Unconventional Warfare: How the Mujahidin Defeated the Soviets

Introduction: Resistance and Its Lessons

Resistance is not futile. One of the lessons learned from the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan is that any resistance force can counter effectively against a powerful aggressor. Resistance — with the proper tools, strategy, and determination — can countermeasure any unwanted entity. The anti-Soviet forces in Afghanistan not only pushed the invaders out of their country, but helped precipitate the eventual fall of the U.S.S.R. as a world power. The question on the table is: what happened in that poor Southwest Asian country? How did the Soviets lose that war, or how did the mujahidin — the soldiers of God — win?

First and foremost, the Soviet political and military leaders made strategic and tactical errors. The Afghan rebels employed unconventional warfare as their only viable means of defeating the Soviets. Eventually, though too late, the Russian troops switched some of their battle tactics to root out resistance. However, due to the rebels' ability to stage their attacks from the naturally rugged and fortified terrain of Afghanistan, reinforced with American and Chinese-made weapons, and to cross the border into Pakistani sanctuaries, they were able to sustain a protracted war that ultimately demoralized and defeated the Soviet Armed Forces.

It was unconventional warfare that helped the American colonials defeat the British in the War for Independence; it was unconventional warfare that helped defeat first French and then American forces in Vietnam; and it was unconventional warfare that helped the Israelis gain a homeland in the Middle East. Unconventional warfare is effective when the individuals engaged in it are determined to think and act outside the box — to set aside the standards and norms of conventional fighting and to harass and frustrate the enemy through tactics that are brutal and that inflict pain upon both body and mind.

Soviet Invasion and Early Miscalculations

When Soviet forces entered Afghanistan on Christmas Day, 1979, they were unprepared for what they were about to encounter. The U.S.S.R.'s political and military leadership had been pursuing an invasion since 1973, when the King of Afghanistan was deposed and the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) assumed power. The PDPA was a union of two parties — one primarily Islamic and the other pro-Soviet. Eventually, unrest and civil war erupted. The U.S.S.R. used the internal conflict as an excuse to enter Afghanistan militarily and prop up its supporters. The opponents were forced into the hills, and the full-scale Soviet invasion commenced, with troops entering the country in armored vehicles or heavily armed aircraft. The Russians had used this strategy in Hungary and Czechoslovakia in the 1950s and had successfully suppressed any resistance in a short period of time. But in Afghanistan, things were horribly miscalculated.

Soviet troops "in Afghanistan were made up of the following formations: three motor rifle divisions, an airborne division, two supply and support brigades, and several separate regiments. These formations were under the command and control of the Fortieth Army, which was formed in the Turkestan and Central Asian Military Districts; the number of soldiers of Muslim religion was significant" (Sarin and Dvoretsky, 87–88). With the added Soviet Air Force personnel, more than 110,000 troops were posted in Afghanistan. Despite their training to prepare for conditions within the country, it was still inadequate to the challenges the Soviet troops faced — notwithstanding their superiority in firepower and manpower deployed in that rugged terrain.

The mujahidin — the anti-Soviet fighters — were "a movement without rhetoric or ideology or a supreme leader. The guerrillas had no complexes, no chips on their shoulders regarding the modern world, since they had never clashed with it until the Soviets came" (Kaplan, 17). It was this very lack of reference, this inexperience with the outside world, that the mujahidin were able to turn to their advantage during the resistance war. Upon first appearance, any resistance force seemed doomed to failure against one of the world's superpowers, but the Afghans had a deep heritage in guerrilla-style, unconventional fighting. A 17th-century Afghan epic, Dasornama by Khushal Khan Khattak, advises that "the guerrilla method of warfare is more effective than a pitched battle. There are two prerequisites for this kind of warfare: good horses (mobility) and good archers (firepower). These two can help a small force defeat a large enemy. When you fight a smaller enemy detachment you should decisively attack with surprise. But if the enemy receives reinforcements and you encounter a stronger force, avoid decisive engagement and swiftly withdraw only to hit back where the enemy is vulnerable. By this you gain sustainability and the ability to fight a long war of attrition. A war of attrition eventually frustrates the enemy, no matter how strong he may be, and that gives a chance of victory to a small force fighting against an invading army" (Isby, 99). Three centuries later, this advice remained the guiding strategy of the Afghan resistance.

Mujahidin Tactics and Strategy

The mujahidin knew they could not defeat the Soviet forces and pro-Soviet Afghan forces on the enemy's terms. They had to fight on their own terms, as they had been taught and raised. They were facing "well-trained personnel and modern equipment. Infantry and artillery soldiers and other specialists knew their organic weapons systems well. They fought in units with great coordination and were well oriented. But this was true only while operating on flat terrain" (Sarin and Dvoretsky, 93).

The Afghan resistance fighters, under the guidance of their Islamic mullahs and provincial warlords, devised effective tactics and strategies to engage the larger Soviet and pro-Soviet forces: avoid direct combat with a superior force; use the element of surprise; attack more frequently at night; yield a battlefield to the enemy when holding it would result in heavy resistance casualties; and conduct terror and disinformation campaigns in enemy-held villages. These soldiers of God carried out successful ambushes throughout the course of the war. They would attack small convoys along mountainous routes when those convoys were lightly armed. Against larger forces in small valleys or ravines, they would destroy the lead and rear vehicles to cause a jam, create confusion, and induce panic. They would disguise themselves as pro-Soviet soldiers and spread disinformation in local villages to create disorder and fuel the rumor mill among the local population. They would also infiltrate Soviet firebases, conduct swift raids on equipment or supply depots, destroy what they could, and withdraw back into the mountains.

Conclusion: Lessons of the Mujahidin

If the lessons of the mujahidin are clear, it is that no challenge so great cannot be overcome, that oppression is not an option in life, and that an effective strategy, properly executed, can bring down the mightiest of adversaries. The Soviet experience in Afghanistan also demonstrated the enduring danger of underestimating one's opponent — a miscalculation that cost the U.S.S.R. not just the war, but ultimately contributed to the unraveling of an empire.

The broader historical record confirms this pattern. From the guerrilla campaigns of the American Revolution to the insurgencies in Vietnam and beyond, unconventional warfare has repeatedly proven that a determined, adaptable resistance force, fighting on terrain it knows and for a cause it believes in, can frustrate and ultimately defeat even the most powerful conventional military machine.

References

Bonosky, Phillip. Washington's Secret War against Afghanistan. New York: International Publishers, 1985.

Isby, David C. War in a Distant Country Afghanistan: Invasion and Resistance. New York: Sterling Publishing Company, 1989.

Kakar, M. Hassan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979–1982. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995.

Kaplan, Robert D. Soldiers of God: With Islamic Warriors in Afghanistan and Pakistan. New York: Vintage Books, 1990.

Sarin, Oleg, and Lev Dvoretsky. The Afghan Syndrome: The Soviet Union's Vietnam. Novato: Presidio Press, 1993.