Hezbollah: History, Ideology, Goals, and Capabilities

Introduction

The recent wave of anti-American demonstrations in Egypt and the murder of an American ambassador and three embassy staff members in Libya make clear that America's global war on terrorism has fueled the growth of numerous terrorist organizations, including Lebanon's Hezbollah. Nevertheless, representatives of Hezbollah argue that they are not a terrorist organization but rather a political party with legitimate goals, while critics cite numerous instances of terrorist activity by the group. In order to gain fresh insights into this debate, this paper provides an in-depth profile of the Lebanese organization Hezbollah. An examination of the organization's origins, ideology, goals, and objectives is followed by a discussion of Hezbollah's leadership, funding, and capabilities. Finally, the paper describes known and suspected weapons and lethal agents, their delivery methods, the types of procedures used in prior attacks, propaganda and surveillance methods, and significant events and dates in the organization's history that may be relevant to attack planning, before offering a summary of the research in the conclusion.

Hezbollah's Origin, Ideology, Goals, and Objectives

While everyone can agree that the modern state of Lebanon emerged following its independence from France in 1943 and that Hezbollah was formed in 1982, there are widely divergent opinions concerning the organization's true ideology and goals. Some observers and representatives of the organization alike argue that Hezbollah is not a ruthless terrorist organization but has legitimate goals and objectives that have assumed new importance and relevance following the Arab Spring uprisings. For instance, in 2003, Lebanese Ambassador Farid Abboud presented a speech on the current state of Hezbollah and the misconceptions that persist concerning the nature of the organization — especially in the climate that followed the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, when the United States demanded that Lebanon freeze Hezbollah's assets. According to Ziad (2003), "The ambassador began by stressing that Hezbollah was not a terrorist group, nor 'a fringe element that commits outrages now and then.' Rather, he said, it is a broad-based political party that participates in elections, with representatives in parliament and a legitimate political presence in the system" (p. 72). Moreover, proponents argue that Hezbollah's overarching goal is not to create an Islamic state but is instead focused on improving the condition of the constituents it represents as part of the overall political process. In this regard, the ambassador stressed that "[Hezbollah] doesn't give a hoot about the way of life in this country. Its agenda is very localized, and its practices are indicative of this" (Ziad, 2003, p. 72).

The ambassador also emphasized that an immediate goal of the organization is to forge a viable resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and that its constituents deserved the right to express their views through this framework. He noted, "We will not disqualify it from the Lebanese polity just because its agenda is anti-Israel" (Ziad, 2003, p. 72). Just as insurgents and terrorists are called freedom fighters or heroes depending on who is doing the naming, Ziad suggests that Hezbollah's ideology and representation in the legitimate law-making process demands that its goals be considered valid. In this regard, Ziad reports that the ambassador also pointed out: "If the United States wants to use certain moral and legal parameters to judge one side, then judge the other side as well. Otherwise, go back to politics. Hezbollah is just one part of the conflict that exists between the Arabs and Israelis, the crux of which is the Israeli occupation of Palestine" (Ziad, 2003, p. 72).

The election of a Muslim Brotherhood member to the presidency of Egypt reflects this larger overall trend that emerged post-Arab Spring, lending additional credibility to the view that Hezbollah is a legitimate political organization with valid goals and objectives. By sharp contrast, a Senior Fellow at RAND Corporation's Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments recently characterized Hezbollah as an "Iranian terrorist proxy organization" (Lambeth, 2012, p. 82). Given these divergent views, an examination of Hezbollah's leadership, funding sources, and operational capabilities can provide further insight into the organization's real purpose.

Hezbollah's Leadership, Funding, and Capabilities

In reality, Hezbollah was just one of several political organizations that emerged in Lebanon following its independence and was a relative latecomer at that (Norton, 2009). Following its creation in the early 1980s, the party enjoyed varying levels of support while receiving funding primarily from Iran (Norton, 2009) as well as other sources discussed below. In 1997, Hezbollah's former secretary-general, Shaikh Subhi al-Tufayli, attempted to reinvigorate support for the party by soliciting local backing in the Beqaa Valley among disenfranchised farmers and tribesmen, but no single organization can be viewed as having majority support in Lebanon today (Norton, 2009). Nevertheless, by the 1990s, Hezbollah was regarded as "the best-organized political phenomenon [which] enjoyed the largest base of popular support" (Norton, 2009, p. 83).

The environment in which Hezbollah emerged as a viable political party — irrespective of its military capabilities — was highly conducive to this level of response. Prior to Hezbollah's establishment in 1982, a number of secular parties had already been formed in Lebanon, as well as the reformist Amal movement, which continues to enjoy significant membership. In fact, Hussein Nasrallah, brother to Hasan Nasrallah, a founder of Hezbollah and its secretary-general, remains a life member of the Amal organization (Norton, 2009). Membership in Hezbollah clearly does not preclude membership in other organizations with similar goals, and further support for Hezbollah was gained from historically marginalized Lebanese Shi'a who personally experienced Israeli incursions into their country, as well as from the widespread view that Amal and other organizations were incapable of effective resistance (Sorenson, 2012). In this regard, Sorenson cites "the pivotal role of Imad Mughniyah, both in pushing Hezbollah towards armed resistance and in eliciting Iranian support, making him more significant in Hezbollah's evolution than Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, who helped shape Hezbollah's religious identity" (2012, p. 384). Sorenson also emphasizes the role played by Israel in legitimizing Hezbollah during and following the 1982 invasion, due in part to Israel's use of so-called "iron fist" tactics against Lebanese Shi'a, which fueled widespread support and admiration for the organization (Sorenson, 2012). By the mid-1980s, Hezbollah increasingly engaged in a dual tactic of deploying suicide bombers while promoting increased involvement in Shi'a social and economic programs (Sorenson, 2012).

Indeed, just as North Korea continues to trumpet its ceasefire with the United States as evidence that even monolithic powers can be defeated where there is sufficient resolve, El Rafei emphasizes that "Israel's month-long war against Lebanon ended with Hezbollah claiming the high ground. Banners touting Hezbollah's 'divine victory' quickly decorated the disaster areas of southern Lebanon, and billboards denounced 'the savage destruction inflicted by the Zionists and the Americans'" (2006, p. 31). The ceasefire that was negotiated was due to UN intervention, but this did not stop Hezbollah's official media outlets from "continuing to air triumphant anthems and interviews with the families of the victims showing their total allegiance to the group and their readiness to sacrifice anything, including their own children, for the resistance" (El Rafei, 2006, p. 32).

Meanwhile, Israeli forces stepped up pressure against Hezbollah, and Israeli air units succeeded in killing Sayyid Abbas Mussawi, a key Hezbollah leader, in February 1992 (Sorenson, 2012). According to Sorenson, "Hezbollah retaliated against the Israeli Embassy in Argentina a month later, dramatically demonstrating its global reach. Mussawi's death paved the way for Hassan Nasrallah to take the reins" (2012, p. 383). In response to these pressures, Nasrallah conceded to Iranian demands — actively resisted by other Hezbollah leaders — to participate in Lebanese elections. As Sorenson notes, "The supreme leader (Ayatollah Khamenei) had spoken, and for Hezbollah the matter was settled" (2012, p. 383).

Conclusion

While it is true that Hezbollah has legitimate political party representation in the Lebanese government, the Republican or Democratic parties in the United States do not have their own army or rockets, and military actions are prosecuted through the national government. By sharp contrast, Hezbollah has been shown to possess both the materiel and the operational procedures needed to prosecute military operations throughout the Middle East. The Arab Spring uprisings and the charged political climate that exists between Palestine and Israel virtually guarantee that Hezbollah will continue to play an operative role in this highly volatile region of the world for the foreseeable future.