This paper examines the six levels of the chain of command during the Vietnam War and analyzes how each level perceived and applied the Rules of Engagement (ROE). The six levels considered are individual soldiers in the field, battalion commanders, division commanders, General William Westmoreland, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, and President Lyndon Johnson. The paper explores how proximity to battlefield realities shaped each level's understanding of ROE, discusses the political dimensions embedded in ROE planning, and concludes that while perspectives differed across the hierarchy, all levels contributed to a flexible, policy-grounded framework designed to function even when direct communication between the field and Washington was impossible.
The objective of this study is to examine the views of the six levels in the chain of command from the perspective of each during the Vietnam War. The six levels of the chain of command include: (1) individual soldiers in the field; (2) battalion commanders; (3) division commanders; (4) General William Westmoreland; (5) Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara; and (6) President Lyndon Johnson.
The Vietnam War produced significant conflict in the arena of public opinion. Under the Rules of Engagement, directives and orders were designed to focus on mission accomplishment while maintaining relations with the civilian population. The Rules of Engagement set out how operations should proceed during a crisis, and when followed, they served to account for "policy and political sensitivities" (The Chain of Command and NCO Support Channel, FM 7-21.13, n.d., p. 5).
Rules of engagement are described as tools of immense value for bridging "the gap between the political dimension and military operations" (Palmer, 1993, p. 5). They are also valuable in maintaining "centralized control, and permitting decentralized execution" (The Chain of Command and NCO Support Channel, FM 7-21.13, n.d., p. 6).
The Rules of Engagement were viewed differently by different levels within the chain of command, depending upon each level's proximity to the actions taken under those rules. For example, the U.S. President during the Vietnam War issued directives from Washington without the benefit of on-site experience and knowledge. From that vantage point, the Rules of Engagement looked quite different than they did to individual soldiers on the battlefield, who witnessed young children strapped with bombs and watched their fellow soldiers fall victim to such traps and lose their lives.
Battalion commanders and division commanders, however, had the benefit of on-site knowledge and were informed by the firsthand accounts soldiers reported from the battlefield. The fourth level — that of General William Westmoreland — represented an informed role with respect to the Rules of Engagement during the Vietnam War. However, like President Lyndon Johnson, Westmoreland was sufficiently removed from the daily realities of the battlefield that he tended to view combat operations from a more theoretical and strategic perspective than did those at the lower levels of the chain of command hierarchy.
Planning of the Rules of Engagement is reported to require "effective top level command and control...intimate interaction between civilian and military officials...skill and flexibility in adopting existing contingency plans...[and] up to date, reliable information" (Palmer, 1993, p. 19). The Rules of Engagement are further described as comprising "a combination of law, policy, experience, and expectation" (p. 6).
"Requirements and components of effective ROE planning"
"ROE as bridge between political and operational realms"
"ROE flexibility and cross-level command synthesis"
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