Ignorance of the Law Defense: Morality and Legal Guilt
This paper examines how moral perceptions of a defendant influence legal determinations of guilt, drawing on Alter, Kernochan, Darley, et al.'s (2007) four empirical studies. It explores the tension between the longstanding legal principle that ignorance of the law is no excuse and the moral intuition that genuine ignorance undermines criminal intent. The paper discusses the utilitarian rationale behind denying ignorance as a defense, the practical problems that arise from rigid application of that standard, and the Supreme Court's ambiguous rulings on the matter. It concludes by considering how law grounded in prevailing moral sentiment may achieve greater legitimacy and consistency.
- Introduction: Morality and the Ignorance Defense: Moral perceptions shape guilt determinations despite ignorance claims
- Utilitarian Rationale for Denying Ignorance as a Defense: Three utilitarian reasons courts reject ignorance as excuse
- Problems With Firmly Denying Ignorance Claims: Rigid denial of ignorance conflicts with social norms and fairness
- Supreme Court Ambiguity and the Role of Intent: Court rulings and empirical studies complicate intent standards
- Moral Credibility and Legal Legitimacy: Law reflecting moral sentiment gains legitimacy and consistency
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What makes this paper effective
- The paper grounds its analysis in a specific empirical study (Alter et al., 2007), lending credibility to what could otherwise be a purely philosophical argument.
- It presents a balanced structure, first explaining the utilitarian case for denying the ignorance defense, then systematically identifying the practical and moral problems with that position.
- Concrete examples — such as local statutes prohibiting rainwater collection and the reclassification of controlled substances — make abstract legal concepts accessible and persuasive.
Key academic technique demonstrated
The paper effectively uses a synthesizing move: it draws on empirical psychology, legal theory, and Supreme Court precedent simultaneously, weaving them together to build a nuanced argument rather than relying on any single disciplinary lens. This interdisciplinary synthesis demonstrates graduate-level analytical breadth.
Structure breakdown
The paper opens by introducing the central tension between moral culpability and the no-ignorance legal standard. It then lays out the utilitarian justifications for that standard before pivoting to critique them with real-world counterexamples. A section on Supreme Court ambiguity bridges theory and practice, and the conclusion ties everything together by arguing that law aligned with moral intuitions is ultimately more legitimate and consistent.
Introduction: Morality and the Ignorance Defense
In "Morality Influences How People Apply the Ignorance of the Law Defense," Alter, Kernochan, Darley, et al. (2007) present the findings of four empirical studies showing how the perceived morality of a defendant influences decisions regarding determinations of guilt. In all four studies, the researchers found that laypeople judge a defendant more harshly when the defendant is perceived as an immoral person — regardless of whether the defendant claims ignorance of the law. The authors contend that the law should reflect the "moral intuitions" of the people, allowing for a differentiation between the actus reus (the criminal act) and the mens rea (criminal intent). Complicating matters is the fact that American legal precedent does not allow for an ignorance of the law defense; a person cannot hide behind claims of not knowing the law. A person who genuinely does not know that an act is criminal cannot have criminal intent — something that presents a moral conundrum for legal analysts.
If intent is equated with moral culpability and thus with legal definitions of guilt, then the law must also be able to distinguish between genuine criminal intent and genuine ignorance. As Rosenweig (2013) puts it, the no-ignorance standard applies to crimes that are "self-evident wrongs," and there are a slew of acts deemed criminal that are not necessarily self-evidently so (p. 1). A prime example would be not knowing that a certain substance had recently been designated as a controlled or banned substance, especially given that laws governing controlled substances are subject to change and an average person cannot be reasonably expected to keep up with every statute (Kerr, 2015). Many laws are either obscure or too complex to understand, or breaking those laws might not actually cause harm.
References
Alter, A. L., Kernochan, J., Darley, J. M., et al. (2007). Morality influences how people apply the ignorance of the law defense. Law & Society Review, 41(4): 819–864.
Kerr, O. (2015). Ignorance of the law is no excuse: or is it? The Washington Post, 18 June 2015.
Rosenweig, P. (2013). Ignorance of the law is no excuse, but it is reality. The Heritage Foundation, 17 June 2013.
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