This paper examines the use of deception as a tactic in law enforcement crisis negotiations, drawing on real cases such as the James Harvey hostage incident and State v. Sands. It considers two philosophical justifications for lying in crisis situations — expediency and utilitarian reasoning — including arguments by Sissela Bok and Grotius regarding consequentialist ethics and the principle of forfeiture. The paper also addresses the significant drawback that deceptive tactics can erode public trust in law enforcement and undermine future negotiations. It concludes that deception may be justified when it produces greater good than harm, but must be applied sparingly and discreetly.
Crisis negotiation entails law enforcement communication and interaction with people threatening to cause actual bodily harm or property destruction. This may include hostage takers, suicidal individuals, stalkers, and barricaded subjects (McMains & Mullins, 2010). As illustrated by the James Harvey case, the distress characterizing such incidents — coupled with a lack of full control over the situation — may tempt law enforcers to engage in deceptive tactics aimed at diffusing tensions (Frances, 1995; Lakhani, 2007).
In 1988, Harvey held a group of children hostage in a classroom. After lengthy negotiations, he was offered a videotaped pardon from the Governor in exchange for a public press opportunity at which he would air his grievances. Harvey surrendered his weapon as a result, after which he was wrestled to the ground and arrested (Frances, 1995). The promises made to him were never fulfilled. In a similar case — State v. Sands — the immunity offered to the appellant was likewise not upheld. In both cases, legal decisions held that the promises had been made under duress (Frances, 1995). This essentially sets a legal precedent applicable to all similar situations.
The use of deception in crisis situations, especially for the purpose of saving lives, appears appropriate for two significant reasons. First, lies can be expedient to the extent that they diffuse a situation without any physical confrontation (McMains & Mullins, 2010). This is advantageous because it averts possible loss of life and destruction of property — outcomes that are commonplace in physical confrontations. Second, lying seems justified through considerations of utility (Lakhani, 2007). This perspective is grounded in the various justifications offered through philosophical reasoning.
With regard to consequentialist reasoning, Sissela Bok asserts that lying in crisis situations is justified if the outcomes of deception outweigh the possible negative outcomes of the situation (Frances, 1995). In this view, lying is justified as a means to an end. In another argument supporting deception, Grotius contends that the principle of forfeiture makes lying acceptable when it is directed at hostile people whose rights are not — in a strict sense — violated by the lie (Frances, 1995). According to Grotius, people with evil intentions forfeit their right to expect truthful information (Frances, 1995). In essence, lying is advantageous because it is expedient: it can help diffuse dangerous situations without necessarily escalating violence or confrontation.
"How deception erodes trust and future negotiation effectiveness"
The deceptive tactics used on Harvey, for example, were publicly broadcast in news coverage. This public portrayal of deception erodes trust in law enforcement officers. Such portrayals may prove disadvantageous in future crisis situations, particularly if a hostage taker was previously a bystander who witnessed law enforcement using deception. In such cases, deception as a tactic could be not only fruitless but actively counterproductive (McMains & Mullins, 2010; Frances, 1995).
Lying is acceptable if it produces greater good than harm. It should be employed when it can expedite the resolution process with little or no harm to those involved. However, deception must be used sparingly, and its application should be kept from public disclosure whenever possible. Striking this balance is essential to preserving both the effectiveness of crisis negotiation and the long-term credibility of law enforcement.
Frances, B. (1995). Criminal Justice Ethics: Lying during crisis negotiations — a costly means to expedient resolution. Retrieved from
Lakhani, A. (2007). The truth about lying as a negotiation tactic: Where business, ethics, and law collide … or do they? ADR Bulletin, 9(6), pp. 101–109.
McMains, M. J., & Mullins, W. C. (2010). Crisis negotiations (4th ed.). New Providence, NJ: LexisNexis/Anderson.
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