Dualism and Personal Identity in Being John Malkovich

Introduction: Philosophy and Dualism on Screen

There have been several representations of philosophy on screen, and one topic that has always been of interest to filmmakers and viewers alike is dualism. Dualism is a philosophical concept that has been posited by great thinkers throughout history, such as Plato and Socrates. Descartes, more particularly, postulated his view that "human beings are made up of two kinds of stuff or 'substance': mental or spiritual substance (minds), and physical or material substance (bodies)" (Falzon 2002, p. 61). The dualist principle has been apparent in various films, and one clear example can be found in director Spike Jonze's 1999 film Being John Malkovich. The story revolves around filing clerk Craig Schwartz (John Cusack), who finds a passageway in his office through which he can enter the mind of the actor John Malkovich — a premise grounded in the same dualist principle (Falzon 2002, p. 62).

The mind-body problem that Descartes articulated remains one of the central concerns of Western philosophy. His position holds that the mind and body are distinct substances: the mind is an immaterial, thinking thing, while the body is an extended, physical thing. This separation forms the foundation of Cartesian dualism and raises profound questions about what constitutes personal identity. As Falzon observes, "the dualist view of human beings means that it is possible for the mind to exist separately from the body" (2002, p. 62), while the persona nonetheless remains that same person despite residing in a different physical form. Blackburn similarly notes that Descartes held we had "'clear and distinct' perception that the self was distinct from the body" (1999, p. 122). These two positions together set up the philosophical stakes that Being John Malkovich dramatizes so vividly.

The dualist role is evident throughout the film in the emphasis placed on John Malkovich's memory. When Schwartz discovers that he is able to remain in the persona of Malkovich and live the actor's life as his own, the significance of memory to identity becomes central. Schwartz finds his own life dull and unsuccessful, and the chance to inhabit Malkovich offers the transformation he craves. The dualist persona becomes progressively clearer as Schwartz assumes Malkovich's personality through access to the actor's memory. Although he knows he is still Schwartz, he acts out the life of John Malkovich — with a notable twist, as he eventually turns the actor into an accomplished puppeteer.

Descartes and the Dual Nature of the Self

Dualism is further illustrated in a key monologue in which Craig says: "It raises all sorts of philosophical-type questions, you know, about the nature of the self, about the existence of a soul. Am I me? Is Malkovich Malkovich? ... Do you see what a metaphysical can of worms this portal is?" (Jonze 1999; Litch 2002, p. 67). This monologue captures Descartes' concept of the dual nature of the human being with particular precision, since Craig is attempting to articulate the difference between mind or soul and body. The important question the film raises — and one that many viewers will have contemplated — is: How important is John Malkovich's memory to identifying him as John Malkovich?

The answer the film suggests is that memory is the central principle of personal identity. Without Malkovich's memory, the person inhabiting his body would simply be someone else. As Falzon states, "the dualist view of human beings means that it is possible for the mind to exist separately from the body" (2002, p. 62), yet the persona remains that of the same person even when residing in a different physical form. Thus, personal identity follows the mind — and, more specifically, the memory — rather than the body. Schwartz uses Malkovich's memory to live a life he never had and finds a fulfillment his old self never achieved. John Malkovich's mind may be said to reside temporarily in Craig's body, but it is Malkovich's personality — carried by his memory — that defines who is truly present.

Although Descartes postulated that "we had 'clear and distinct' perception that the self was distinct from the body" (Blackburn 1999, p. 122), several counterarguments remain, and various philosophers and thinkers throughout the ages have endeavored to address the dualist concept. Some of these arguments are valid and converge with Descartes' view, while others leave further questions about the nature of the human being unanswered. Thinkers working in the physicalist tradition, for instance, dispute the notion that the mind can meaningfully exist apart from bodily processes, challenging the very premise the film takes for granted.

Memory, Identity, and the Malkovich Portal

The application of, and search for answers to, the dual nature of humankind will always remain active. It makes for a rich topic of discussion among thinkers and provides a compelling subject for film. There may be no definitive right or wrong answer to the dualist question, but the continual pursuit of answers is itself an affirmation of humankind's constant drive to understand what it truly means to be human.

The film Being John Malkovich contains all the ingredients necessary for exploring the arguments and counterarguments surrounding the dualist nature of humankind. More importantly, it offers a dramatic answer to the question of identity: if one person's memory is utilized by another, the more dominant or pronounced memory takes precedence, even when a dual personality is present. As the audience witnesses with Schwartz, he may have retained his physical form, but for several months he was, in every meaningful sense, Malkovich. The film thus stands as a thought-provoking cinematic meditation on the enduring philosophical question of what constitutes the self.

Jonze, S (dir) 1999, Being John Malkovich (film), Malkovich Films, United States.

Blackburn, S 1999, 'The Self' in Think, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 120–148.

Conclusion

Litch, M 2002, 'Personal Identity' in Philosophy Through Film, Routledge, New York, pp. 67–86.

Witchalls, C 2007, 'Brain-bending numbers: Lab comes one step closer to building artificial human brain', The Guardian, 20 December.