This research paper examines California's Three Strikes Law, enacted in 1994, through the lens of deterrence theory. The paper traces the historical origins of the legislation, outlines its key provisions, and synthesizes a substantial body of empirical research assessing its effectiveness in reducing crime and recidivism. Both supporting and opposing evidence is reviewed, including studies on incapacitation effects, felony arrest rate reductions, drug crime trends, and prosecutorial discretion. The paper also addresses the methodological challenge of distinguishing deterrence from incapacitation in crime control research. A quantitative secondary research methodology is proposed to evaluate the law's long-term deterrent impact using crime rates, recidivism data, and parole statistics.
Crime is a major social problem throughout the country. More specifically, criminals who are repeat offenders make up a substantial number of the individuals who commit crime. With this understood, many states throughout the nation have developed programs that attempt to deter people from becoming habitual criminals. These programs are based on the deterrence theory of crime. This particular theory asserts that:
"the more certain and severe the perceived punishment for a particular crime, the more likely individuals are to believe that the crime is not in their best interest. Therefore, they will not engage in the act. In this sense, deterrence theory may be placed beneath the umbrella of the theory of reasoned action and its extension, the theory of planned behavior (e.g., Ajzen, 1991). These theories seek to explain intention to behave in a general sense, whereas deterrence theory aims to predict a specific set of intentions; that is, those directed at lawbreaking (Strelan & Boeckmann, 2006, p. 2912)."
The state of California implemented the three strikes law in March of 1994 as a type of legislation designed to deter criminals from repeatedly committing crimes. This legislation "was enacted as Chapter 12, Statutes of 1994 (AB 971, Jones) by the Legislature and by the electorate in Proposition 184 (A Primer: Three Strikes — The Impact After More Than a Decade, 2005)." Under this law there is a minimum sentence of 25 years to life for individuals who are three-time repeat offenders. The law pertains to individuals who have previous serious or violent felony convictions (A Primer: Three Strikes — The Impact After More Than a Decade, 2005).
The Three Strikes law has been controversial because it drastically increases the sentences that some repeat offenders receive. For instance, consider "a defendant who has prior convictions for assault on a police officer and burglary of a residence, both considered serious or violent crimes," who is also arrested for receiving stolen property, a nonserious and nonviolent felony. Prior to the implementation of the Three Strikes law, he would have served a two-year sentence for the property offense. However, as a result of the law, he would receive a life sentence (A Primer: Three Strikes — The Impact After More Than a Decade, 2005).
Goodno (2007) explains that within the state of California the three strikes law was implemented as a response to the murders of young girls by career criminals. Indeed, in the early 1990s the murder of two young girls increased public awareness of the problem of criminal recidivism. The first of the two murders occurred in 1992 when eighteen-year-old Kimber Reynolds was killed during an attempted robbery. The person who murdered her was a paroled felon whose criminal record included gun and drug charges. Following her death, her father began to encourage legislators to implement more stringent sentencing for repeat criminals (Goodno, 2007).
In an effort to get tougher legislation passed, Reynolds testified before the California Legislature in support of a bill involving a three strikes framework for habitual criminals. The bill called for sentencing of 25 years to life for repeat offenders. At the time, the bill did not become law. However, a few months after the bill was struck down, Polly Klaas, who was twelve years old, was also murdered by an individual with a long criminal history. Eventually, the Klaas murder became a major catalyst for the development and implementation of the three strikes legislation in California.
Since implementing the legislation, questions as to whether this program is working as a deterrent have persisted. Many argue that this program is too stringent and has done nothing more than increase the prison population. Many also assert that crime in California has only decreased by a minimal amount and that such decreases would have occurred even if the state had not implemented the three strikes law.
High levels of crime make some areas of California uncomfortable for residents and business owners alike. In addition, crime costs the state of California a great deal of money each year. These costs are associated with an increase in the number of police, funding for detention facilities, and decreases in the number of businesses willing to invest in high-crime areas. For these reasons, the state of California wants the three strikes law to serve the purpose of deterring criminal activity. Deterrence has long been viewed as the most feasible way of preventing crime. One of the main purposes of creating laws and punishments is to deter people from committing crimes. Although deterrence theory has been well received and widely accepted, there are many questions concerning certain laws that are based on it, among them the three strikes law in California.
This study is significant because California and other states throughout the country should have comprehensive evidence that the three strikes law has assisted in deterring crime. The need for such evidence is two-fold. On the one hand, the state of California needs this information to determine whether the legislation is effective. On the other hand, states that are considering implementing similar legislation need to understand whether such policies are effective at decreasing crime rates and achieving deterrence. Overall, the proposed study is significant because it will provide legislators and the criminal justice system with the information needed to determine whether three strikes laws contribute to deterring people from committing crimes, thus making the public safer.
The following research questions guide this study:
Kovandzic, Sloan, and Vieraitis (2004) report that between 1993 and 1996 a total of 25 states and the federal government implemented "three strikes and you're out" laws. Of the states that implemented such laws, California has been the most persistent in enforcing them. In the years since the implementation of the three strikes law in California, several studies have aimed at determining whether the law has been successful in deterring crime.
Goodno (2007) reports that there are two primary theoretical principles associated with the three strikes law. In addition to the deterrence effect, the law is also based on the incapacitation effect. The incapacitation effect involves the idea of repeat offenders being detained for longer periods of time; during incarceration, offenders are incapable of committing new crimes. Proponents of the law also asserted that it would have a deterrent effect, meaning that possible criminal activity would be deterred because of the potential for longer sentences under the Three Strikes law (Goodno, 2007). Goodno (2007) asserts that studies conducted in the years since the law's implementation have shown that it does have an effect on both incapacitation and deterrence.
As it pertains to the incapacitation effect, observations have found that since the inception of the three strikes law, the number of sentenced third-strikers decreased every year from 1996 until 2003. Goodno (2007) also notes a similar decrease involving second-strike offenders. Some claim that the drop in capital sentences since 2000 may be linked to the Three Strikes law. One possible interpretation of this decline is that there are fewer strikers every year because the law is doing its job — in other words, defendants who are habitual offenders are incapacitated and cannot commit additional crimes while serving longer sentences (Goodno, 2007).
Goodno (2007) also reports that prisoners with strikes have usually committed more serious crimes than those without any strikes. This is significant because it demonstrates that the law is functioning as intended — serving the purpose of incapacitating felons who are generally more prone to engaging in criminal activity (Goodno, 2007).
Goodno (2007) further contends that the law has had a deterrent effect, most evident in the decrease in the crime rate since the law was first implemented in 1994. Goodno (2007) reports the findings of a 1999 FBI study, which suggested that:
"[s]ince California enacted its three strikes law in 1994, crime has dropped 26.9 percent, which translates to 815,000 fewer crimes. While numerous social and economic factors underlie crime rates, the correlation between the drop in California's crime rate and the enactment of the Three Strikes law is notable. One interpretation of this correlation is that potential offenders may be deterred from committing crimes because of the possibility of serving longer sentences (Goodno, 2007)."
Many studies have confirmed the deterrent effect of California's three strikes law. Goodno (2007) explains that in one survey, most juvenile offenders questioned responded that if they knew they would be sentenced to 25 years to life, they would not commit a serious or violent crime. Additionally, other studies have found that the three strikes model has a deterrent effect because it "reduces felony arrest rates among the class of criminals with 1 strike by 29 to 48 percent… and among the class of criminals with 2 strikes by 12.5 percent (Goodno, 2007)." Goodno (2007) also reports that when using an economic model, another study found that the Three Strikes law continues to deter offenders from committing crimes that would qualify for a first strike.
In addition to decreases in crime rates, the deterrence effect can also be observed in parole statistics (Goodno, 2007). Goodno (2007) reports that more parolees have left the state of California than have entered it. When writing the opinion in Ewing v. California, Justice O'Connor asserted that "[a]n unintended but positive consequence of 'Three Strikes' has been the impact on parolees leaving the state. More California parolees are now leaving the state than parolees from other jurisdictions entering California. This striking turnaround started in 1994 (Goodno, 2007)." This trend suggests that parolees are more likely to leave California because they are aware that if they continue with criminal activity, they will face tougher penalties there (Goodno, 2007).
According to Chen (2008), soon after the law was implemented, supporters asserted that there were significant decreases in crime rates as a result of its passage (Ardaiz, 2000; Lungren, 1996, 1997; Reynolds, 1995). The effectiveness of the law was also revisited in 2005. Reynolds (2005) reported a 46% decline in the index crime rate from 1992 to 2002, asserting that "the reduction in crime that occurred after the passage of 3-Strikes speaks for itself… any objective assessment would credit 3-Strikes with playing a major role in California's record crime drops (Reynolds, 2005, quoted in Chen, 2008)."
A study of the three strikes law conducted by the California Attorney General's (CAG) Office in 1996 found that the implementation of the law resulted in one million fewer criminal victimizations and a decrease in murders by 5,000. However, Helland and Tabarrok (2007) explain that these figures are not accurate because the CAG only "compared the drop in crime in California between 1994 and 1996 to the drop in crime in other states and concluded that the difference represented the effect of the law. Even a simple improvement in methods such as an examination of before and after trends finds much smaller and generally insignificant effects (Helland & Tabarrok, 2007)."
Helland and Tabarrok (2007) also point out that Shepherd (2002) produced the most methodologically rigorous study of the law's impact on crime rates in California. This claim of accuracy rests on the fact that Shepherd utilized a structural model and compared data at the county level with county fixed effects. Using this method, Shepherd found that during the two years following the implementation of the three strikes law, murders decreased by 8, there were several thousand fewer aggravated assaults, and approximately 400,000 fewer burglaries.
The method used by Helland and Tabarrok (2007) differs considerably from previous efforts. Rather than investigating aggregate crime rates and connecting them to a measure of the three strikes law, the authors followed a large group of criminals released from prison in California during the same year the three strikes rule was implemented. The authors then determined the deterrent effect by "comparing the subsequent arrest profiles of criminals who were released with 1 and 2 strikes to criminals released with 0 and 1 strike respectively." Through this method, the authors found that California's three strikes legislation significantly reduces felony arrest rates among the class of criminals with 1 strike by 48 percent and among the class of criminals with 2 strikes by 12.5 percent (Helland & Tabarrok, 2007, p. 309).
"Evidence the law fails to deter crime"
"Methodological challenge of separating two effects"
"Proposed quantitative secondary research design"
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