Diversionary War Theory and U.S. Presidential Politics

Introduction

The world we live in seems to occupy one of the most important periods in the history of humanity, as no other era has seen more development in terms of technology, information, and psychological manipulation. This is the result of both evolution and revolution. At the same time, however, certain precepts have proven resistant to dissolution. As early as the 18th century, theorists articulated ideas that can be justified today. Carl von Clausewitz, reflecting on the French-Prussian conflicts, argued that war represents politics conducted by other means. Nowadays, while the future offers humanity endless possibilities in travel, thought, and nanotechnology, it also ensures that populations — regardless of their degree of intellectual development — can be manipulated, and that politicians can conceive of politics in terms of war, divorced from the traditional dimensions of armed conflict itself.

Precisely because politics has been conducted by other means, scholars have been led to consider the role of wars in shaping both internal and foreign politics. The scope of this analysis is to review the literature focusing on the extent to which wars have been used as a diversionary force by U.S. presidents. Is diversionary war being used — and has it been used in the past — to distract public opinion and redirect attention away from other political issues?

There has been much research into the issue, but the results have been collectively inconclusive. As one scholar argues, "the diversionary theory of the use of force must be subjected to more intensive theoretical scrutiny and rigorous testing to determine more precisely its validity." The findings continue to contradict one another, as scholars take different points of reference when addressing this topic — from the actual definition of the term to the reasons why presidents might choose to treat war as an instrument of domestic politics.

The review addresses three questions:

1) What are the key questions that scholars have attempted to answer?

Key Questions Scholars Have Attempted to Answer

2) How has the field's understanding of the issue changed over time (if at all)?

3) What have been and remain the key disagreements in the field?

Each question is prone to major disagreements — not so much concerning the theoretical considerations themselves (which will be addressed under question three), but in terms of similar analytical approaches yielding different results. These weaknesses will be stressed throughout all three sections.

The subject is important to consider because it offers a wider understanding of the ways and means by which war is conducted, thereby addressing an issue useful for a clearer picture of internal politics and how it is prosecuted with the aid of foreign policy. Regardless of the inconclusive evidence in the existing literature, wars are waged and, as a result, domestic politics changes. The ratio between these two elements remains an open question.

Scholars have approached the matter of war as a diversionary force by addressing several key points. The first and most important relates to the actual meaning of "diversionary war" in a political context. Jack S. Levy, for instance, situates the concept at the same societal level as the "Marxist-Leninist theory of imperialism." He rallies behind the "diversionary theory of war," defining it as "the idea that political elites often embark on adventurous foreign policies or even resort to war in order to distract popular attention away from internal social and economic problems and consolidate their own domestic political support." This idea is broadly acknowledged as central to the notion of diversionary war.

Another definition also underscores the connection between domestic and international politics: diversionary uses of force involve "employing force by the commander in chief to distract the public from deteriorating political conditions at home."

Scholars tend to relate war to the conduct of international politics, thus inevitably echoing Clausewitz. William Baker, presenting his own framework for understanding diversionary war theory, outlines three schools of thought. The first begins with the observation that, for most incumbents, public approval moves ineluctably downward from the first day in office. The second emphasizes the domestic and international contexts in which the president operates and to which presidential popularity responds. The third accepts the relationship between public approval and environmental stimuli but emphasizes instead the symbolic nature of the presidency and the potential for ameliorating the negative impact of events in both domestic and international arenas through political drama and effective public relations strategies.

Baker's framing reflects the consensus among most supporters of the diversionary war thesis: public approval is the most important variable for any sitting president. The three schools of thought are all, to varying degrees, connected to the acceptance of the presidency — on the domestic scene (the first and partially the second) or the international one (the third). One defining element of "diversionary war," therefore, is its strict connection to both domestic and international policy.

Nonetheless, some scholars are circumspect about drawing this connection as a starting point for defining diversionary war. As one critic notes, "although the diversionary theory of international conflict is intuitively plausible and is supported by much anecdotal evidence, quantitative tests generally have failed to establish a systematic link between domestic political troubles and foreign policy adventurism." Even so, he contends that understanding the role domestic politics plays in framing international policy decisions is necessary for a clearer view of whether diversionary war operates in practice. Regardless of the applicability of the assumption to the American case, the general analytical framework centers on the connection between domestic and international politics.

A second important point concerns the reasons why diversionary war is used. There is little agreement here either. One primary reason stressed in the literature is the manipulation of public opinion: "presidents have routinely used military force to raise their public approval rating, divert attention from a weak economy, and bolster their party's chances in national elections." This is confirmed by Phillips, who argues that "no one should be surprised if President Bush sought to divert attention from the budget deficit and savings and loan scandal by taking military action against Iraq, arguing that he would not be the first president to act forcefully abroad for partisan advantage." The media plays an increasing role in this dynamic: an international threat, representing the supreme menace to a nation's security and existence, will naturally command more attention than the perennial domestic concerns of unemployment or economic weakness.

A further reason relates to the image of the presidency and how the administration is perceived at home and abroad. It has been argued that "among the most important concerns presidents consider when confronted with an opportunity to use force is the need to appear forceful and strong to both international and domestic audiences. The president's reputation as a credible protector of the United States' international interests, its allies, and Americans abroad rests in large part on his willingness to take forceful action when such interests are threatened. To do less would be to risk creating an impression of weakness among adversaries, allies, neutrals, and the American public." This was especially salient during the Cold War, when the perception of adversarial strength mattered more than its reality. Much of the Cold War's covert and proxy activity was in fact motivated by an image of Soviet power that later proved to have been significantly overstated.

Diversionary war also has its own psychological logic as it pertains to the population. People tend to view international threats as the ultimate source of danger, and the state is the most trusted instrument for guaranteeing security. An international threat thus calls that guarantee into question. As one scholar notes, "as the leader of one of the world's great powers, the president of the United States is charged with the responsibility of guiding and implementing policies to protect and advance U.S. interests abroad. This is an onerous responsibility; the fortunes of various presidents have risen or fallen on the basis of the American public's satisfaction with their performance in this capacity." An external threat fosters internal cohesion, and Morgan and Bickers point out that presidential approval ratings tend to rise when a president uses military force on the assumption that he is acting as commander in chief in defense of American interests abroad.

The weaknesses of these theories are pointed out most sharply by Meernik, who argues that a president must first have the opportunity to use war as a diversionary technique. This opportunity is conditioned by factors such as threats to U.S. territorial security, its allies, or proxy states; perceived dangers to U.S. government, military, or diplomatic personnel; events likely to produce advances by ideologically committed opponents; events likely to result in losses of U.S. influence in regions within its sphere; and interstate military conflicts of potential consequence.

Even when such opportunities are present, empirical studies show that in 213 such occasions no military action was taken. This suggests that additional factors determine whether military force is actually deployed. Meernik identifies three main considerations: the interests of the American people, the domestic image of the president, and — during the Cold War — the constraint of avoiding direct confrontation with the Soviet Union. The first two remain relevant today; the third was specific to the bipolar era, when any direct clash with Moscow would have threatened the resolution of the numerous proxy conflicts that followed the Second World War.

The principal objection to using international force as a domestic distraction is therefore that even when all the enabling conditions are present — positive presidential ratings, high approval — the decision to use military force is not always made.

How the Field's Understanding Has Changed Over Time

Another weakness raised by critics of the diversionary war thesis is that the theoretical foundation for the idea of national cohesion in the face of an external enemy is not as solid as it appears. As Morgan and Bickers argue, "it is not clear that the assumption that external enemies rally internal support is as well founded as it first appears. Levy (1989) points out that the argument draws heavily from the sociological literature showing that an external threat increases the cohesiveness of a small group. Extending these findings from small group behavior to organizations as large and complex as nation-states is, at the very least, problematic. States consist of many groups that may be seriously at odds with one another and, in some cases, may even feel less enmity toward foreign groups than toward competing domestic interests." The outcome of an externally directed diversionary action may therefore be the opposite of the intended unity.

This theoretical gap is compounded by the problem of sampling: scholars often draw conclusions from certain groups rather than the full population. While the majority rather than unanimity may be the operative standard, it still cannot be confidently asserted that a U.S. military intervention abroad guarantees acceptance for the president and his administration across the full spectrum of domestic opinion.

A further weakness concerns the question of unilateral presidential decision-making. While supporters of the diversionary war thesis treat the decision to use force as essentially independent of opportunity, critics suggest that the desire and capacity to wage war for political purposes are strongly shaped by the personality of the incumbent. As one scholar notes, "every president makes decisions and establishes his foreign policymaking processes differently. While institutional pressures and limitations exist for every president, the process and presidential 'style,' especially during military decisions, appear to be strongly based on a president's individual preferences."

No generalized theory of military intervention as a tool for improving public support is therefore fully sustainable. There are clear cases in which presidents declined to intervene not because they lacked the opportunity or feared public disapproval, but because military action was simply not the right solution. The most eloquent example is the Kennedy administration's decision not to enter open conflict with the Soviet Union during the Cuban Missile Crisis. The situation represented a genuine threat to national security, and the nuclear stakes were existential. Despite comfortable approval ratings, Kennedy refused to escalate against Khrushchev — a decision that many questioned even after the crisis was defused. This example suggests that not every opportunity for intervention is seized to boost domestic support, and that presidential personality and judgment are also decisive factors. It also provides a counterargument for those who contend that diversionary war is used to maintain the prestige of the American presidency.

Finally, a weakness that bears on both the definition and the practical analysis of diversionary war is the limited data available. James Meernik notes that "most data sets on the political use of military force contain data pertaining only to situations where force was used and not to those occasions where presidents refrained from deploying the military." He further stresses that "we have no way to evaluate presidential decision making when a use of force was considered, but not utilized. We are forced to assume that presidential decision making in a quarter when no use of force took place is analogous to decision making in a crisis where no force was used." Because information is far more visible for situations in which war was actually waged and covered by the media, it is difficult to gauge the degree to which temptations to use force were resisted and how those occasions differed from cases in which war was chosen.

The issue has been widely debated since the Cold War. After the demise of the Soviet Union, however, the existence of a clearly defined ultimate enemy was called into question, and the focus of scholarly analysis shifted — not so much at the theoretical level but in terms of the empirical reference points available.

William Baker notes that "the popular presumption that presidents will turn to military adventurism to divert attention from dismal economic conditions, faltering popularity ratings or pending electoral misfortune is well represented both historically and in the mainstream media, and owes much to the in-group/out-group hypotheses found in the sociological literature." During the Cold War era, however, presidential popularity was treated largely as a secondary concern, since the nuclear threat was understood as an existential question of survival rather than a political variable. The conflict-cohesion hypothesis — which holds that conflict with an "out-group" increases the cohesion and political centralization of the "in-group" — was nonetheless operative during this period, providing a social-psychological rationale for the diversionary use of force.

After the first Gulf War, scholars began to examine more explicitly the possibility that diversionary force had been used to redirect public attention. Baker notes that, in contrast to Cold War interventions — which were rarely questioned as diversionary at the time — post-Cold War military actions became the subject of serious scrutiny, partly because more information was now available. "Later research, however, has found evidence to suggest that domestic politics does play some role in the foreign policy decisions of national leaders. In recent decades, statistical evidence has suggested that presidential uses of force may indeed redound to the benefit of the chief executive's public approval ratings." Baker also stresses that the relationship between internal and foreign policy can be deceptive, citing President George H. W. Bush's experience: despite high approval ratings during the Gulf War, he failed to win reelection. This underscores the point that the use of force does not reliably translate into sustained public approval.

Another important theoretical shift concerns the dominant paradigm itself. The Cold War era was dominated by realist state behavior — a framework in which, as one scholar notes, "many international relations theorists have treated (and tested) the diversionary hypothesis as a universal dictum of state behavior rather than as a partial explanation of some foreign policy decisions." The liberal school of thought, which gained prominence after the end of the Cold War (an outcome the realists had failed to foresee), placed greater weight on public opinion and domestic politics as factors in foreign policy decisions. Politicians, within this framework, are far more attentive to popular sentiment than realist theory had acknowledged.

A further evolution in the field concerns the proportionality of diversionary action. Morgan and Bickers ask whether the decision to go to war is an appropriate response to a given level of internal discontent. As they note, "most studies, following Rummel's (1963) lead, have sought to determine whether, over some specified period of time, those countries experiencing greater internal conflict also experience greater external conflict. If, however, all states engage in diversionary tactics, but have different internal conflict thresholds for doing so, it would be possible for empirical results based on such tests to be completely wrong." Different states tolerate different levels of internal conflict before resorting to external diversionary action, making cross-national generalizations unreliable.