Drone Strikes and Counterterrorism: Weighing the Strategic and Ethical Arguments

Introduction and Thesis

Robotic drones have been in use by the United States as a strategy of attack against terrorist groups for several years, beginning in the administration of George W. Bush. They have been effective, yet there is and has been considerable controversy surrounding the use of these robotic technologies. This paper examines both criticisms and supportive positions regarding drone strikes. The analysis draws on opinion articles by Daniel Byman and Kenneth Anderson to explore how drones operate and to present arguments both against and in support of their continued use.

Thesis: This paper supports the use of drones as a successful way to combat and eliminate key terrorist leaders who use violence to kill innocent people while advancing their ideologies. Although innocent people have been killed during targeted drone strikes—a situation that is unfortunate and warrants U.S. reparations whenever possible—this tragic outcome is not reason enough to discontinue the program.

Advantages of the Drone Program

Byman makes a compelling case that drones "have done their job remarkably well" and have "devastated al Qaeda," without putting U.S. forces in harm's way and at "little financial cost" (Byman, 2013). Byman correctly argues that the United States, in a constant battle with terror groups in many parts of the world, "simply cannot tolerate terrorist safe havens in remote parts of Pakistan and elsewhere." The data from the New American Foundation through 2013 shows that 3,300 al Qaeda, Taliban, and other terrorist operatives have been killed by drones, as Byman points out (Byman, p. 2).

Byman and Anderson published their articles before the ISIS terror movement took hold, so their analysis predates that significant development. However, Byman raises an important practical concern: when the U.S. needs to "capture or eliminate an enemy," even if the operation is successful and a terrorist is captured, what should the U.S. do with the detainee, given the ongoing problems at Guantanamo Bay? Some observers, including United Nations human rights advocate Ben Emmerson, believe more focus should be placed on "factors that might contribute to extremism and terrorism, such as poverty, unemployment, and authoritarianism." While Byman shows empathy for that approach, he says it is "far from clear how Washington could execute it" (p. 3).

Notably, the White House recently conducted a conference with representatives from 60 nations focused on exactly what Emmerson was proposing. The factors contributing to radicalization of young men into terrorists were key discussion points at the Obama Administration's conference, which was criticized by conservatives.

Byman explains that while some politicians in the Middle East and Pakistan loudly criticize the U.S. drone program, many foreign officials have actually "supported it." Pakistan has even been willing to host U.S. drone facilities (Byman, p. 4). Pakistani leaders have actually requested "continuous Predator coverage" from the U.S., since the enemies of the U.S.—Taliban and other militants—are also enemies of Pakistan (Byman, p. 4). However, despite official government support, approximately 74 percent of Pakistani citizens "viewed the United States as their enemy" in a 2012 poll, with the drone program's civilian casualties likely being a primary cause of this public hostility (Byman, p. 5).

The unintentional killing of civilians is a definite downside to the drone program, and Pakistani public anger is understandable. According to Anderson's article, between 2004 and 2012, the U.S. conducted 344 drone strikes in Pakistan, killing "between 2,562 and 3,325 people, of whom between 474 and 881 were civilians" (Anderson, 2013). This data comes from Georgetown law professor Rosa Brooks, though Anderson acknowledges that other studies show fewer civilian casualties by drones.

One significant concern raised by Byman involves the future spread of drone technology. What happens when terrorists obtain drones, or when they fall into the hands of ruthless dictators like Syrian President Bashar al-Assad? Byman argues that it is inevitable that terrorists or criminals at some levels will acquire drones, and this "cannot be stopped" (p. 6). As of Byman's article's publication, China had already begun manufacturing drones, and many countries purchasing from China are not friendly toward the U.S., creating a persistent challenge for the future.

U.S. Senator Rand Paul of Kentucky has made opposition to drone strikes a centerpiece of his criticism of President Barack Obama's policies. It is worth noting that Paul has held presidential aspirations, identifies as a conservative Republican, and has opposed Obama's presidency consistently. Therefore, it is unsurprising that he would object to Obama's use of drones. However, what specifically does Paul argue against regarding drone warfare?

Opposition and Criticisms

After an American drone strike killed radical cleric Anwar al-Awlaki in Yemen, criticism emerged from various quarters, including Paul. Al-Awlaki was an American citizen who had been radicalized, rejected democracy and Western values, and orchestrated attempts to kill innocent people through terrorism on multiple occasions. Kenneth Anderson points out that al-Awlaki was the principal instigator of the Fort Hood shooting on November 5, 2009, which killed 13 soldiers and injured more than thirty others. Anderson also notes that al-Awlaki directed efforts to "detonate a plane over Detroit on Christmas Day" and was "deeply involved in a plot to load printer ink with explosives" intended for detonation on a passenger jet (Anderson, 2013). Regardless of his citizenship, al-Awlaki was a terrorist responsible for plots to kill Americans.

Despite these facts, Paul asserted that killing al-Awlaki violated "due process" rights guaranteed to U.S. citizens in the Constitution. Paul's objection was so strong that he staged a "13-hour filibuster on the question of the legality of drone strikes" on the U.S. Senate floor (Anderson, p. 3).

Although Paul's attacks on the drone program "delighted many conservatives and libertarians," Anderson argues that as president, Obama possesses "many and capacious constitutional powers" regarding foreign policy. More pointedly, Anderson asks: Were the passengers aboard that Christmas Day commercial jetliner given "due process" by al-Awlaki's terrorist associates? Were the 13 soldiers gunned down in cold blood given "due process"? The answer, of course, is no—a compelling response to the senator's constitutional objections.

Anderson also addresses the "offensively foolish" objection to drones made by New Yorker writer Jane Mayer in 2009. Mayer asserted that because remote drone pilots operate at considerable distance from their targets, this encourages a "push-button" video-game mentality toward killing. Anderson effectively counters by noting that pilots of manned fighter aircraft operate "a mile above a target looking at a tiny coordinates screen," and when a sailor in a submarine launches a cruise missile, the target could be hundreds of miles away (Anderson, p. 4). The distance objection, therefore, applies equally to other military technologies.

Beyond the immediate debate over drone effectiveness and legality, larger strategic questions merit attention. Byman emphasizes that the U.S. must "guard against...the relative ease of using drones" because this convenience could make American military intervention abroad "too common" (p. 6). This concern reflects worry that drones might lower the political threshold for military action.

There are many valid points raised by both Anderson and Byman. Among them is Byman's important concern that the U.S. needs to "guard against...the relative ease of using drones" because it could make American intervention abroad "too common" (p. 6). Additionally, on the political front, Anderson suggests that "Republicans in Congress should stand with the president on the main issue of drone warfare" in order to maintain "the foundations of its legitimacy" (Anderson, p. 12). Given the current political antipathy and lack of cooperation in Congress, finding common ground between Republicans and the Obama administration seems unlikely.

Nevertheless, the thesis of this paper is that the drone program has been successful in eliminating known terrorist leaders and should continue, despite its shortcomings and the tragic deaths of innocents. The strategic value of removing high-level terrorists from operational planning, combined with the reduced risk to American personnel and the relatively low financial cost, outweighs the legitimate ethical and legal concerns—provided that the U.S. continues to refine targeting procedures and work toward diplomatic solutions to the underlying conflicts that breed terrorism.

Conclusion

Anderson, Kenneth. "The Case for Drones." Commentary. Retrieved February 23, 2015, from 2013.

Byman, Daniel. "Why Drones Work." Foreign Affairs, 92.4 (2013): 32-43.