Europe After WWII: Historical Development of Unification

Introduction

Europe was torn apart by ugly forms of national and ethnic hatred in the aftermath of World War II (1939–1945). Geographically situated at the center of a global power system, Europe recognized that any failure of peace could lead to global annihilation. In response, Europeans worked to establish a framework that would foster peace and regional cooperation. Their goal was the creation of a Common Market, which was ultimately established by 1957. This essay highlights the historical development of unification ideas in Europe after World War II, examining the key treaties, movements, and theoretical frameworks that shaped the continent's path toward integration.

Treaty of Paris (1951)

Europe suffered both economic and political crises after World War II. In 1950, Robert Schuman, the French Foreign Minister, proposed placing the production of German coal and steel under a common High Authority, inviting all European countries to participate within an organizational framework. The Netherlands, Luxembourg, Belgium, France, and Germany accepted this challenge and began negotiating a treaty. The foundational idea was inspired by Jean Monnet, a senior French civil servant who had put forward the original proposal in 1950. Although his idea was straightforward, the participating countries envisioned a more complex institutional structure.

The Treaty of Paris, establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), was signed on 18 April 1951 in Paris. It was valid for fifty years and expired on 23 July 2002. The Treaty opened on 10 February 1953 for iron ore, scrap, and coal, and on 1 May 1953 for steel. Its objective was to create a common market for coal and steel. As Surhone, Tennoe, and Henssonow (2010) noted, "The treaty was seen as producing diplomatic and economic stability in Western Europe after the Second World War" (p. 60). It was expected to bring economic expansion, increase employment, raise living standards, improve working conditions, equalize access to sources of production, and establish the lowest possible prices.

The Treaty enabled the free movement of these products without taxes or customs duties and included two important protocols. Its overall achievements were highly positive: the Community managed various crises, ensured balanced production development, and improved the distribution of resources. Steel production increased, becoming both better and cheaper. The Treaty expired in 2002 and was subsequently amended by several other agreements, including the Merger Treaty and the Treaty on Greenland.

David Mitrany and Functionalism

David Mitrany (1888–1974) spent most of his adult life in the United States and Britain, having been born in Romania. He had no particular interest in becoming a theorist of European integration. In his view, nationalism was the root cause of war, and he believed that nations needed to be tied more closely together to prevent the catastrophe of another world war. Mitrany was not in favor of federation as a means of binding nations together, and he also opposed the creation of regional federations, arguing that such arrangements simply reproduced national rivalries on a larger scale.

Instead, Mitrany proposed the creation of a series of separate international functional agencies, each with authority over a specific area of human life. His ultimate goal was to remove authority over individual technical tasks from national governments. He argued that if states continued to surrender areas of control, they would gradually become less capable of independent action. He was confident that national governments would eventually discover they were "enmeshed in the spreading web of international activities and agencies" (Mitrany, 1966, p. 35). He used the organization of railway systems and other communications networks as examples, and he also promoted less nationalistic outlooks and attitudes among the general public.

Conclusion

World War II completely destroyed the economic and political conditions of Europe, and Europeans continue to face significant hurdles. When we look at Western Europe today, we see policies of continued fiscal contraction aimed at meeting abstract requirements for future monetary union. These policies seem, at least from an outside perspective, to miss the point entirely. They do not provide firms or workers with stronger incentives to create and find jobs, either through government subsidy or through market opportunity. Since moving decisively in either ideological direction appears unacceptably risky, European governments have chosen to remain in the middle, hoping that monetary union will produce positive results. Western European economic management continues to puzzle those who study and practice macroeconomic policy elsewhere in the world.

References

Haas, E. B. (1968). The uniting of Europe: Political, social and economic forces, 1950–1957. Stanford University Press.

Lindberg, L. (1963). The political dynamics of European economic integration. Oxford University Press.

Milward, A. S. (1984). The reconstruction of Western Europe 1945–51. SAGE Publications.

Mitrany, D. (1966). A working peace system. Quadrangle Books.

Surhone, L. M., Tennoe, M. T., & Henssonow, S. F. (2010). Treaty of Paris. VDM Publishing.