This paper reviews Erik J. Dahl's 2008 article "Preventing Terrorist Attacks: Challenging the Conventional Wisdom," published by the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. The review situates Dahl's work within the broader post-9/11 literature on terrorism prevention and contrasts his approach with more policy-focused analyses such as that of Noor Razzaq. The paper summarizes Dahl's core argument — that failures to prevent terrorist attacks stem from lack of imagination, excessive focus on tactical intelligence, and bureaucratic limitations — and outlines his three proposed strategies: rethinking conventional wisdom, prioritizing local and domestic intelligence, and shifting the intelligence reform debate to lower-level organizational concerns.
Ever since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the security of the United States has been transformed into the foremost priority of presidential administrations. Beyond formal political directives, more and more individuals have placed increased emphasis on issues of security, particularly the prevention of terrorist attacks.
In this setting of growing focus on terrorist attack prevention, the literature in the field has also expanded. Numerous books have been written on the topic, such as Preventing Surprise Attacks: Intelligence Reform in the Wake of 9/11 by Richard Posner (2005), Human Security, Law and Prevention of Terrorism by Andrej Zwitter (2010), and Cybersecurity: Preventing Terrorist Attacks and Protecting Privacy in Cyberspace by the United States Congress, published under the U.S. Government Printing Office (2010).
Alongside books, the number of articles on the topic of terrorist attack prevention has also increased. While books require longer periods to research and edit, articles are typically written more quickly and remain relevant because they address issues of immediate current concern. One notable example is Erik Dahl's (2008) article on the prevention of terrorism through the implementation of a new approach.
Most articles on terrorist attack prevention point out the need to develop and implement new policies at the national level in order to discourage terrorism. Noor Razzaq, for example, takes a highly formal approach focused on the presentation of policies and legislation aimed at preventing terrorist attacks. He outlines the various provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act that create opportunities for counterterrorism, such as the sharing of information and the disclosure of data (Noor, 2007).
Dahl's article is generally different from other articles on the prevention of terrorist attacks available in the literature. In contrast to Noor — who is part of the police force — Dahl is affiliated with a research and educational institution, which lends his article greater credibility and reduces the expectation of institutional bias. His approach is accordingly more objective and analytical.
Dahl begins his article by observing that after a terrorist attack occurs, the warning signs become retrospectively visible. The question he raises is why these signs were not recognized in the first place, so that the attacks could have been prevented. In some instances, the signs are recognized and the attacks are stopped before they cause any harm — as in the cases of the New York City "Day of Terror" plot, the Lackawanna Six, and the Fort Dix plot.
When attacks are identified and stopped beforehand, they are seldom remembered. But some attacks are never prevented and come to materialize, causing immeasurable damage. The conventional belief holds that such failures occurred because the existing security system failed to recognize the warning signs, and that sustained improvements in security systems, mechanisms, and legislation would improve detection capabilities and prevent future attacks.
Erik Dahl, however, disagrees with this conventional belief. He argues that failures to identify the signs of an impending terrorist attack — and therefore to prevent the attack — are attributable to three main problems: the lack of imagination within the security system, an excessive focus on tactical intelligence, and limitations imposed by organizational and bureaucratic processes.
In order to overcome these limitations and increase the likelihood of identifying warning signs and preventing attacks, Dahl proposes three strategies. He argues for the need to become more imaginative, to place greater emphasis on local and domestic intelligence, and to shift the focus of the intelligence reform debate from top-level organizational issues to lower-level concerns. In his own words:
"Get past the conventional wisdom. We need to recognize that many commonly held beliefs about preventing terrorist attacks are mistaken, and that the next major terrorist attack against Americans is unlikely to be prevented by organizational reforms and efforts to increase imagination."
"Focus on local and domestic intelligence. The record of failed terrorist plots tells us that the most effective intelligence is gathered close to home, as a result of local, on-the-ground domestic intelligence efforts."
"Shift the debate on intelligence reform. Most of the national discussion about intelligence reform concerns top-level organizational issues, but the more important debate is a lower-level one. As we turn our focus toward domestic intelligence, we must have a serious, informed debate over domestic intelligence gathering and how to balance civil liberties while still obtaining the intelligence needed to prevent future attacks." (Dahl, 2008)
All in all, the article is an intriguing one, especially since it is highly different from other articles available. While the majority of the literature on the prevention of terrorist attacks is formal and emphasizes reforms, policies, and legislation, Dahl introduces a new angle in the discussion. His article also has the benefit of being written in a manner that is easily accessible to general readers as well as specialists.
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