Second Battle of Zhawar: Soviet-Afghan War Analysis

Introduction

"Afghanistan is a country of strong beliefs and traditions in which the population opposes the Soviets and the hostile communist ideology of the government. The communist ideology directly attacked the ethnic structure, community structure, and religious beliefs of the people, and the people violently rejected this ideology" — a rejection that eventually led to one of the most embarrassing defeats in Soviet military history. There were a number of decisive battles where Soviet and DRA forces faltered badly, and the Second Battle of Zhawar stands as a particularly instructive example, partly because of the reliance on poor commanders.

In this battle, LTG Nabi Azimi of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA), which had sided with the Soviets, illustrated his shortcomings as a commander and failed to execute the mission. He had clearly underestimated the Mujahideen fighting force entrenched in the caves around the Ghar Mountains and provided poor guidance to his DRA and Soviet troops.

Background and Strategic Context

At the time of the Second Battle of Zhawar, Mikhail Gorbachev had already publicly promised that he would begin withdrawing Soviet troops from Afghanistan following a series of disheartening losses. The Soviets were under mounting pressure to leave: "They were unable to bring enough force into the country due to public opinion — particularly in the Third World — and their inability to provide the logistics support necessary for a larger force." This ultimately constrained Soviet control over troops and resources at the outset of the battle.

In response to these pressures, "the Soviet high command issued orders to their forces to not get involved in direct combat when possible, but to emphasize security missions, guarding lines of communication and important installations. Simultaneously, they adopted additional measures to strengthen the DRA forces." As a result, the approximately 2,000 Soviet troops who participated in the Second Battle of Zhawar were there only in support of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, and were thus unable to act outside the command boundaries set by LTG Nabi Azimi. Essentially, the full weight of responsibility rested on his shoulders.

The primary mission objective was to capture the region around Zhawar and end the Mujahideen siege on the Khost region by destroying one of their strongest logistical hubs. According to the research, "Zhawar was a Mujahideen logistics transfer base in Paktia Province in the eastern part of Afghanistan." It was flanked by the Sodyaki Ghar and Moghulgi Ghar Mountains, with only a narrow canyon opening to the southeast toward Pakistan. A permanent force of 500 Mujahideen soldiers — known as the "Zhawar Regiment" — defended the base. Though "due to its primary logistic function, the Regiment was not fully equipped for combat," it was nonetheless a credible fighting force. The Zhawar Regiment was also primarily responsible for preventing Soviet forces from flooding across the border into Pakistan. They were equipped with two howitzer guns previously captured from the Soviets, six Chinese-manufactured rocket launchers, and a number of machine guns.

Course of the Battle

The Second Battle of Zhawar began in early February 1986 and lasted until mid-April of that year. It pitted LTG Nabi Azimi against the commander of the Mujahideen forces, Jalaluddin Haqqani. Compared to the first offensive, this battle involved significantly more troops — approximately 12,000 in total, including around 2,000 Soviets under DRA command.

The battle opened with DRA forces attacking the Khost and Gardez districts, an area that had been contested repeatedly since 1981, changing hands on multiple occasions. The DRA's advance was painfully slow, hampered by large numbers of opposing Mujahideen in the region and extremely poor weather conditions.

Once these forces finally reached Zhawar in March 1986, the second phase of the battle commenced with an airborne assault conducted by the Afghan 38th Commando Brigade. A series of Mi-8 helicopters were supposed to deliver the first combat unit, but instead became hopelessly lost and eventually landed in Pakistan, where the crews were taken prisoner. This resulted in the loss of forces that could have materially affected the outcome of the battle. Despite this setback, the main assault continued by air, with Zhawar being attacked by Soviet Su-25 aircraft.

The aerial assault significantly degraded the Mujahideen forces, but the effect was short-lived. The Mujahideen launched a series of counterattacks against Soviet and DRA landing zones. The following days saw intense fighting, during which the DRA 38th Brigade was nearly completely destroyed, losing more than 20 helicopters in the process.

The failure of the original mission prompted Soviet generals to relieve Azimi of command, replacing him with General Valentin Varennikov. With this change in leadership, additional Soviet troops were brought in to intensify both the aerial and ground campaign. Under the new command, Soviet and DRA forces captured Dawri Gar Mountain and eventually drove the Mujahideen out of the region. However, as the Mujahideen retreated, they seeded the mountain passes with landmines and explosives, making the Soviets' movement even more difficult. Despite the heavy toll of taking Zhawar, the Mujahideen recaptured the region shortly thereafter, once again shifting the momentum of the war against the Soviets — returning to attack Zhawar within only days of their withdrawal.

Conclusion

Azimi's poor commanding skills led to the trouble the Soviets and the DRA encountered in the Second Battle of Zhawar, yet this was only the beginning of the end. This battle was, in many respects, a foreshadowing of the inevitable Soviet defeat. As the scholarship makes clear, "the inability of the Soviet military to win the war decisively condemned it to suffer a slow bloodletting, in a process that exposed the very weaknesses of the military as well as the Soviet political structure of society itself." The inexperience of the DRA and the clear incompetence of Azimi as a military leader produced massive losses and operational failures — failures that reflected, in miniature, the strategic bankruptcy of the entire Soviet campaign in Afghanistan.