The Death Penalty: Deterrence, Racial Bias, and Abolition

Introduction: The Death Penalty Debate

One of the most contentious issues in contemporary America is the continued use of the death penalty against certain offenders. Supporters argue that the death penalty acts as a deterrent against further crime, and implicitly contend that the state is well within its rights to execute citizens. Those who argue for abolition point out that, by any reasonable metric, the death penalty does not act as a deterrent, and that even if it did, the state does not have the constitutional authority to perform executions—especially when they are applied as unevenly and unaccountably as has been the case in America.

After examining the evidence for both sides, it becomes clear that the death penalty does far more harm than good, and furthermore that most support for the death penalty either rests on faulty logic—such as the claim that it works as a deterrent—or is grounded in a highly subjective, and often religious, understanding of the ethical limitations of the state. With all these factors in mind, it becomes clear that the death penalty should be abolished, due to its lack of efficacy as a deterrent as well as the long history of ethically questionable practices surrounding its actual use. Those practices include the disproportionate execution of Black defendants over white defendants, as well as the inadequately mitigated risk of executing innocent citizens.

Evaluating the Deterrence Claim

Before examining the arguments opposing the continued use of the death penalty, it is necessary to consider the origins of its widespread support and what that means for the larger argument. The most common argument in favor of the death penalty is the idea that it acts as a deterrent for potential offenders—that the fear of death is so intimidating that it causes potential offenders to refrain from murder or some other violent act that might lead to a capital sentence. Numerous studies examining crime rates in connection with execution rates have not shown a deterrent effect, and although this evidence is overwhelming, some researchers have argued that differences in state law make using the execution rate alone insufficient for an analysis of possible deterrent effects.

Specifically, "the distribution of execution is seriously skewed among states" so that "for the period of 1995–2006, the total number of executions in the United States is 792, but Texas alone has executed 294 prisoners in the same period, which accounts for 37.12% of all executions" (Choe, 2010, p. 12). Furthermore, "the top three states—Texas, Oklahoma (80 executions) and Virginia (74 executions)—executed 448 prisoners, which is 56.57% of total executions," and "this percentage goes up to approximately 80% if we include the next five states," making it clear that in order to fully rule out the deterrent effect, a different standard beyond raw execution rates must be used (Choe, 2010, p. 12).

Thus, "instead of using execution rate," a useful 2010 study employs "dummy variables to categorize states into different groups and to compare the group mean homicide rates" as a way of examining possible deterrence without being hampered by the uneven distribution of executions across states. However, even "with state-level panel data from 1995 to 2006, this paper failed to find a meaningful deterrent effect of the death penalty," and in fact "even the state with the most executions does not have a statistically meaningful lower homicide rate than no-death-penalty states" (Choe, 2010, p. 15). Regardless of the analysis method, the data simply does not support the claim that the death penalty acts as a deterrent—a point that must be stated unequivocally, because the so-called deterrent effect is the primary argument in favor of capital punishment precisely because it can ostensibly be backed up by observational data.

As the data actually shows, however, this deterrent effect is not real, and so any further use of it as an argument relies on the ignorance of the audience rather than the legitimacy of the evidence. It therefore becomes necessary to examine the beliefs and attitudes that inform death penalty support in order to understand why majority support persists.

Why Support Persists: Values Over Evidence

Because the oft-claimed reasons for supporting the death penalty—such as an imagined deterrent effect—have been so repeatedly and thoroughly debunked, a number of studies have examined the underlying beliefs and attitudes that inform death penalty support in order to determine the cause of its still-majority backing. The most striking result from these studies is evidence showing that death penalty support is highly value-expressive, meaning that people's support depends heavily on the values they seek to embody and express elsewhere, especially including their religious beliefs.

The importance of these values is such that in one study, "although a majority of respondents support the death penalty, a substantial proportion lack confidence in its use and support a moratorium on executions," and although many respondents were not entirely comfortable with capital punishment, "of those lacking confidence and those supporting a moratorium, strong majorities maintain support for the death penalty (68% and 73%, respectively)" (Vollum, Longmire, & Buffington-Vollum, 2004, p. 521). This finding deserves emphasis, because the death penalty is one area of public policy in which total confidence should arguably be established before the policy is applied—since its successful application always ultimately results in someone's death. Sadly, even people who "lack confidence" in it support it nonetheless.

In the same study, the researchers found that although "more than one-third of subjects reported little or no confidence that the death penalty is 'imposed fairly on poor people' or 'imposed fairly on minorities' (36% and 35%, respectively)," and that "a majority of respondents support a moratorium in order to protect innocent people from being executed (55%), to ensure competent legal representation during trial (55%), and to ensure acceptable levels of access to appeals (52%)," they did not support a moratorium in all cases. Specifically, "although respondents expressed much lesser confidence that capital punishment was administered fairly in terms of race or class, a majority were unwilling to support a moratorium on either of these grounds" (Vollum, Longmire, & Buffington-Vollum, 2004, p. 533).

To understand how this cognitive dissonance operates—where recognized injustice in the administration of the death penalty is not deemed sufficient reason to preclude its use—one must examine additional studies analyzing the beliefs behind capital punishment support. According to research on death penalty attitudes, "sex, race, political party affiliation, religion, and college major (criminal justice) were found to be significantly related to level of death penalty support," with "males and Republicans more likely to support the death penalty than their counterparts" while "Black respondents were far less likely to support the death penalty than others" (Vollum & Buffington-Vollum, 2010, p. 25). This coincides with research demonstrating that "those who favor the death penalty were more likely to be males and Protestant," and that the death penalty is less likely to be applied to defendants who express some religious belief (Miller & Miller, 2008, p. 120). These results demonstrate something that should be readily apparent but is rarely articulated: support for the death penalty is much higher among those demographics least likely to suffer from it.

This partially helps to explain one surprising finding: "criminal justice majors were found to be significantly more likely than other majors to support the death penalty." The study proposes that "assuming that criminal justice majors know more about the realities of the criminal justice system (and, by extension, the death penalty system)" should "potentially challenge Marshall's hypothesis that knowledge about the death penalty reduces support for its use," but "another interpretation is that those who select criminal justice as a major are more likely to hold ideological perspectives in favor of the death penalty in the first place" (Vollum & Buffington-Vollum, 2010, p. 25).

The evidence suggests that both explanations contain some truth. "Contrary to Marshall's hypothesis suggesting death penalty support is largely instrumental and thus likely to change in the face of knowledge, much support for the death penalty is value-expressive," meaning that "support of the death penalty, in part, serves to manifest underlying and deeply held values. As such, it is unlikely to change in light of knowledge or information about the death penalty and its administration" (Vollum & Buffington-Vollum, 2010, p. 30). Furthermore, "those who scored higher on value-expressive attitudes were less accepting of information critical of the death penalty and, in turn, less likely to change their views in light of the information presented." Thus, the widespread support of the death penalty in the face of ample evidence of its functional inefficacy and unjust application is explained by the fact that much of that support is shaped by values and beliefs wholly separate from evidence or data—and as such, those beliefs are largely immutable in the face of such evidence.

At this point, not only has the death penalty been shown to lack any deterrent effect, but its supporters have been shown to hold views that are, by their own design, resistant to disconfirmation. The main argument in favor of capital punishment has been shown to be inadequate, and those who maintain it despite the evidence do so in a manner that no empirical finding can readily correct. This clears the way for examining the affirmative arguments against the death penalty—of which the racial disparity in sentencing is perhaps the most damaging.

References

Choe, J. (2010). Another look at the deterrent effect of death penalty. Journal of Advanced Research in Law and Economics, 1(1), 12–15.

Lynch, M., & Haney, C. (2000). Discrimination and instructional comprehension: Guided discretion, racial bias, and the death penalty. Law and Human Behavior, 24(3), 337–351.

Miller, M. K., & Miller, D. R. (2008). Religious characteristics and the death penalty. Law and Human Behavior, 32(2), 113–123.

Vollum, S., & Buffington-Vollum, J. (2010). An examination of social-psychological factors and support for the death penalty: Attribution, moral disengagement, and the value-expressive function of attitudes. American Journal of Criminal Justice, 35(1/2), 15–36.

Vollum, S., Longmire, D. R., & Buffington-Vollum, J. (2004). Confidence in the death penalty and support for its use: Exploring the value-expressive dimension of death penalty attitudes. Justice Quarterly, 21(3), 521–546.