Italy's Role in World War II: Puppet State or Victim?

World Wars and the Rise of Decolonization

Both World War I and World War II were global events that left territories, countries, nations, and individuals exhausted from effort and from loss. These wars proved ultimately ironic when the term "the war to end all wars" was shown to be tragically inaccurate with the outbreak of the Second World War. In addition to their devastation, however, both conflicts produced significant changes, developments, and effects on the world and its prevailing paradigms.

Decolonization, for example, proved to be one of the most important effects. Whereas colonization had been a mainly European paradigm—enabled by advances in transport and new geographical discoveries—the World Wars created conditions in which territories could pursue autonomy, searching for their own identities rather than the identities imposed by their colonizers. Anti-colonial leaders such as Gandhi, Mao Tse-tung, and Ho Chi Minh created realities in which liberation from colonial rule became possible. To this day, it remains unclear whether this development has produced a paradigm of peace or simply a new form of warfare as newly independent territories attempt to forge national identities.

World War II created conditions that were fundamentally unfavorable for colonialism, since old powers were being overrun by Axis forces and new alliances were formed to challenge colonial and despotic rule. Britain was particularly threatened by powers in North Africa, Japan, and Southeast Asia. For Italy, World War II also carried its own specific events and paradigm shifts, as the country became a territory shaped by war and by the manipulation of competing external forces.

Italy Under Mussolini and the German Influence

As World War II progressed, the broader effects of decolonization ran concurrently with the Allied strategic problem of finding a new objective after the end of the North African campaign, alongside Italy's own political need to extricate itself from a war the country perceived as increasingly pointless. At the time, Italy was under the Fascist rule of Mussolini. However, Mussolini had by this stage become a leader in little more than name. Even within his own administration he faced a severe lack of support, and other leaders regarded him as little more than a puppet for Hitler. Consequently, the Germans became increasingly involved in directing the Italian war effort.

As much as Mussolini served as Hitler's puppet, Italian troops were increasingly deployed in service of the German war effort. Italian soldiers were sent to fight the Russian Communists and were also used on anti-guerrilla missions in the Balkans. Italians were regarded as somewhat "second-class" within this arrangement—a fact the Italians themselves were painfully aware of. Hitler responded to Italian military weakness by simply sending more German troops, and he even went as far as deploying Germans in place of the Italian reinforcements Mussolini had requested to counter the threat of Allied invasion.

Interestingly, Field Marshal Kesselring somewhat softened this difficult experience. As German commander of the Mediterranean and a known admirer of Italian culture, he worked to promote Italian-German relations in a way that mitigated the otherwise harsh dynamic between the two forces. When the situation became intolerable for the Italians in 1943, however, they understood that the time had come to eliminate Mussolini from power—and that they would need Allied assistance to protect against the inevitable German reaction.

The invasion of Sicily acted as a catalyst for this effort. The result was a bloodless coup in which the king demanded that Mussolini resign. Mussolini was removed and replaced by Badoglio, who nonetheless insisted that Italy remain in the war. Even with Mussolini gone, Italy was no closer to extricating itself from the conflict.

The Allied Decision to Invade Italy

At the same time, the Allied decision to invade Italy—despite their initial intention not to do so—created further complications for Italy's desire to join the Allied cause. Churchill believed that an invasion of southern Italy would form a sound follow-up strategy to the operations in Sicily. Such a move would create a platform for operations in the Balkans, while Allied bombers could be stationed on Italian airfields within range of Romanian oil fields. Churchill's long-term intention was not only to bring Mussolini down, but also to secure Rome without significant German resistance, on the assumption that the Germans would not choose to fight for southern Italy.

This proved to be a tragically flawed assumption. Allied forces faced increasing opposition throughout Italy, denying them anything resembling a cheap or easy victory. Churchill continued to press for additional resources to sustain the Italian campaign, but there was significant division among the Allied leaders. Those opposing the invasion adamantly refused such requests, forcing Alexander, the field commander, to fight without the resources the situation demanded. Ultimately, the Allied forces were obliged to allocate resources after all in order to contain the unfolding disaster. In this way, not only the Italians themselves but also the foreign troops fighting within Italian borders were reduced to what felt like a second-class operation.

It appeared, therefore, that Italy had become the location of a senseless campaign. The division among Allied leadership created a feeling among troops of being embroiled in an effort without clear purpose—that they were simply there because the Allied command did not know what else to do. Italy's rugged terrain compounded this problem, making movement and combat extraordinarily difficult. Soldiers fighting in this theater therefore faced a dual burden of psychological and physical hardship.