Panama vs. Haiti Interventions: Media and Public Opinion
This paper compares the U.S. government's handling of the Panama and Haiti military interventions and examines how media framing shaped public opinion in each case. Under President Bush, the media portrayed the Panama intervention positively — depicting soldiers as liberators and Noriega as a villain — generating a clear "rally 'round the flag effect." By contrast, the Haiti intervention under President Clinton received skeptical and dismissive media coverage, undermining White House messaging and preventing any comparable surge in public support. The paper draws on media content, the conditions required for the rally effect, and the contrasting rhetorical strategies of both presidents to explain these divergent outcomes.
- Introduction: Two Interventions, Two Outcomes: Thesis contrasting Panama and Haiti media and public support
- The Panama Intervention and the Rally 'Round the Flag Effect: How media and government created rally effect for Panama
- The Haiti Intervention and Media Skepticism: Skeptical media coverage undermined Clinton's Haiti messaging
- Presidential Rhetoric and Cognition Generation: Bush versus Clinton rhetorical strategies and their outcomes
- Media Framing: Positive vs. Negative Coverage: Contrasting tone and content across both interventions
- Conclusion: Media cooperation key to rally effect occurring
✍️ How to write this paper — guide, tools & examples ▾
What makes this paper effective
- Uses a clear comparative structure, placing two case studies side by side to isolate the variable — media framing — that explains the different public opinion outcomes.
- Grounds the analysis in a specific theoretical concept (the "rally 'round the flag effect") and methodically tests its conditions against each intervention.
- Draws on concrete, observable evidence — anchor tone, on-screen imagery, the diplomatic actors involved — rather than relying solely on abstract claims.
Key academic technique demonstrated
The paper demonstrates applied comparative case analysis: it identifies shared conditions across two events, then explains divergent outcomes by isolating a key difference (media cooperation vs. media opposition). This is strengthened by referencing the specific criteria required for the rally effect, allowing the author to show systematically why one case qualifies and the other does not.
Structure breakdown
The paper opens with a thesis contrasting the two interventions, then examines the Panama case, followed by Haiti, before analyzing presidential rhetoric and media framing in turn. It closes with a brief conclusion restating the central finding. The structure is largely linear and thematic, moving from context to cause to conclusion across roughly six logical sections.
Introduction: Two Interventions, Two Outcomes
Public opinion differed markedly between the U.S. interventions in Panama and Haiti. The Panama intervention was viewed by the public — prompted by the mainstream media — simplistically, as a mission of good guys (the United States) fighting bad guys (Noriega). The Haiti intervention, by contrast, was framed in reverse: the media suggested it was unnecessary and merely a case of President Clinton trying to divert attention from his own political troubles. This paper compares and contrasts the way the government handled the two interventions, examines the rally 'round the flag effect, and explains why that phenomenon emerged during the Panama intervention but not during the Haiti intervention.
The Panama Intervention and the Rally 'Round the Flag Effect
During the Panama intervention under President Bush, the media depicted U.S. soldiers as effectively bringing Christmas and Santa Claus to the Panamanian people (Milburn Panama Video 1, n.d.). The propaganda campaign made it appear as though Noriega was a ruthless dictator who was withholding joy and gifts from children. Panamanians were shown celebrating Christmas and singing in the streets. The "rally 'round the flag effect" was clearly being implemented by the media in conjunction with the U.S. government throughout the intervention.
The government of Noriega was overthrown, the Panama Canal was reopened, and the people were portrayed as liberated. All of the conditions required for the rally 'round the flag effect were in play: increased support for the president (the halo effect), a methodological approach to news dissemination, government control over the media's propagation efforts, a clear crisis situation portrayed in the news, and a situation remote from Americans' everyday experience. These conditions were fully met in the Panama intervention — but not in the Haiti intervention. The effect is, by nature, time-limited and must unfold outside the scope of ordinary American life. That is why the Panama intervention had to be conducted swiftly and conclude with a satisfying, "just-in-time-for-Christmas" ending.
The Haiti Intervention and Media Skepticism
The Haiti intervention was different from a media standpoint alone. The tone of NBC anchor Tom Brokaw during the U.S. intervention in Haiti under President Clinton was, for example, completely different from the coverage of Panama — skeptical, sly, and mocking, with a smirk as he reported that Americans were wondering why Clinton felt the need to send the army into Haiti, and that Haitians themselves showed no signs of being frightened. This indicated that Brokaw, along with the rest of the mainstream media, was not going to support the intervention.
As noted in course materials on the rally 'round the flag effect, the president "must have control over information with which to arouse" the public if he wishes to win support for foreign intervention (Edelman, "Rally 'round the Flag Effect," n.d., slide 9). In the case of Haiti, Clinton did not control the message because the media was not facilitating the narrative the White House wished to deliver. Instead, other prominent figures — former President Carter, Senator Sam Nunn, and Colin Powell — joined a diplomatic effort urging Haitian leaders to accept the country's democratically elected officials. Eventually, these diplomatic efforts, combined with the threat of imminent invasion, succeeded, and Aristide was able to assume his seat as the nation's democratically elected president. The military intervention then became a peacekeeping mission rather than a combat mission.
Conclusion
The government's handling of the U.S. interventions into Panama and Haiti differed markedly, and the media played a decisive role in each case. When the media worked in concert with the White House to generate support for the Panama intervention, a rally 'round the flag effect was clearly produced. This did not occur with the Haiti intervention because the media was not cooperating with the White House. Instead, it actively sought to make Clinton's policies appear foolish and unnecessary, preventing the conditions required for the rally effect from taking hold.
References
Milburn Haiti Video 1. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://psych.umb.edu/Milburn/335/Milburn-PSYCH335-Haiti1.m4v
Milburn Panama Video 1. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://psych.umb.edu/Milburn/335/Milburn-PSYCH335-Panama1.m4v
Rally 'round the Flag Effect. (n.d.). PowerPoint Presentation.
Create your account
Always verify citation format against your institution’s current style guide requirements.