HS2 High-Speed Rail Proposal: Pros, Cons, and Alternatives

Introduction and Overview of the HS2 Proposal

The HS2 proposal is a government project to build a one-hundred-mile-long High Speed Rail (HSR) line between London and Birmingham, England. Once completed, it will have the capacity to carry 28 trains per hour, with those trains capable of speeds between 220 and 250 miles per hour. Some experts project that this line will reduce journey times from London to other cities by up to 30 minutes. The government reports that there is potential for reduced emissions, job creation, and economic development as a result of the construction of this line. However, a number of individuals and groups disagree with the government's projections, and many argue against the line due to its projected 25 billion pound cost. Others argue that the objections go beyond cost alone, citing added carbon emissions, low usage, and elitism associated with both the construction and continued ridership.

This paper examines seven reports regarding the HS2 development, the pros and cons of construction, and the viewpoints put forward by various groups. The seven reports are: (1) Wendover HS2 — Action Against Chiltern HS2 Routes; (2) HS2 — Demand for Long Distance Service, April 2011; (3) HS2 — Valuing the Benefits of HS2 (London–West Midlands), April 2011; (4) Greengauge 21, Capturing the Benefits of HS2 on Existing Lines; (5) Britain's Transport Infrastructure High Speed Two, January 2009; (6) Bluespace Thinking Ltd. — A Review of High Speed Rail — HS2 Proposals; and (7) A Better Railway for Britain (www.betterthanhs2.org).

These seven reports represent a range of different viewpoints and perspectives from each side of the issue. Some are in favor of construction and support their position with facts and figures, while other groups argue there is a better way to address Britain's ongoing transportation challenges, setting out their alternative ideas in detail.

The paper's author is in the camp of those who wish to see this project reconsidered, and the paper may therefore contain some bias against HS2. The author is conscious of that fact and will seek to maintain an open mind when evaluating the reports and the different viewpoints they represent. The author's central thesis is that the money proposed for new HS2 construction could be better spent upgrading existing forms of transportation — roads, railways, and air links.

The Case for HS2: Government and Pro-Construction Reports

The report issued by HS2 Ltd., Demand for Long Distance Service (April 2011), projects that one effect of the project will be to increase the number of passengers traveling by high-speed rail to 46.2 million each year by 2043. The report indicates that 65% of those travelers will come from existing rail services, "7% from car, 6% from air, while 22% would be entirely new trips" (p. 4). This report appears relatively conservative in its projections, yet it has still been criticized by Wendover and other groups as substantially overstated.

One of the reports takes a different approach to making the case for HS2, focusing not on the direct benefits of the new line but on the indirect benefits for other routes. Greengauge 21, in Capturing the Benefits of HS2 on Existing Lines, argues that research shows "there will be substantial improvements possible on the West Coast Main Line by virtue of the capacity liberated on that route by HS2" (p. 5). The Greengauge 21 report also appeals to passenger experience, stating that "irritating limitations on the commuter peak timetable will become history" (p. 5). The underlying logic here appears to be that a significant number of passengers from the existing slower service will transfer to the new high-speed line, thereby freeing up capacity on the current network.

Challenging the Numbers: Anti-HS2 Reports

Wendover HS2 states that UK taxpayers should have the proposal explained in much greater detail so that people unfamiliar with the project's analysis can assess the strengths and weaknesses of the government's case. The Wendover report largely characterizes the government's reports as "hyperbole, spin and numerical obfuscation" (p. 2). It further states that "any forecast made on the basis of HS2 Ltd. parameters is worthless after c. 2016" (p. 5). The Wendover report concludes that "a proper evaluation of High Speed Rail in the UK needs to be done and its strengths and weaknesses impartially set out. The body doing this must be one that voters can trust… only then can the public judge such a scheme fairly" (p. 39).

A difficulty with the Wendover report, however, is that its own facts and figures are not obviously more reliable than those supplied by the government. The fundamental question of whose numbers are correct remains unresolved.

The report issued by A Better Railway for Britain similarly challenges the government's projections, stating that "the business case for HS2 is very weak and has been based on a number of false premises" (p. 3). The report details an account of the project substantially different from those offered by the pro-construction side. One notable argument it raises is the need to avoid the "expensive disasters that many of our competitors have faced in their high speed rail projects," and to carefully consider "the opportunity cost of HS2 and alternatives that are more beneficial and appropriate to the situation in the UK" (p. 3). This is a significant point: a number of countries have implemented similar projects without realizing the projected benefits.