Corrections and Rehabilitation: Limits of Punishment Theories

The Limits of Deterrence

The idea of deterrence is based on the notion that people will do whatever they can to avoid unpleasant things and seek out pleasant ones. The premise as it relates to crime is that if choosing to commit a crime is made unpleasant, people will not engage in such behavior. In general, this perspective predicts that crime rates will be lowest in places where offending brings about unpleasantness and highest where offending is pleasurable.

According to MacKenzie (2012), deterrence theory makes certain predictions: the more punishment that exists, the less crime there will be; the more people are watched and threatened with punishment, the less crime they will commit; and the more people believe they will be punished, the less crime they will commit. Supporters of deterrence theory believe that consequences make a difference. It would be convenient if this were true, because corrections would then be straightforward — if people were punished, crime would go away. But the evidence does not support this. The evidence shows that, for the most part, deterrence theory proves to be wrong or only weakly supported.

Deterrence is characteristically linked with imposing additional punishment on offenders and is defended by the claim that high crime and recidivism rates exist because offenders are not punished severely enough. This leads to the notion that reducing crime requires getting tough. Conservatives have generally agreed with this idea, arguing that crime must be made not to pay by enacting a range of laws that increase the costs of crime — such as mandatory minimum penalties. In spite of the appeal of these views, it should be understood that deterrence is not inherently a conservative theory; it does not unavoidably lead to a justification of harsh correctional policies. Deterrence is founded on the idea that people deliberately try to avoid unpleasantness and seek pleasure. It follows that by making the choice to commit crime painful, people will choose not to do it (Gendreau, 2012).

According to Nagin (2012), the idea of deterrence is that laws should be enacted to ward off potential offenders, but once a crime has been committed and the punishment of the offender is in question, deterrence can no longer be the primary concern. Surely the only morally valid reason for punishing a person is that they are guilty of some offense and deserve to be punished for it, which is why careful consideration of the balance of justice is essential to any ethically defensible theory of punishment. The basis for punishment is retrospective, not prospective. Although deterring the offender and protecting society might be laudable secondary goals, they can never be the primary justification for the punishment meted out. If deterrence were truly the central rationale for punishment, a person known by the authorities to be innocent might nevertheless rightfully be punished, provided only that the public believed the accused to be guilty and was, by virtue of their punishment, deterred from committing crimes themselves. This is one illustration of the barbarity of a theory of punishment founded on deterrence. Deterrence strategies frequently incite the very behavior they are intended to prevent, and such strategies rarely satisfy the challenging set of conditions under which their supporters claim they would work.

The Limits of Control-Oriented Supervision Programs

The control-based model is founded on a premise shared by liberal treatment advocates: that society relies too heavily on imprisonment as an offender-control strategy. There is an essential role for community corrections programs in both the treatment-centered and the control-centered model of offender management. The difference is that the control-centered model would design community corrections programs focused primarily on offender monitoring and control, while treatment advocates would design programs that emphasized the delivery of treatment to offenders in both institutional and community settings. Both models focus on crime control outcomes and both measure success in terms of individual abstention from crime rather than changes in overall community crime rates (MacKenzie, 2000).

According to Akers and Jensen (2002), a considerable body of research suggests that informal social controls are more effective than formal social controls at both the individual and community level. It is nonetheless reasonable to suggest that the relationship that develops between a probation or parole officer and an offender — in combination with other factors such as family, peers, work, and neighborhood — could represent a significant informal social control mechanism. With smaller caseloads and closer contact, it seems plausible that offenders will consider the consequences of their choices in terms of the impact on their relationship with their parole officer. There is a probable deterrent effect that may arise from increased contact between officers and offenders, but it will more likely occur as a result of the bond that develops between the two individuals.

The Case for Rehabilitation and the Attack on the Rehabilitative Ideal

A premise that has persisted throughout the history of American corrections is that efforts should be made to reform those who commit crimes. In the early 1900s, the rehabilitative model was eagerly promoted and helped to guide the reform of the correctional system, leading to the achievement of indeterminate sentencing, parole, probation, and a separate juvenile justice system. Over the following decades, offender treatment reigned as the dominant correctional philosophy. Then, in the early 1970s, rehabilitation underwent a sharp reversal of fortune. The broader upheavals in American society during this period prompted a widespread reevaluation of the state-run criminal justice system. Rehabilitation was criticized by liberals for permitting the state to act coercively against offenders, and was attacked by conservatives for permitting the state to act compassionately toward them (Cullen & Gilbert, 1982).

Although assessments vary about exactly how far support for rehabilitative theories of penal treatment has eroded, the decline of the rehabilitative model is clearly substantial. Some support this decline out of frustration with crime and a resulting desire to punish and incapacitate offenders. The more reasoned attacks against the rehabilitative model, however, have rested on three principal propositions: that the rehabilitative model poses a threat to the political values of free societies; that the rehabilitative ideal has proven susceptible in practice to debasement and the serving of unintended social ends; and that, either because of scientific ignorance or institutional incapacities, a rehabilitative approach is deficient. Still, the decline of the rehabilitative model cannot be entirely explained as the result of rational arguments made against it. The variety of the attacks, their contradictory assumptions and motivations, and the abruptness of the decline suggest that broader social and cultural forces are at work. The present social climate reflects a reduced faith in positive behavioral change, particularly through correctional institutions. Pessimism and controversy surround the values and effectiveness of all correctional institutions (Cullen & Gilbert, 1982).

Conclusion

There are many ways that offenders can be managed within the criminal justice system, and all approaches have both advantages and drawbacks. The limit of deterrence theory is that what deters one person may not deter another. The limits of the control-oriented model include the finding that informal social controls are more effective than formal social controls. The limits of incapacitation include a lack of physical space to house offenders. And the limits of restorative justice include the difficulty of bringing offenders and victims to a mutual resolution. Given the limitations of all these models, rehabilitation appears to be the most effective and broadly supported approach to corrections.

References

Akers, R. L., & Jensen, G. F. (2002). Dangerous liaison? Rational choice theory as the basis for correctional intervention. In A. Piquero & S. Tibbetts (Eds.), Rational choice and criminal behavior: Recent research and future challenges (pp. 279–296). New York: Routledge.

Braithwaite, J. (2012). Reintegrative shaming. In F. T. Cullen & C. L. Johnson (Eds.), Correctional theory. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Cullen, F. T., & Gilbert, K. E. (1982). Reaffirming rehabilitation. Cincinnati: Anderson Publishing Company.

Cullen, F. T., Pealer, J. A., Fisher, B. S., Applegate, B. K., & Santana, S. A. (2002). Public support for correctional rehabilitation in America: Change or consistency? Presented at the American Society of Criminology, Chicago, IL.

Gendreau, P. (2012). What works to change offenders. In F. T. Cullen & C. L. Johnson (Eds.), Correctional theory. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

MacKenzie, D. L. (2000). Evidence-based corrections: Identifying what works. Crime & Delinquency, 46(4), 457–471.

MacKenzie, D. L. (2012). From theory to policy. In F. T. Cullen & C. L. Johnson (Eds.), Correctional theory. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Nagin, D. S. (2012). Scaring offenders straight. In F. T. Cullen & C. L. Johnson (Eds.), Correctional theory. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Padgett, K. G., Bales, W. D., & Blomberg, T. G. (2006). Under surveillance: An empirical test of the effectiveness and consequences of electronic monitoring. Criminology & Public Policy, 5(1), 61–91.

Wilson, J. Q. (2012). Locking up the wicked. In F. T. Cullen & C. L. Johnson (Eds.), Correctional theory. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.