This paper examines Canada's Conservative Government's "tough on crime" approach, focusing on sentencing reforms such as the Conditional Sentencing Reform Bill and increased incarceration periods. Drawing primarily on Colin Goff's Criminal Justice in Canada, the paper argues that harsher penalties fail to address the root causes of criminal behavior and instead inflate prison populations without reducing crime. It draws parallels to the United States' experience with mass incarceration and contends that effective crime reduction requires education and proactive prevention rather than punitive deterrence alone. The paper ultimately calls for a systemic shift toward rehabilitative and educational strategies.
The Conservative Government in Canada emphasized its attitudes toward crime by implementing a system designed both to deter and to harshly punish criminals, with the stated aim of making the country a safer place. Child sex offenders, for instance, became less likely to receive mild sentences, and authorities were generally instructed to do everything in their power to prevent serious crimes from occurring. As a result, penalties became more significant and the public was encouraged to play a more active role in protecting the community.
This punitive orientation drew on the longstanding assumption that the prospect of severe consequences would cause potential offenders to reconsider their actions. By raising the perceived risks associated with criminal behavior, the government believed it could achieve measurable reductions in crime across Canada. Understanding the logic behind these reforms — and their limitations — is essential to evaluating the direction of criminal justice policy in Canada during this period.
The Conditional Sentencing Reform Bill was among the first principal "tough on crime" reforms that the Conservative Government adopted after coming to power. "Proposed in 2006, the bill's objective was to restrict the availability of conditional releases (day and full parole and statutory release)" (Kury & Shea 121). The legislation was largely aimed at preventing offenders who had received sentences of ten or more years from accessing conditional release (Kury & Shea 121). Individuals convicted of crimes such as theft of property or money worth over $5,000 suddenly found themselves denied parole, substantially worsening their situation.
The government did not stop at changing parole conditions; it also moved to increase incarceration periods for certain offences. Criminals responsible for particular crimes would face harsher penalties as a direct consequence of their actions. The move was intended primarily to deter potential offenders by forcing them to weigh the heightened risks involved. Risk was a central factor in the series of reforms adopted under the Conservative Government's leadership: by enacting laws that raised the stakes for criminal activity, the government hoped to achieve greater success in its broader effort to prevent crime. These laws were expected to reduce the overall number of criminal acts in Canada, on the assumption that offenders would rationally acknowledge and respond to the increased consequences of their behavior.
Chapter 6 of Colin Goff's book Criminal Justice in Canada addresses a series of problems associated with the Conservative Government's approach in an attempt to help readers understand why and how this form of policing is ineffective. The chapter emphasizes the difficulties the authorities encountered as they relied on one of the most traditional methods in the history of criminal justice. There are numerous reasons why this approach proved ineffective, the most significant being that criminals perceived little to no real threat in these measures — other motives drove criminal behavior, and individuals did not stop simply because penalties had become more severe.
What the Conservative Government failed to understand was that policymakers first needed to address the underlying factors that lead individuals to become criminals. By focusing on those root causes, authorities would be far more likely to achieve a genuine reduction in crime. Simply increasing the severity of penalties was, in effect, a reactive and blunt instrument — offenders generally acknowledged the greater risks they faced but experienced little hesitation as a result. As scholars of deterrence theory have long noted, the certainty of punishment tends to be a stronger behavioral deterrent than its severity alone.
"U.S. prison population as cautionary example for Canada"
"Case for education-based crime deterrence over punishment"
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