Nightclub Fire Safety: Lessons from The Station Fire

Introduction: The Station Fire in Historical Context

In some ways, the historical events surrounding The Station fire were precedent-setting. In other ways, however, they were sadly familiar. A clear example of this dichotomy is found in the fire's ignition source. According to a report compiled by Robert Duvall (2006) on nightclub fires, the conflagration at The Station "resulted from a form of ignition not often seen when comparing other fires in assembly occupancies: pyrotechnics" (p. 22). In this regard, the fire at The Station was unique relative to the other fires examined in Duvall's document.

The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) has very specific standards and requirements for the use of pyrotechnics in "Existing Assembly Occupancies" (Duvall, 2006, p. 22). Interestingly, even a cursory review of those standards reveals a connection to the other major fires discussed in Duvall's report. Several of those conflagrations were suspected to have originated from the use of open flame. The close relationship between open flame devices and pyrotechnics is underscored by the NFPA's own regulatory language: both are addressed under the same heading and chapter number, titled "Open Flame Devices and Pyrotechnics," in the NFPA's Life Safety Code (Duvall, 2006, p. 22). The Cocoanut Grove fire, for example, was believed to have originated from an open flame source — a detail that links it directly to the regulatory framework later applied to The Station.

Combustible Materials and Egress Failures

There were also a large number of combustible materials present in the interior of The Station, a factor that connects this fire to several earlier disasters. The presence of such materials was a point of commonality between The Station and the fires at The Rhythm Club, Cocoanut Grove, and the Beverly Hills Supper Club (Duvall, 2006, p. 18). What differed at The Station — and at each of the other historic fires — was the specific type of combustible material involved. At The Station, soundproof foam insulating materials lined the interior, and these directly contributed to the fire's rapid spread.

Another historically significant aspect of The Station fire was the difficulty patrons experienced in exiting the building. Unfortunately, this problem of inadequate or obstructed egress is yet another characteristic the fire shares with earlier nightclub disasters. With the entire venue destroyed, approximately 100 people killed, and around 200 more injured, the NFPA ranks The Station fire as "the fourth deadliest nightclub fire in U.S. history."

NFPA Code Reforms After The Station Fire

The events at The Station played a profound role in shaping contemporary fire safety culture, largely because they forced a reexamination — and significant tightening — of standards for public venues such as nightclubs. In the wake of the fire, the NFPA made a number of changes to its requirements. These included a new rule that the main entrance of a nightclub or similar venue must be capable of accommodating at least two-thirds of its maximum occupancy. Prior to The Station fire, such exits were only required to accommodate half of total occupancy. Additional egress changes mandated that "other exits must accommodate not less than one-half the total occupant load… the total egress capacity must accommodate 117% of the total occupant load" (Duvall, 2006, p. 1).

Further reforms included mandatory sprinkler systems in venues hosting more than 100 people, required exit inspections before nightclubs could be approved to open, and new restrictions on seating arrangements at festival-style events. Taken together, these changes made fire code compliance substantially more stringent for nightclub operators across the country.

References

Duvall, R. (2006). NFPA case study: Nightclub fires. National Fire Protection Association.