Using 9/11 as Justification to Invade Iraq: A Critical View
This essay critically analyzes the use of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks as a political justification for the U.S. invasion of Iraq. The paper argues that the rationale for war was manufactured and inadequate on three grounds: Iraq presented no credible military threat to the United States, United Nations inspectors had already failed to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, and UN sanctions against Iraq had not been given sufficient time to work. Drawing on sources including the 9/11 Commission Report, Richard Clarke's testimony, and James Bamford's research, the essay contends that post-9/11 fear was deliberately exploited by the Bush administration to build public and legislative support for a war that ultimately proved unjustified.
- Introduction: Manufacturing a Case for War: Post-9/11 fear exploited to justify Iraq invasion
- Iraq Presented No Military Threat to the United States: Iraq posed no real danger to America
- UN Inspectors Found No Weapons of Mass Destruction: UN inspectors found no WMDs before the war
- UN Sanctions Were Not Given Enough Time: Sanctions could have exposed truth without war
- Conclusion: Fear, False Information, and an Unnecessary War: Fear and falsehoods produced an unjustified war
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What makes this paper effective
- The essay establishes a clear three-part thesis in the introduction and methodically addresses each claim in its own body paragraph, making the argument easy to follow.
- It incorporates authoritative primary and secondary sources — including the 9/11 Commission Report, a senior government adviser's testimony, and investigative journalism — to ground its claims in documented evidence.
- The paper effectively uses rhetorical contrast, juxtaposing the Bush administration's assertions with what inspectors, advisers, and commissions actually found, highlighting the gap between official claims and reality.
Key academic technique demonstrated
The paper demonstrates argumentative scaffolding: each body section opens with a numbered claim from the thesis, develops it with evidence and source quotations, and connects back to the central argument that post-9/11 fear — not facts — drove the decision for war. This technique keeps the argument focused and prevents the essay from drifting into narrative summary.
Structure breakdown
The essay follows a classic five-part structure: an introductory section that frames the political context and states a three-part thesis; three body sections each devoted to one pillar of the argument (military threat, WMDs, and UN sanctions); and a brief conclusion that synthesizes the role of fear and misinformation. The Works Cited page follows MLA format with four sources spanning government reports, television journalism, and investigative nonfiction.
Introduction: Manufacturing a Case for War
The war in Iraq may or may not have been justified for humanitarian or ideological reasons, depending on one's perspective. American leaders who favored war with Iraq used the frightened public mood after 9/11 to maneuver opinion toward supporting the war, supposedly for America's safety. According to "Clarke's Take on Terror":
"In the aftermath of Sept. 11, President Bush ordered his then top anti-terrorism adviser to look for a link between Iraq and the attacks, despite being told there didn't seem to be one . . . The charge comes from the adviser, Richard Clarke . . . Clarke says that as early as the day after the attacks, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was pushing for retaliatory strikes on Iraq, even though al Qaeda was based in Afghanistan . . . Clarke suggests the idea took him so aback, he initially thought Rumsfeld was joking."
Another American stated in hindsight, "If the government can use 9/11 as a justification to invade Iraq, then what prevents them from using 9/11 to shut up anyone who doesn't agree with government policy? They think the U.S. public will believe their scare tactics . . . To a frightening degree they have been right" ("9/11-Big Deal"). Rationales for war with Iraq were manufactured, as we now know, out of little more than thin air and a fervent wish by the Executive Branch to wage war on Iraq in particular. These "compelling" reasons were then swallowed by the Legislative Branch. The national mood at the time was that anyone who did not favor war was "unpatriotic."
Using 9/11 to convince America to wage war against Iraq was a misguided tactic for three main reasons: (1) Iraq presented no military threat; (2) UN inspectors had been unable to find weapons of mass destruction there; and (3) UN sanctions against Iraq were not given enough time to work. Based on those reasons, the 9/11 terrorist attacks were an inadequate and inappropriate justification for the invasion.
Works Cited
Bamford, James. A Pretext for War: 9/11, Iraq, and the Abuse of America's Intelligence Agencies. New York: Doubleday, 2004. Back Flap.
"Clarke's Take on Terror." 60 Minutes [online]. March 21, 2004. Retrieved May 2, 2005, from: <
"9/11-Big Deal." Retrieved May 3, 2005, from: <
"Executive Summary." The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Against the United States. New York: Norton, 2004. p. 10.
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