This paper critically examines four major correctional strategies — deterrence, control-oriented supervision, incapacitation, and restorative justice — and the empirical and theoretical limits of each. Drawing on scholarship by MacKenzie, Nagin, Gendreau, Cullen, and others, the paper argues that none of these punishment-focused models consistently reduces crime or recidivism. It then presents the case for rehabilitation, reviewing the attack on the rehabilitative ideal, empirical evidence on treatment effectiveness, the principles of effective correctional intervention, and sustained public support for rehabilitation as the primary goal of the correctional system.
The idea of deterrence is based on the notion that people will do whatever they can to avoid unpleasant things and seek out pleasant ones. The premise as it relates to crime is that if choosing to commit a crime is made unpleasant, people will not engage in such behavior. In general, this perspective predicts that crime rates will be lowest in places where offending brings about unpleasantness and highest where offending is pleasurable.
According to MacKenzie (2012), deterrence theory makes certain predictions: the more punishment that exists, the less crime there will be; the more people are watched and threatened with punishment, the less crime they will commit; and the more people believe they will be punished, the less crime they will commit. Supporters of deterrence theory believe that consequences make a difference. It would be convenient if this were true, because corrections would then be straightforward — if people were punished, crime would go away. But the evidence does not support this. The evidence shows that, for the most part, deterrence theory proves to be wrong or only weakly supported.
Deterrence is characteristically linked with imposing additional punishment on offenders and is defended by the claim that high crime and recidivism rates exist because offenders are not punished severely enough. This leads to the notion that reducing crime requires getting tough. Conservatives have generally agreed with this idea, arguing that crime must be made not to pay by enacting a range of laws that increase the costs of crime — such as mandatory minimum penalties. In spite of the appeal of these views, it should be understood that deterrence is not inherently a conservative theory; it does not unavoidably lead to a justification of harsh correctional policies. Deterrence is founded on the idea that people deliberately try to avoid unpleasantness and seek pleasure. It follows that by making the choice to commit crime painful, people will choose not to do it (Gendreau, 2012).
According to Nagin (2012), the idea of deterrence is that laws should be enacted to ward off potential offenders, but once a crime has been committed and the punishment of the offender is in question, deterrence can no longer be the primary concern. Surely the only morally valid reason for punishing a person is that they are guilty of some offense and deserve to be punished for it, which is why careful consideration of the balance of justice is essential to any ethically defensible theory of punishment. The basis for punishment is retrospective, not prospective. Although deterring the offender and protecting society might be laudable secondary goals, they can never be the primary justification for the punishment meted out. If deterrence were truly the central rationale for punishment, a person known by the authorities to be innocent might nevertheless rightfully be punished, provided only that the public believed the accused to be guilty and was, by virtue of their punishment, deterred from committing crimes themselves. This is one illustration of the barbarity of a theory of punishment founded on deterrence. Deterrence strategies frequently incite the very behavior they are intended to prevent, and such strategies rarely satisfy the challenging set of conditions under which their supporters claim they would work.
The control-based model is founded on a premise shared by liberal treatment advocates: that society relies too heavily on imprisonment as an offender-control strategy. There is an essential role for community corrections programs in both the treatment-centered and the control-centered model of offender management. The difference is that the control-centered model would design community corrections programs focused primarily on offender monitoring and control, while treatment advocates would design programs that emphasized the delivery of treatment to offenders in both institutional and community settings. Both models focus on crime control outcomes and both measure success in terms of individual abstention from crime rather than changes in overall community crime rates (MacKenzie, 2000).
According to Akers and Jensen (2002), a considerable body of research suggests that informal social controls are more effective than formal social controls at both the individual and community level. It is nonetheless reasonable to suggest that the relationship that develops between a probation or parole officer and an offender — in combination with other factors such as family, peers, work, and neighborhood — could represent a significant informal social control mechanism. With smaller caseloads and closer contact, it seems plausible that offenders will consider the consequences of their choices in terms of the impact on their relationship with their parole officer. There is a probable deterrent effect that may arise from increased contact between officers and offenders, but it will more likely occur as a result of the bond that develops between the two individuals.
Incapacitation uses imprisonment as a means of separating offenders from the rest of society so that they cannot commit offenses while confined. According to MacKenzie (2012), there is no question that the main crime-reduction strategy used since the 1980s has been to increase the use of punishment, predominantly incarceration, under the assumption that people who are locked up will be prevented from committing additional crimes.
The fundamental problem with incapacitation is one of space. The criminal justice system currently faces a tension between the public's demand for harsher punishment of convicted criminals and its unwillingness to provide additional resources to make that possible. The principal operational constraint is prison capacity: prisons are already filled to capacity. The current level of incarceration represents an issue of enormous political and social concern, as well as considerable expense.
The present growth in prison populations comes at a time of relatively little growth in prison capacity, resulting in prison overcrowding and serious concerns about its effects. It has led to conditions of confinement that are inappropriately severe, prompting court interventions directed at correcting such conditions. Overcrowded prisons inevitably increase the difficulty of managing institutions and lead to a transfer of control from those charged with managing the institution to the most dangerous inmates, with attendant deterioration of staff morale, reduced security, and an increased risk of riots or other serious problems (Wilson, 2012).
MacKenzie (2012) suggests that restorative justice (RJ) is a set of principles about justice that assumes a compassionate, helpful, and rational human spirit. It presupposes that victims can be generous toward those who have harmed them, that offenders can be remorseful and sorry for their actions, that their personal communities of care can play an active role of support, and that a facilitator can guide balanced dialogue and encourage consensual decision-making between parties with opposing interests.
The restorative justice model entails a set of principles and values that include limiting values, maximizing values, and evolving values. While the criminal justice system today is offender-centered and focused on punishment, the restorative justice model offers a more balanced view of the appropriate public response to crime. It supports the public dimension of criminal law but introduces the victim's perspective and the addressing of needs created by the crime as an inseparable feature of justice (MacKenzie, 2012).
"Prison capacity and restorative justice shortcomings"
Research indicates that offender treatment programs that conduct thorough, objective assessments of offenders and use that information to inform treatment planning decisions achieve much better outcomes than programs that do not conduct such assessments. Assessment allows programs to deploy their treatment resources — personnel, money, and time — in a more cost-effective manner by directing them where they will produce the best outcomes (Braithwaite, 2012).
Risk assessment provides a measure of the risk principle, which holds that high-risk offenders will likely reoffend if untreated, while low-risk offenders are unlikely to reoffend even without treatment. Rigorous treatment should be reserved for higher-risk offenders, as treatment can make a real difference for them. Lower-risk offenders should receive little, if any, intervention, as treatment resources would largely be wasted on them. The risk principle is extensively discussed in the research literature (Braithwaite, 2012).
There is a risk that the entire enterprise could devolve into careless empiricism — scouring data for significant associations without any understanding of why the components of successful programs are interconnected. The principles of effective intervention, however, have been shown to be well-validated. The first principle is that interventions should target the known predictors of crime and recidivism for change. This principle begins with the assumption that correctional treatments must be grounded in criminological knowledge. There are two kinds of predictors that place people at risk for crime: static predictors, such as criminal history, which cannot be changed, and dynamic predictors, such as antisocial attitudes, which can potentially be changed (Gendreau, 2012).
The second principle is that treatment services should be behavioral in nature. Behavioral interventions are generally effective in changing a range of human behaviors. With regard to crime, they are well-suited to changing criminogenic needs, antisocial attitudes, cognitions, personality orientations, and associations that drive recidivism (Gendreau, 2012).
The third principle is that treatment interventions should be used primarily with higher-risk offenders, targeting their criminogenic needs for change. Contrary to conventional wisdom, higher-risk offenders are capable of change, and the most significant reductions in recidivism are achieved by providing them with treatment services. In contrast, lower-risk offenders typically do not require intervention because they are unlikely to reoffend. Subjecting them to intensive, structured interventions is an irresponsible use of scarce resources and, under certain conditions, may actually increase recidivism (Gendreau, 2012).
"Evidence-based principles guiding successful offender treatment"
"Survey data showing public backing for rehabilitation"
Padgett, K. G., Bales, W. D., & Blomberg, T. G. (2006). Under surveillance: An empirical test of the effectiveness and consequences of electronic monitoring. Criminology & Public Policy, 5(1), 61–91.
Wilson, J. Q. (2012). Locking up the wicked. In F. T. Cullen & C. L. Johnson (Eds.), Correctional theory. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
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