Nixon's China Opening to Obama's Pivot to Asia Strategy

Introduction: The Cold War and China's Global Role

The Cold War represented one of the most important periods in the history of the world. It not only changed the way in which the political world was configured following the end of the Second World War, but it also marked a shift in the way relations among states and international actors are perceived. From this point of view, the end of that period marked the beginning of an era in which the political coordinates for international relations were uncertain and lacked a particular direction. The demise of the Soviet Union left the United States as the overall winner in the bipolar struggle. However, the entire state system was thrown into confusion and disarray, making the early years of the post-communist period rather uncertain — an inevitable consequence of the global nature of the Cold War.

China played a significant role in the Cold War and in balancing relations between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. The Cold War was the context in which China re-emerged as an important power, regrouping forces around common ideas. After the fall of the communist wall in Europe and the demise of the U.S.S.R., China remained the single most important communist country in the world and is currently ranked the second-largest economy, after the United States, with an average economic growth of roughly 10% over the last decade. However, in order to fully understand how China reached this status, and to grasp the relationship it has with the United States in particular, it is essential to consider the Cold War period — and most importantly the role President Nixon and his Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, played in unlocking the diplomatic stalemate between the U.S. and China, thereby opening the road to broader diplomatic cooperation.

This research focuses on several points. The first takes into account the significant elements of the Cold War and, more precisely, the historical background of the confrontation. This is not intended as a full historical account of the era but rather a description of the elements that determined several key developments, among them the Sino-Soviet split that led to the unlocking of U.S.-China relations. Another point considered is the evolution of Chinese political and economic power during the Cold War and the post-Mao period. This is important because it sets the stage for explaining China's significance to the United States and the necessity of this complicated relationship. Ideological views are also extremely significant for China, resting on extremely solid cultural ground that makes China — although sometimes uncomfortable — relatively predictable, which is crucial in foreign policy. Finally, all these elements lead to a justified American orientation toward China as the pivot of U.S. foreign policy in Asia.

Historical Background: The Cold War, Nixon, and Kissinger

The Cold War can be seen as a particular yet strange phenomenon in the history of humankind. It lacked direct confrontation between the major parties involved, yet it is considered an open conflict, as both the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. used proxy wars, and armed conflict did, after all, occur. From start to finish, politicians and strategic analysts suggested different lines of action, ranging from full confrontation to gradual reduction of tensions and eventually diplomatic resolution. Henry Kissinger advocated both approaches at different moments. In the beginning, he tended to support those willing to confront communism and defend every territory from the ideological threat of the socialist bloc. Alongside Richard Nixon, he developed the shuttle diplomacy that eventually paid off by reopening talks with communist China and giving a new dimension to the Arab-Israeli conflict, which was itself, in part, a fragment of the Cold War.

The proxy wars that took place throughout the Cold War are also a clear example of the global nature of the confrontation. Korea, Vietnam, and Afghanistan in the 1980s were all conflicts deeply infused with ideology, politics, and economics (Kissinger, 1995). The reason the Cold War became a global war lies in the interdependent nature of relations between states and their leaderships.

The historical context of the war also influenced the way it developed. The ideological framework of communism had expanded in Russia and China — two of the most important countries in the world — following the First World War. With China being the most populated country on earth, communism attracted enormous numbers of adherents. The phenomenon expanded accordingly, prompting the West to respond. Due to the escalatory nature of the conflict, it eventually became global and very difficult to stop.

The most important proof of the central roles played by the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. in the Cold War is its aftermath. Once the U.S.S.R. collapsed, the confrontation ended and the victory of capitalism was proclaimed. Countries around the world underwent important revolutionary transitions from communist regimes to democratic ones.

For the Cold War power structure, the question of great-power status was essential because the two most important countries — the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. — were the poles of power that determined how spheres of influence would be divided. China, at the start of this period, was not part of that arrangement. However, in time, it stepped up in terms of economic strength and ideological independence from the U.S.S.R.

The Cold War era demonstrated once again the political dimension of great-power status. Both the U.S. and the Soviet Union had established, by tacit agreement or latent conflict, their respective areas of influence. The U.S. established itself as the upholder of democracy and liberalism, notions it promoted throughout the Free World, while the U.S.S.R., in trying to maintain its great-power status, imposed its communist ideology on Eastern Europe and Third World countries (Kissinger, 1995). This ideological confrontation therefore illustrates the way in which great powers manifest political influence and, in a sense, justify their own reason for being.

In order to reach and maintain great-power status, the military component is rather significant. The most prominent example is the arms race between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. (Hobsbawm, 1996). At the time, it served both as a means to express particular supremacy and as a way to preserve security. This eventually led to the so-called security dilemma (Nye, 2005), which proved the true nature of both great military powers: given their military parity and comparable capabilities, each bloc's security demands effectively required the other's insecurity or destruction. This dynamic also underlined the importance of great powers developing the means to support their claims for supremacy.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, is the economic dimension of great-power leadership. The Cold War era again provides a worthy example. Although scholars did not succeed in anticipating the end of the confrontation, subsequent analysis argues that from the very beginning, the communist economic system was destined to fail because it would eventually suffer an implosion (Calvocoressi, 1996). Therefore, in order to maintain status in the international arena, a competitive economic system capable of providing financial and human resources for both the military and political spheres is essential.

Today, it is rather difficult to determine the precise need of the international system for great powers from a political perspective. The institutionalist perspective on international relations strongly argues that not only is the nation-state no longer the main actor in international affairs, but its status as the essential social structure is being undermined (Karlas, 2006). Realists counter that the state, regardless of size and strength, is in constant search of security. Still, as Barry Buzan suggests, the new threats posed by terrorism, famine, deadly diseases, and global warming can no longer be addressed by national entities alone.

The international political scene is not dominated by a single great power, nor should it be. Most states have engaged in democratic political processes; however, important actors such as China, Russia, and Iran refuse to accept Western-style politics and therefore resist its influence. From a military perspective, the existence of a dominant great power is no longer viable: terrorist groups have become significant actors in international relations and are not controllable factions. At the same time, the Iranian nuclear program, the North Korean nuclear file, and the nuclear capabilities of India and Pakistan create a significant imbalance that attempts at dominance would only exacerbate — a dynamic similar to the Cold War security dilemma. In the economic sphere, nation-states have a diminished role in setting global trends, with multinational corporations increasingly acting as major powers in their own right.

China's Economic Rise and Post-Mao Development

China's economic success since the death of Mao is largely attributable to the post-Mao retention of an authoritarian political system.

The Asian continent has been a center of global attention for decades and is considered one of the most important regions in the world due to its economic, military, and demographic potential. Without doubt, the state with the most impressive evolution in the region is China. Its economic rise has been so spectacular that it has triggered discussions about its geostrategic potential — discussions that, during the Cold War era, had remained largely latent. Today, one can speak seriously about the implications of China's territory (the third largest in the world), its population (the largest in the world), its military might, and its extraordinary labor force.

The current situation of the Chinese economy is largely due to reforms and strategies implemented following Mao Zedong's death. The Maoist period is fairly considered one of the most difficult in Chinese history. Several significant reforms took place at that time, among them the Great Leap Forward; however, the Chinese economy and population suffered greatly from economic setbacks and coercive labor programs.

The changes that followed Mao Zedong's death enabled China to become one of the most important economic powers in the world. A general look at the figures representing the state of the Chinese economy points to the scale of its development starting from 1978 — a milestone for China's emergence as a new economic force, owing to the reform platform Deng Xiaoping outlined. In this sense, "in 1978, it accounted for less than one percent of the world economy, and its total foreign trade was worth $20.6 billion. Today, it accounts for four percent of the world economy and has foreign trade worth $851 billion — the third-largest national total in the world" (Bijian, 2005). This demonstrates the success with which the Chinese government managed to combine its national potential — human resources, natural resources, state funds, and even ideological beliefs — in order to transform an underdeveloped economic system within the capitalist era.

At the same time, it is rather difficult to identify the single key to the Chinese economic phenomenon. Morrison argues in a brief for the U.S. Congress that one of the most difficult challenges facing China is deep social inequality (2006). This is difficult to justify in a country experiencing such high economic growth, suggesting an unhealthy political and social system rooted in clear historical issues.

These issues trace back to the Maoist period and its aftermath. China's geographical, demographic, and political potential placed it ahead of its Asian neighbors. Its military rise came as a result of the combination of economic emergence and its imperial historical past, and it now constitutes an essential element of China's confirmation as a major world force (L'atlas géopolitique, 2002). However, none of this could have been achieved without the political commitment of the communist regime to reestablish the nation's past glory — an element which stimulated the population and gave it the sense of national unity needed to support decisions taken at the central level (Bijian, 2005). All these elements placed together "could make China a superpower" and consequently a challenge to the world's economic system, which is based on principles such as free markets and capitalism (Roy, 1996).

The reforms that swept China from 1978 to 1997, during which an annual gross rate of 9.8% was recorded (Li, n.d.), were marked by acute political changes and setbacks. During the early years of reform, corruption flourished and enabled public spending to reach extraordinary levels — an almost inevitable factor, as the relative freedom that followed Mao's death allowed the political system to engage in less regulated activities.

The success of the reforms in the 1980s and 1990s represented, in fact, a success of the planned economy with less strain on the population. Economic practices became more liberal, even within the framework of the communist party. Although a state-run system remained in place, "the period of readjustment produced promising results, increasing incomes substantially; raising the availability of food, housing, and other consumer goods; and generating strong rates of growth in all sectors except heavy industry, which was intentionally restrained" (Worden, 1987). Thus, the most strategically important sector of the economy remained under state control, with the state refusing to relinquish power over the commanding heights.

An important element of the reform period from 1978 onwards was the state's control over political appointments. More precisely, the CEOs of important state-run factories and industries were always drawn from party ranks (Virmani, 2006). This was a crucial factor because it enabled constant state control over industry. Even as the economy moved in a more liberal direction, the actual management of enterprises was politically determined, allowing strict control of production and exports. In a country with a constantly growing industrial base, this practice provided the necessary framework for continuing the planned economy on essentially capitalist principles.

This constant control over the economy was also reflected in its demands on the population. When the first five-year plan was drafted after 1978, the entire population was required — or even obliged — to contribute by severely reducing personal spending in order to achieve the party's proposed goals. As Virmani notes, given the decentralization of management to the provincial level rather than the center, the state experienced serious revenue losses (2006). Therefore, even with decentralization in place, the state effectively forced the population to contribute individually to the nation's well-being. In few other countries of the world would populations have accepted such a demand; in China, people willingly offered part of their savings for the common good.

The economic reforms of this period helped create a particular social structure that is visible today in China's major cities, where entrepreneurs operate in a relatively friendly atmosphere with the state and foreign investors are common due to the cheap labor force. As opposed to other former communist states, China has largely avoided major reforms at the administrative and economic levels of its state apparatus.

In recent years, events in the Chinese political system have only strengthened the belief that although the Chinese government will continue to support economic reforms, it will not undertake fundamental reforms of its own state apparatus. President Hu Jintao stated on numerous occasions that China would not pursue a democratic transition (BBC, 2004). It is therefore clear that economic reforms alone will not ensure an improved quality of life for the ordinary Chinese citizen.

The future evolution of the Chinese development model within the globalized economy is hard to ascertain. However, if Chinese markets do open further to foreign trade — as WTO guidelines stipulate — an eventual transformation of the political system may become inevitable, largely because external forces will influence the functioning of planned economies.