Dualism and Personal Identity in Being John Malkovich
This paper examines the philosophical concept of dualism as depicted in Spike Jonze's 1999 film Being John Malkovich. Drawing on Descartes' distinction between mental and physical substance, the paper analyzes how the film's central premise — a filing clerk who discovers a portal into the actor John Malkovich's mind — dramatizes questions about the separability of mind and body, the role of memory in personal identity, and the nature of the self. The paper references Falzon, Blackburn, and Litch to ground its reading, arguing that the film ultimately suggests that the dominant memory defines identity even when two personalities coexist within a single physical form.
- Introduction: Philosophy and Dualism on Screen: Introduces dualism and the film's premise
- Descartes and the Dual Nature of the Self: Outlines Cartesian mind-body distinction
- Memory, Identity, and the Malkovich Portal: Applies dualism to Craig's use of Malkovich's memory
- Counterarguments and the Ongoing Dualist Debate: Acknowledges philosophical objections to dualism
- Conclusion: Affirms film's answer to identity question
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What makes this paper effective
- It anchors a close reading of a popular film in a clearly stated philosophical framework — Cartesian dualism — from the opening paragraph onward.
- The paper integrates direct quotations from both the film's dialogue and secondary scholarly sources (Falzon, Blackburn, Litch) to support its argument rather than relying on plot summary alone.
- It identifies a single interpretive question — "How important is John Malkovich's memory to identifying him as John Malkovich?" — and uses the film's events to answer it systematically.
Key academic technique demonstrated
The paper demonstrates textual evidence layering: it first cites a theorist's definition (Falzon on Descartes), then finds a corresponding moment in the film (Craig's monologue), and finally draws an inferential conclusion that synthesizes both. This move — theory → text → inference — is the core technique of philosophical film analysis.
Structure breakdown
The paper opens by situating dualism within the history of philosophy and naming the film under analysis. The second section grounds the discussion in Descartes' mind–body distinction. The third and longest section applies that framework to specific scenes and the film's central dramatic question about memory and identity. The fourth section briefly acknowledges competing philosophical views before the conclusion affirms the ongoing relevance of the dualist question. The bibliography follows standard author–date formatting consistent with Chicago/Harvard style.
Introduction: Philosophy and Dualism on Screen
There have been several representations of philosophy on screen, and one topic that has always been of interest to filmmakers and viewers alike is dualism. Dualism is a philosophical concept that has been posited by great thinkers throughout history, such as Plato and Socrates. Descartes, more particularly, postulated his view that "human beings are made up of two kinds of stuff or 'substance': mental or spiritual substance (minds), and physical or material substance (bodies)" (Falzon 2002, p. 61). The dualist principle has been apparent in various films, and one clear example can be found in director Spike Jonze's 1999 film Being John Malkovich. The story revolves around filing clerk Craig Schwartz (John Cusack), who finds a passageway in his office through which he can enter the mind of the actor John Malkovich — a premise grounded in the same dualist principle (Falzon 2002, p. 62).
Bibliography
Jonze, S (dir) 1999, Being John Malkovich (film), Malkovich Films, United States.
Blackburn, S 1999, 'The Self' in Think, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 120–148.
Falzon, C 2002, 'Descartes and Dualism' in Philosophy Goes to the Movies, Routledge, London, pp. 60–68.
Kerruish, E 2011, [Course]: Philosophy on Screen: Film and Television, [University], East Lismore.
Litch, M 2002, 'Personal Identity' in Philosophy Through Film, Routledge, New York, pp. 67–86.
Witchalls, C 2007, 'Brain-bending numbers: Lab comes one step closer to building artificial human brain', The Guardian, 20 December.
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