This paper examines Carol Gilligan's argument in "In a Different Voice" regarding the gendered differences in moral development. Using the issue of abortion as a central example, the paper explores how societal expectations create a double standard for women, forcing them to reconcile personal autonomy with communal moral judgment. Gilligan's concept of the "self" and the "other" as two competing moral identities within women is analyzed, along with the consequences of prioritizing one over the other. The paper concludes that women's moral decision-making is inherently more conflicted than men's, and that addressing this disparity is essential for women's full emancipation as individuals.
The paper employs analytical summarization combined with direct quotation. Rather than simply paraphrasing Gilligan, it integrates a key passage to show the asymmetry between male and female moral imperatives — care versus rights-protection — allowing the source material to speak for itself while framing it within the paper's own argument.
The paper follows a tight single-paragraph argumentative structure suitable for a short response or reflection piece. It opens by introducing Gilligan's framework, narrows to the abortion example as illustration, develops the tension between self and other, and closes with a normative call for societal change. This funnel structure moves effectively from theory to application to conclusion.
Carol Gilligan's discussion of the differences in moral development between males and females in her book In a Different Voice brings to the fore how society continually constrains women in the process of formulating moral decisions. Gilligan demonstrates that the standards applied to women's moral reasoning differ fundamentally from those applied to men, creating an unequal burden that shapes — and distorts — the way women come to understand themselves as moral agents.
To illustrate this point, Gilligan uses the issue of abortion as a central example. When a woman faces this decision, her morality is scrutinized by society in ways that a man's rarely is. This societal scrutiny constrains women to make decisions — whether to proceed with or refuse an abortion — not purely on the basis of their own judgment, but under the weight of communal expectation and external moral judgment. The result is that women cannot treat such deeply personal decisions as truly their own.
What prevails in society, Gilligan argues, is a demand that women base their moral decisions not only on personal reflection but also on the viewpoint of their community. This produces a stark double standard. Women face the challenge of reconciling "compassion and autonomy" on one hand, and "virtue and power" on the other — two sets of values that society rarely requires men to balance simultaneously. Men are largely permitted to prioritize self-fulfillment and the protection of individual rights without the same social censure.
This tension is at the heart of the ethics of care that Gilligan's work helped establish as a serious framework in moral philosophy. Unlike traditional rights-based moral theories, the ethics of care centers relationships, responsibility, and context — dimensions of moral life that Gilligan argues are especially salient in women's experience.
This dilemma is captured powerfully in Gilligan's own words: "[t]he moral imperative that emerges repeatedly in … women is an injunction to care … For men, the moral imperative appears rather … to protect from interference the rights to life and self-fulfillment. Women's insistence on care is at first self-critical rather than self-protective …" This asymmetry reveals that women's moral conception is inherently more difficult and conflicted than men's — not because of any deficiency in women, but because of the structural demands society places upon them.
This reality must be addressed in order to emancipate women from the bonds that continually repress their full realization as individuals. Recognizing and challenging the double standard embedded in social expectations of women's moral behavior is a necessary step toward genuine equality in moral agency.
You’re 75% through this paper. Sign up to read the remaining 1 section.
Sign Up Now — Instant Access Already a member? Log inAlways verify citation format against your institution’s current style guide requirements.