covertly, without broad support from the Irish public at home and under intense scrutiny from the British. The fierce Catholic nationalism that the IRA fed upon was perhaps most embodied by MacStíofáin himself — yet even he ultimately called for a ceasefire, sensing the war was unsustainable and unwinnable.

Social and Psychological Variables

The Green Book was a significant propaganda tool, but the IRA also used Sinn Féin and various publications — including the Sinn Féin newspaper An Phoblacht — to promote its cause. Irish organizations that championed Irish identity and the Irish language were also important spheres of influence, as they appealed to a distinctive sense of self. Several theoretical frameworks help explain how the cultivation of an Irish nationalist and Catholic identity encouraged young men toward the IRA, which represented a form of action against perceived oppressors.

Stereotyping played a part in the development of support for the IRA: casting the British or the Protestants as faceless, inhuman adversaries allowed a violent mentality to develop, and portraying them as uniformly united against one's country, faith, and ideals reinforced that attitude. Stereotypes arise from preconceived ideas that are formed for a variety of reasons and then propagated through groups and individuals. People tend to view their own groups more favorably than they do others, in part because of a sense of pride in group membership (Hilton & Von Hippel, 1996). The IRA drew on a culture of Irish nationalism that had been developing for centuries — at least since Henry VIII's Act of Succession forced Irish Catholics to choose sides.

Another framework for understanding why some Irish nationalists joined the IRA is Social Identity Theory (SIT), which posits that individuals develop a sense of who they are based on their group memberships. A person's identity and sense of self are shaped by belonging to a group, whether a subculture, a political party, or a national movement. Identity can also be formed negatively — by recognizing what one is not, typically a member of a group viewed as less favorable than one's own. SIT can also explain how individuals position themselves in relationships of superiority or inferiority relative to other groups (Branch et al., 2018). As Branch et al. (2018) note, SIT can illuminate "why individuals seek to place themselves within or outside particular social groups and may suggest why some individuals could be more vulnerable" to attacks from other groups (p. 11). Ultimately, social identity is bound up with self-preservation and self-promotion: social group membership is a source of pride and self-esteem, which motivates people to rate their own group more favorably than others (McLeod, 2008).

Labeling theory, put forward by Edwin Lemert, demonstrates how labels of deviance acquire meaning primarily when applied by those who hold power (Lumen, 2019). Such labels persist because powerful groups use them to define others. The labeled individuals may embrace the designation because they lack the power to contest it, or because — if they are already judged as deviant — they conclude they may as well accept the identity. Labeling theory also helps explain how deviance and crime emerge and how stereotyping contributes to controversial policing practices such as racial profiling (Lumen, 2019). Many young men found a sense of identity and purpose in the IRA: belonging gave them a job to do and a goal to fight for, lending meaning to their lives.

Conclusion

In the end, it was a combination of ruthless counterterrorism tactics and deep-cover infiltration that contributed to the ultimate ceasefire and political truce, as both sides recognized the impracticality of continuing the Troubles any longer. The IRA's inability to secure territory, maintain adequate funding, or sustain a coherent organizational structure proved fatal to its military ambitions. At the same time, British intelligence methods — however legally and ethically questionable — succeeded in fragmenting IRA operations to the point where the conflict could no longer be sustained. It was left to Sinn Féin and the political process to translate exhaustion on both sides into a durable peace agreement.