Nixon Doctrine and the Cambodian Crisis of the Cold War

The Nixon Doctrine: Origins and Core Principles

The Nixon Doctrine, declared by President Richard M. Nixon in the summer of 1969 just a few months after taking office, represented a significant alteration of American policy during the Cold War. Nixon upheld the fundamentals of George Kennan's strategy of "containment" for the spread of Communism, insofar as he promised American support for any democratic third-world nation in its fight against Communism. The shift came with the type of support America offered: the Nixon Doctrine promised that America would send military and financial assistance, but no troops.

Cold War Context and Prior U.S. Strategy

A quick glance at the prior history of American troop commitments during the Cold War gives some sense of Nixon's rationale. The American intervention in Korea under Truman had resulted in a stalemate, with a hostile Marxist North Korea separated from the U.S.-backed South Korea by a narrow demilitarized zone. Meanwhile in the Americas, Roosevelt's "Good Neighbor" policy meant that Cold War strategy was conducted largely without troop involvement. When Communist governments were either democratically elected, as with Arbenz in Guatemala, or seized power through revolution, as with Fidel Castro in Cuba, the response from the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations came through covert operations — a CIA-sponsored coup in Guatemala and the failed Bay of Pigs invasion in Cuba.

As a result, the Nixon Doctrine was, in some sense, a synthesis of previous Cold War strategies employed in different regions. It responded to the stalemate — and the heavy loss of American lives — that accompanied the large-scale commitment of troops in Korea and Vietnam by announcing that troop involvement would no longer be American policy. But the Nixon Doctrine likewise drew lessons from the history of Cold War covert operations, recognizing that American money and weaponry, presumably combined with policy guidance, could be employed to contain the spread of Communism. However, the overall success of the Nixon Doctrine remains a matter of debate.

Cambodia's Colonial History and Path to Neutrality

To take one particularly interesting example that immediately followed Nixon's establishment of the doctrine, we might consider the seemingly peripheral case of Cambodia. For Nixon himself, Cambodia would prove to be anything but peripheral: this small neutral nation would, in 1970, become the cause of tremendous social unrest within the United States itself. The reasons for this are complicated but fascinating.

Like Vietnam, Cambodia had been part of the French colonial protectorate of Indochina at the time of World War Two (Brinkley 2011, 45). During the war, Cambodia was occupied by the Japanese from 1941 to 1945, but after the war's end it once more became a French colonial possession in an era of widespread decolonization. However, Cambodia received its independence from France in late 1953 peacefully, unlike Vietnam, which was engaged in warfare against the French under Ho Chi Minh's leadership.

The contrast extended to the types of government established. About six months before Ho Chi Minh's forces in Vietnam won their decisive victory against the French at Dien Bien Phu, Cambodia was made independent as a constitutional monarchy — much like the United Kingdom — with a parliamentary government and prime minister, but with King Sihanouk as official head of state (Brinkley 2011, 125). Fascinatingly, within two years Sihanouk abdicated as King in order to run for, and win, the office of Prime Minister. This may have granted him greater legitimacy as the country's ruler. Because Sihanouk had abdicated in favor of his own father, when his father died in 1960, Sihanouk was heir to the throne. He took the title of Prince Sihanouk and became head of state while remaining Prime Minister.

In the 1960s, Sihanouk observed the growing American involvement in Vietnam and adopted an official policy of neutrality toward the Cold War. By 1961, he had officially committed Cambodia to the Non-Aligned Movement — that group of third-world nations, most of them newly independent former colonial possessions in Asia and Africa, which declared neutrality in the Cold War (Shawcross 2002, 55). The reasons for this strategy were obvious: not only was the Cold War far from cold in neighboring Vietnam, but Cambodia's position between heavy American involvement in the Pacific — with a continued presence in Japan, Korea, and the Philippines beyond the escalating Vietnam conflict — and various Communist neighbors, including China, made neutrality the sensible geographic choice.

Conclusion: Cambodia as a Case Study in Cold War Policy Failure

The Cambodian situation was one which Nixon mismanaged disastrously. Certainly the secret bombing campaign did not incline the Cambodian population to view America favorably. It remains unclear whether the Nixon administration had any involvement in the 1970 Cambodian coup that installed Lon Nol's military coalition government, but Lon Nol remains a salient example of the Nixon Doctrine in action: no American troops were committed to Cambodia, but Lon Nol's government received American weapons and aid as it descended into open warfare with neighboring Vietnam (Shaw 2005, 101). Yet the end result of this policy — intended to contain the spread of Communism — was that Cambodia became a particularly brutal Communist state. The domino fell hard in this case.

As a result, it can be said that the Nixon Doctrine did alter Cambodia's behavior and policy — but it did so in the wrong direction. Rather than preserving Cambodia as an ally or even a neutral third party, Nixon's policy arguably pushed Cambodia into Communism. Cambodia thus stands as a sobering case study in the limits and potential consequences of Cold War containment strategies that rely on proxy support without adequate attention to local political dynamics.

References

Brinkley, J. (2011). Cambodia's curse: The modern history of a troubled land. Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs.

Nolan, K. W. (1990). Into Cambodia, spring campaign, summer offensive. New York: Presidio.

Shaw, J. M. (2005). The Cambodian campaign: The 1970 offensive and America's Vietnam War. Lawrence: Kansas University Press.

Shawcross, W. (2002). Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon, and the destruction of Cambodia. Revised edition. New York: Cooper Square Press.