CIA Secrecy, Ethics, and Government Oversight

Introduction: Secrecy and Scandal in Government Agencies

"Any agency which works in secret can behave in a scandalous manner, and the CIA is no exception to this rule." This paper analyzes that statement on two grounds: is it true that agencies which act in secret behave in a scandalous manner? And if so, is the CIA an exception to, or a demonstration of, this rule?

This paper argues, first, that all agencies throughout history and in whatever country, region, or empire — which act in secret — are inherently prone to dishonesty and unethical acts. Second, the CIA must act, to some degree, in secret with some of its operations. Finally, the paper argues that the CIA will always be prone to dishonesty and unethical actions, which requires more regular oversight.

All agencies throughout history and across nations are prone to act in a dishonest and unethical manner. The proof of this hypothesis rests on the null hypothesis: the author has been unable to find a government agency that acts in secret and that has not, over time, acted in an unethical manner. A second null hypothesis would be to find a spying operation that has operated in an ethical and honest manner over a long period, thereby disproving the original statement.

One can argue that any government agency requires power in order to be effective. Power comes through the purse — the ability to fund — through coercion — the ability to force — or through persuasion — the ability to convince. None of these methods is, in and of itself, inherently unethical. One can persuade, coerce, or bankroll activities in an open and above-board way. The Founding Fathers intended to create a system of public accountability and checks and balances such that administrators were not able to rule the citizenry in an unbridled way. The American Society for Public Administration's ethics statement includes three pillars: to serve the public interest, the law, and standards of personal and professional excellence (Lempert, 1997).

Whereas government agencies should be engaged in controlling negative consequences (such as crime and foreign attacks) or assuring improvements in the standards of living of the governed (from roads to schools), a good deal of the effort expended in public administration is directed at controlling public officials themselves:

"To a significant extent, the organization, rules, and energy of urban government are focused on surveilling and controlling officials rather than on the production of government outputs" (Anechiarico, 1994).

First Hypothesis: Has Any Secret Agency Maintained High Ethical Standards?

This is true not only in American government, but in governments around the world. Patronage, politicking, and pork have been an integral part of politically associated government agencies since the founding of America. Washington, Adams, and Jefferson complained of the "shameless corruption" in the appointments and administration of public agencies (Kurtz, 1957).

Is there any spying agency that has proven, over time, to maintain high ethical standards? One can argue that Mossad, the Israeli intelligence agency, had the most impeccable reputation for ethical behavior from the founding of Israel in 1947. Its earlier actions in the 1950s and 1960s concentrated on protecting the state of Israel from hostile surrounding powers and on retrieving Nazi war criminals, such as Adolf Eichmann, who had participated in or led atrocities during the Holocaust. One could characterize Mossad's kidnapping of Eichmann from Argentina as ethical, despite the subterfuge used against Eichmann and the then-dictatorial Argentinian government (Rosenbaum, 1993). From that comparatively virtuous period in the 1950s, however, Mossad's reputation has declined as it has engaged in torture and targeted killings of Palestinian terrorists (David, 2003).

Spying is inherently deceptive: the acts of lying, subterfuge, and deception can be necessary to coerce or fool others into betraying their country or fellow citizens. One can call such acts ethically justified, but even the most principled spying agency can lose sight of its founding goals over time. Mossad provides exactly this kind of cautionary example.

The Founding Fathers depended on the moral superiority of society as handed down directly from God to each citizen, and not through the intermediary of a king or other public official:

"We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness" (Jefferson, 1776).

Thus, according to the Declaration of Independence and the subsequent Bill of Rights in the Constitution, each citizen holds the inalienable right to dictate how they are governed. The ethical framework that was "self-evident" in the minds of the Founding Fathers was grounded in the Creator.

A creeping rationalism and rejection of these values has led to their replacement by "professionalism" — the assumption that governmental matters are too complex, too opaque, or too important to be overseen by ordinary citizens or their representatives. According to Guy Adams, "professionalism has assimilated ethics as a part of its ordinary definition," implying that the fundamental compact between the governed and those in government can be replaced by a creeping Mandarinization of modern government practice (Adams, 1993).

However, professionalism may be a necessary result of the growth of public agencies. Imposing a fixed moral set of precepts becomes increasingly difficult as society changes rapidly. According to Rokeach:

Second Hypothesis: Professionalism and the Erosion of Ethical Foundations

"If values were completely stable, individual and social change would be impossible. If values were completely unstable, continuity of human personality and society would be impossible. Any conception of human values, if it is to be fruitful, must be able to account for the enduring character of values as well as for their changing character" (Rokeach, 1972).

An appeal to the "universal values" of the Founding Fathers, or even to those values of particular religions, thus becomes difficult to apply over time as society, religion, and ethics shift in meaning.

The CIA has been implicated in unethical conduct since its founding after World War II. Allende in 1973, Mossadeq in 1952, and Diem in 1963 were all national leaders and victims of CIA operations (Johnson, 1992). The "moral authority" for these actions was asserted through presidential order in all of these and many other cases. One can question whether that moral authority was (1) justified, (2) if not justified, carried primarily by the executive branch, and/or (3) if not justified, shared also by CIA operatives and directors who were complicit in the actions that led to the deposition and deaths of those leaders.

If one accepts Mossad's kidnapping of Eichmann as morally defensible, then at least a partial moral justification can be constructed for the three CIA actions above. If, for example, the CIA had existed and could have eliminated Hitler in the 1930s, few today would argue that such action would have been morally unjustifiable — illustrating how context and consequence shape ethical judgments about covert operations.

Ginsberg and Shefter argue that the United States government is being dramatically undermined by the combination of invective, political intrigue, and innuendo (Ginsberg, 2002). This paper contends that (1) such tactics have existed since the founding of this country, (2) unethical conduct is a continual danger in any government agency at any time and in any country, and (3) unethical conduct is a particular concern among intelligence officers operating in secret.

Certainly Watergate, which was only marginally linked with the CIA, marked an increase in the public's distrust of the White House and the federal government in general. While perceptions of corruption were heightened, the longer-term effects may have been salutary.

Connected to, and perhaps prompted by, the Watergate break-in, Senator Frank Church (D-Idaho) conducted Senate hearings on the CIA that resulted in a significant curtailment of the agency's powers (Olmsted, 1996). While Church placed an appropriate spotlight on earlier CIA operations, his oversight also resulted in a significant crippling of the agency — particularly of the human intelligence operatives who were compromised and who were so critical to the agency's ongoing function as an information gatherer. One could argue that the CIA's lack of "humint" during the 1980s and 1990s resulted in major lapses in predictive capability, from the Iranian Revolution in 1979 to the bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut in 1984, to the failure to anticipate the 9/11 attacks in 2001.

Conclusion: Is the CIA Inherently Untrustworthy?

Lempert, D. (1997). Holding accountable the powers that be: Protecting our integrity and the public we serve. Public Administration Review, 11–25.

Olmsted, K. S. (1996). Challenging the secret government: The post-Watergate investigations of the CIA and FBI. UNC Press.

Rokeach, M. (1972). The nature of human values. The Free Press.

Rosenbaum, A. S. (1993). Prosecuting Nazi criminals. Westview Press.